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Abstract
My thesis studies aspects related to international trade, labour markets and productivity.
The first chapter analyses how countries adjust to the rise of China considering that
labour markets are imperfect. I provide a theoretical framework to structurally quantify
the impact of trade shocks and I find that China’s integration generates overall gains
worldwide. However, in low-tech manufacturing industries in the UK and in the US, which
face severe import competition from China, workers’ real wages fall and unemployment
rises.
The second chapter studies the recent boom in commodities-for-manufactures trade
between China and other developing countries. Brazilian census data show that local
labour markets more affected by Chinese import competition experienced slower growth
in manufacturing wages and in-migration rates between 2000 and 2010. However, locations
benefiting from rising Chinese demand experienced higher wage growth and positive effects
on job quality.
The third chapter suggests a possible explanation for poor productivity after the “Great
Recession” in the UK: Low growth in the effective capital-labour ratio. This is likely to
have occurred because there has been a fall in real wages and increases in the cost of capital
due to the financial crisis. After accounting for (simulated) changes in the capital-labour
ratio, the evolution of total factor productivity appears much more similar to earlier severe
recessions and possibly related to underutilised resources.
The last chapter shows that there is almost no “net decoupling” (the difference in
growth of GDP per hour and average compensation, both deflated by the GDP deflator)
over the past 40 years in the UK, although there is evidence of “gross decoupling” (the
difference in growth of GDP per hour deflated by the GDP deflator and median wages
deflated by a measure of consumer price inflation) in the US and, to a lesser extent, in the
UK.
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Chapter 1
International Competition and
Labor Market Adjustment
1.1 Introduction
It has been recognized that trade openness is likely to be welfare improving in the long-run,
by decreasing prices and allowing countries to expand their production to new markets.
These gains, however, generally neglect important labour market aspects that take place
during the adjustment process, such as displacement of workers in sectors harmed by im-
port competition and the fact that workers do not move immediately to growing exporting
sectors.
In the last decades China has emerged as powerful player in international trade. In
2013, it surpassed the United States of America (US) to become the world’s largest goods
trader in value terms. In this paper I study how countries adjust to the rise of China in a
world with imperfect labour markets.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a tractable framework to structurally
quantify the impact of trade shocks in a world with both search frictions and labour
mobility frictions between sectors. I calculate changes in real income per capita arising
from the emergence of China using numerical methods, both in the new equilibrium and
along the transition period. My calculations take into account not only the benefits but
also account for potential costs linked to labour market adjustments. I find that China’s
integration generate gains worldwide also in the short-run. However, there are winners
and losers in the labour market.
My dynamic trade model incorporates search and matching frictions from Pissarides
(2000) into a multi-country-sector Costinot et al. (2012) framework.1 In this set-up goods
1This is a multi-sector version of Eaton and Kortum (2002) where labour is the solely factor of produc-
tion.
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can be purchased at home, but consumers will pay the least-cost around the world account-
ing for trade costs. Hence, individuals benefit from more trade integration by accessing
imported goods at lower costs. On the other hand, a rise in import competition in a sector
will decrease nominal wages and increase job destruction in this sector. Wages will not be
equal across sectors within countries because of labour mobility frictions, which are added
to the model assuming that workers have exogenous preferences over sectors. To analyze
how all these effects interact following a trade shock I use numerical simulations.
The “China shock” used in my numerical exercise consists of a decrease in Chinese
trade barriers and an increase in Chinese productivity that emulates the growth rate of
China’s share of world exports following China’s entry to the WTO. I find that northern
economies gain from this shock. For example, annual real consumption in the US and
in the United Kingdom (UK) increase by 1.3% and 2.3%, respectively, in the new steady
state compared to the initial one.
The effects of the shock on wages and unemployment are heterogeneous across sectors
within countries. In low-tech manufacturing industries in the UK and in the US, which
face severe import competition from China, workers’ real wages fall and unemployment
rises. The fall in the real average wage in this sector is approximately 1.7% in the US and
0.9% in the UK during the adjustment period five years after the shock. However, at the
same point in time workers in the service sector experience a rise in the real average wage
and no significant change in the unemployment rate: The real average wage in services
increases by approximately 2% in the US and 2.6% in the UK.
The numerical exercise also demonstrates the dynamic effects associated with the rise
of China. Immediately after the shock, nominal wages rise in exporting sectors and fall in
industries facing fierce import competition from China. As workers move from sectors hit
badly by China in search of better paid jobs in other industries, wages in exporting sectors
start to fall due to a rise in labour supply. This implies that wages are lower in the final
steady state than during the transition in these industries. In some import competing
sectors, however, the effects go in the opposite direction: Wages fall immediately after the
shock and recover over time.2
In order to perform counterfactual analysis I estimate a sub-set of the parameters of
the model using country-sector level data. I estimate a gravity equation delivered by the
model using data on bilateral trade flows to obtain the trade elasticity parameter. I also
use equations from my theoretical framework to estimate the parameters related to job
2More precisely, in the low-tech manufacturing sector, wages fall during the first five years after the
shock in the US and during the first six years in the UK before starting to recover. Note also that wages in
import competing sectors hit badly by China will still be lower in the new steady state than in the initial
one.
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destruction and labour mobility frictions between sectors. The remaining parameters are
either calibrated or taken from the literature.
Even though countries experience overall real income gains in my counterfactual exer-
cise, workers in import competing sectors lose from a fall in real wages and an increase in
unemployment not only during the transition but also in the new steady state. Another
prediction from my model is that low-paid (low-productivity) jobs are the ones destroyed
in sectors that experience a negative shock. I validate the qualitative predictions discussed
above by drawing on detailed employer-employee panel data from one developed mid-size
economy, the UK. Quantitative trade exercises usually focus on the US. I also look at the
US in my counterfactuals, but as a very large and rich country, I find it useful to validate
the micro implications of my model on a smaller and more open economy, the UK.
By analyzing the period between 2000 (the year before China entered into the WTO)
and 2007 (the year before the “Great Recession”) I provide support for the three main
predictions discussed, i.e., that more Chinese import competition in an industry: i) de-
crease worker’s earnings; ii) increase worker’s number of years spent out of employment;
iii) has a stronger impact on low-paid workers.3
I find that workers initially employed in industries that suffered from high levels of
import exposure to Chinese products between 2000 and 2007 earned less and spent more
time out of employment when compared to individuals that were in industries less affected
by imports from China. I find a negative and significant effects in terms of both weekly
and hourly earnings, and that workers that received lower wages between 1997 and 2000
(a proxy for skills) experienced higher subsequent employment losses between 2000 and
2007.
Many other papers study the effects of trade openness on labour markets by quanti-
fying theoretical models. However, to my knowledge this is the first paper that explicitly
quantifies the effects of a trade shock, the emergence of China, analyzing all the follow-
ing aspects: general equilibrium effects across countries, the dynamic adjustment path
to a new equilibrium (in a set-up where jobs can be endogenously destroyed) and labour
mobility frictions between sectors.4
An example of a paper that quantifies the effects of a trade shock on labour markets
3My empirical strategy builds on Autor et al. (2013b).
4di Giovanni et al. (2014) evaluate the welfare impact of China’s integration considering a multi-sector,
multi-country framework and also find that welfare increase in developed economies. Levchenko and Zhang
(2013) study not only the aggregate but also the distributional impacts of the trade integration of China
and other developing economies considering factor immobility, finding that reallocation of factors across
sectors contributes relatively little for aggregate gains, but has large distributional impacts. Both papers,
however, consider a static framework with full-employment. Bloom et al. (2014) use a dynamic “trapped
factors” model (with perfect labour markets) to analyze the impact of China’s integration on the growth
rate of OECD countries, finding that it increases the profit from innovation, and hence, the long-run growth
rate.
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is Artuc¸ et al. (2010), where the authors consider a dynamic model with labour mobility
frictions across sectors. They estimate the variance of US workers’ industry switching costs
using gross flows across industries and simulate a trade liberalisation shock. This and other
papers in this literature, however, consider a small open economy set-up, disregarding
general equilibrium effects across countries.5
Another strand of the literature quantifies models in which labour markets are im-
perfect taking into account general equilibrium effects across countries, but usually ignore
multi-sector economies (and consequently that workers do not move freely between sectors)
and are silent about transitional dynamics, due to the static nature of their framework.
The most similar paper to mine in this area is Heid and Larch (2012), that considers
search generated unemployment in an Arkolakis et al. (2012) environment and calculate
international trade welfare effects in the absence of full employment.6
The validation of the predictions of my model also contributes to the literature that
uses worker level information to identify effects of international trade on labour market
outcomes, including out of employment dynamics. Examples are Autor et al. (2013b),
which considers the China shock to identify impacts on labour markets in the US, and
Pfaffermayr et al. (2007), which uses Austrian data to estimate how trade and outsourcing
affect transition probabilities between sectors and/or out of employment states.7
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 I present my model and discuss its most
important implications. In section 3 I structurally estimate a sub-set of the parameters
of the model, explain how to numerically compute my counterfactual exercise and present
its results. In Section 4 I validate the key micro implications of the model using employer-
employee panel data from the UK. I offer concluding comments in Section 5.
5Another interesting study is Dix-Carneiro (2014), which estimates a dynamic model using Brazilian
micro-data to study the adjustment path after a Brazilian trade liberalisation episode in the nineties. Utar
(2011) calibrates a model using Brazilian data to answer a similar question, while Helpman et al. (2012a)
use linked employer-employee data to analyze also the trade effects in this same country, but with a greater
focus on wage inequality. Cosar et al. (2013) and Utar (2006) use Colombian firm level data to estimate
a dynamic model of labour adjustment and study how the economy fairs following an import competition
shock.
6Felbermayr et al. (2013) construct a static one sector Armington model with frictions on the goods
and labour markets and use a panel data of developed countries to verify the predictions of the model.
Felbermayr et al. (2014) builds a dynamic two country one sector model a la Melitz (2003) to study
inequality response to trade shocks in Germany, but consider only a static framework in their calibration
exercise using matched employer-employee data from Germany.
7More broadly, the paper adds to a growing literature on the effects of trade shocks on labour markets,
such as Revenga (1992), Bernard et al. (2006), Topalova (2007), Filho and Muendler (2007), McLaren and
Hakobyan (2010), Bloom et al. (2015), Dauth et al. (2012), Kovak (2013), Autor et al. (2013a) and Costa
et al. (2014).
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1.2 Model
My dynamic trade model incorporates frictional unemployment with endogenous job de-
struction (Pissarides, 2000) into a multi-country/multi-sector Costinot et al. (2012) frame-
work. I also add labour mobility frictions between sectors using some features from Artuc¸
et al. (2010).
The model takes into account that labour markets are imperfect. The economy is
composed of many countries and sectors. Workers without a job can choose the sector in
which to search for employment according to their personal exogenous preferences. Within
a sector, firms and workers have to engage in a costly and uncoordinated process to meet
each other. Each sector produces many types of varieties, and consumers will shop around
and pay the best available price for each type of variety (considering trade costs).
The model is tractable and allows the ability to quantify changes in real income per
capita (my welfare proxy) following a trade shock (the emergence of China) considering not
only the positive aspects associated with cheaper consumption goods but also the potential
negative aspects associated with labour market adjustments. My dynamic framework will
also enable me to study how different groups of workers are affected at different points
in time. I start the section by providing the main components of the model. I then
demonstrate how to compute the equilibrium and discuss some of the implications of the
model.
1.2.1 Set up
In terms of notation, atk,i represents variable ‘a’ in sector k in country i at time t. Some
variables represent a bilateral relationship between two countries. In this case, the variable
atk,oi is related to exporter o and importer i in sector k. Finally, in other cases it will be
necessary to highlight that a variable depends on a worker, on a variety or on a different
productivity level. In such cases, atk,i(l) means that the variable is related to the worker
l, atk,i(j) is a variable associated with the variety j and a
t
k,i(x) is linked to idiosyncratic
productivity x. For the sake of simplicity, I omit the variety index j whenever possible.
Consumers
There are N countries. Each country has an exogenous labour force Li and is formed by K
sectors containing an (endogenous) mass of workers Lti,k and an infinite mass of potential
entrant firms. I assume that heterogeneous family members in each country pool their
income, which is composed of unemployment benefits, labour income, firm profits and
government lump-sum transfers/taxes, and maximize an inner C.E.S, outer Cobb-Douglas
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utility function subject to their income:8
Max
∑
t
∑
k
µi,k

ln
∫ 1
0 (C
t
k,i(j))
dj
(1 + r)t
.
Where k indexes sectors,  = (σ − 1)/σ, σ is the constant elasticity of substitution
(between varieties) and Ctk,i(j) represents consumption of variety j. µi,k is country i’s
share of expenditure on goods from sector k, and
∑
k µi,k = 1. Note that consumers do
not save in this economy. The dynamic effects in the model arise from labour market
features, as shown below.
Labour Markets
Each sector has a continuum of varieties j ∈ [0, 1]. I treat a variety as an ex-ante different
labour market. I omit the variety index j from this point forward, but the reader should
keep in mind that the following expressions are country-sector-variety specific.
Firms and workers have to take part in a costly matching process to meet each other in
a given market. This process is governed by a matching function m(utk,i, v
t
k,i). It denotes
the number of successful matches that occur at a point in time when the unemployment
rate is utk,i and the number of vacancies posted is v
t
k,i (expressed as a fraction of the
labour force). As in Pissarides (2000), I assume that the matching function is increasing
in both arguments, concave and homogeneous of degree 1. Homogeneity implies that
labour market outcomes are invariant to the size of the labour force in the market. For
convenience, I work with θtk,i = v
t
k,i/u
t
k,i, a measure of labour market tightness.
So the probability that any vacancy is matched with an unemployed worker is given
by
m(utk,i, v
t
k,i)
vtk,i
= q(θtk,i),
and the probability that an unemployed worker is matched with an open vacancy is
m(utk,i, v
t
k,i)
utk,i
= θtk,iq(θ
t
k,i).
Workers are free to move between markets to look for a job but not between sectors as
will become clearer later. Unemployed workers receive a constant unemployment benefit
bi. New entrant firms are also free to choose a market in which to post a vacancy and are
8Under the assumption of a “big household” with heterogeneous individuals (employed/unemployed in
different sectors), and that households own some share of firms, household consumption equals its income
Consumptionti = Income
t
i = Wages
t
i + Profits
t
i + UnempBenefits
t
i + Tgov
t
i
The government uses lump-sum taxes/transfers Tgovti to pay unemployment benefits and finance vacancy
costs, as will see later. When the economy is aggregated, I must have that total expenditure in a country
(consumption) will be equal to total revenue obtained with its sales around the world.
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constrained to post a single vacancy. While the vacancy is open they have to pay a per
period cost equals to κ times the productivity of the firm.
Jobs have productivity zk,ix. x is a firm specific component, which changes over time
according to idiosyncratic shocks that arrive to jobs with probability ρ, changing the
productivity to a new value x′, independent of x and drawn from a distribution G(x) with
support [0, 1]. zk,i is a component common to all firms within a variety, constant over time
and taken as given by the firm (I postpone its description until the end of this subsection).
Conditional on producing variety j, each firm can choose its technology level and profit
maximisation trivially implies firms initially operate at the frontier, i.e., all vacancies are
opened with productivity z (at maximum x).
After firms and workers meet, production starts in the subsequent period. Firms are
price takers and their revenue will be equal to ptk,izk,ix. During production periods, firms
pay a wage wtk,i(x) to employees.
When jobs face any type of shock (including the idiosyncratic one), firms have the
option of destroying it or continuing production. Let J tk,i(x) be the value of a filled vacancy
for a firm. Then, production ceases when J tk,i(x) < 0 and continues otherwise. So, job
destruction takes place when x falls below a reservation level Rtk,i, where J
t
k,i(R
t
k,i) = 0.
Defining the expected value of an open vacancy as V tk,i, I can write value functions that
govern firms’ behavior:
V tk,i = −κptk,izk,i +
1
1 + r
[q(θtk,i)J
t+1
k,i (1) + (1− q(θtk,i))V t+1k,i ]. (1.1)
J tk,i(x) = p
t
k,izk,ix− wtk,i(x) +
1
1 + r
[ρ
1∫
Rt+1k,i
J t+1k,i (s)dG(s) + (1− ρ)J t+1k,i (x)]. (1.2)
The value of an open vacancy is equal to the per-period vacancy cost plus the future
value of the vacancy. The latter term is equal to the probability that the vacancy is filled,
q(θtk,i), times the value of a filled vacancy next period, J
t+1
k,i (1), plus the probability that
the vacancy is not filled multiplied by the value of an open vacancy in the future, all
discounted by 1 + r.
I am implicitly assuming that firms are not credit constrained, even though some
papers, e.g. (Manova, 2008), argue that financial frictions matter in international trade.
So, governments will lend money to firms (financed by lump-sum taxes on consumers) as
long as the value of posting a vacancy is greater or equal to zero. The value of a filled
job is given by the per period revenue minus the wage cost plus the expected discounted
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value of the job in the future. The last term is equal to the probability that idiosyncratic
shocks arrive multiplied by the expected value of the job next period, ρ
1∫
Rt+1k,i
J t+1k,i (s)dG(s),
plus the value that the job would have in the absence of a shock times the probability of
such event, (1− ρ)J t+1k,i (x).
U tk,i and W
t
k,i(x) are, respectively, the unemployment and the employment value for a
worker. The value functions governing workers choices are:
U tk,i = bi +
1
1 + r
[θtk,iq(θ
t
k,i)W
t+1
k,i (1) + (1− θtk,iq(θtk,i))U t+1k,i ]. (1.3)
W tk,i(x) = w
t
k,i(x) +
1
1 + r
[ρ(
1∫
Rt+1k,i
W t+1k,i (s)dG(s) +G(R
t+1
k,i )U
t+1
k,i ) + (1− ρ)W t+1k,i (x)]. (1.4)
The unemployment value is equal to the per period unemployment benefit plus the
discounted expected value of the job next period, given that workers get employed with
probability θtk,iq(θ
t
k,i).
The value of a job for a worker is given by the per-period wage plus a continuation
value, which is composed by two terms. First, the worker could get the value that the job
would have in the absence of a shock, W t+1k,i (x), a value that is realised with probability
1 − ρ. If a shock arrives, with probability ρG(Rt+1k,i ) the shock will be sufficiently bad to
drive the worker into unemployment and he/she obtains only U t+1k,i next period. If after
the shock productivity remains above the destruction threshold, then the worker gets on
average ρ
1∫
Rt+1k,i
W t+1k,i (s)dG(s).
Wages are determined by means of a Nash bargaining process, where employees have
exogenous bargaining power 0 < βk,i < 1. Hence, the surplus that accrues to workers
must be equal to a fraction βk,i of the total surplus,
W tk,i(x)− U tk,i = βk,i(J tk,i(x) +W tk,i(x)− U tk,i − V tk,i). (1.5)
Firm Entry and Worker Mobility within a Sector
Remember that workers and firms are free to look for jobs and to open vacancies across
varieties. Hence, at every point in time the unemployment value must be equal for all
varieties that are produced in equilibrium. Because markets are competitive, firms cannot
obtain rents from opening vacancies. This implies that the value of a vacancy will be
equal to zero in any market inside a country. These two conditions can be summarised as
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follows,
U tk,i(j) = U
t
k,i(j
′) (1.6)
V tk,i(j) = V
t
k,i(j
′) = 0, (1.7)
where here I explicitly indicate that the unemployment value and the value of an open
vacancy are ex-ante market specific.
The fact that unemployment values are equalised across different varieties (condition
1.6) implies that ptk,izk,i must be equal across markets that produce in equilibrium. Sup-
pose that there are two varieties j and j′ with distinct values of ptk,izk,i and without loss
of generality, assume that job market tightness is greater in market j, meaning that it is
easier for a worker to find a job there. In this case, ptk,izk,i must be greater in market j
′,
such that the lower probability of finding a job in this market is compensated by higher
wages. However, if this is the case, firms will only be willing to open vacancies in market j,
where they have a higher probability of finding a worker and can pay lower wages. Hence,
the only possible equilibrium is a symmetric one where θtk,i and p
t
k,izk,i are equalised across
varieties inside a sector in a country. Hence, all varieties also have the same labour market
outcomes Rtk,i and u
t
k,i, as well as the same wage distribution. As will be discussed below,
the only variety dependent variable is the price (a sketch of proof is presented in Appendix
1.A).
Worker Mobility between Sectors
Before looking for a job in a particular sector, an unemployed worker must choose a sector,
and in contrast to the variety case, they do not move freely between sectors. I assume that
each worker has a (unobserved by the econometrician) preference νk(l) for each sector,
invariant over time. I further assume that workers know all the information necessary
before taking their decision. Hence, the value of being unemployed in a particular sector
for a worker l, Uˆ tk,i(l), is given by
Uˆ tk,i(l) = U
t
k,i + νk(l).
A high νk(l) relative to νk′(l) means that the worker has some advantage of looking
for jobs in sector k relative to sector k′, for example, because he/she prefers to work in
industry k as it is located in an area where he/she owns a property or his/her family
members are settled. I do not provide a more detailed micro foundation for νk(l) to keep
the model as simple as possible.
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So the probability that a worker will end up looking for job in sector k while unemployed
is given by
Pr(Uˆ tk,i(l) ≥ Uˆ tk′,i(l)) = Pr(νk(l) ≥ ν(l)k′ + U tk′,i − U tk,i). (1.8)
For simplicity, I assume that νk(l) are i.i.d. across individuals and industries, following
a type I extreme value (or Gumbel) distribution with parameters (−γζ, ζ).9 The parameter
ζ, which governs the variance of the shock, reflects how important non-pecuniary motives
are to a worker’s decision to switch sectors. When ζ is very large, pecuniary reasons play
almost no role and workers will respond less to wage (or probability of finding a job)
differences across sectors. In the polar case of ζ going to infinity, workers are fixed in
a particular industry. When ζ is small the opposite is true and workers tend to move
relatively more across sectors following unexpected changes in sectoral unemployment
values.
This assumption implies a tractable way of adding labour mobility frictions to the
model. In my counterfactual exercise, I will be able to analyze how different levels of
mobility frictions influence the impacts on several outcomes following a trade shock. It
also incorporates an interesting effect on the model: It allows sectors with high wages
and high job-finding rates to coexist in equilibrium with sectors with low wages and low
job-finding rates. If there were no frictions (workers were completely free to move) sectors
with higher wages would necessarily have lower job-finding rates (as long as the value of
posting vacancies were equal to zero in both sectors).
Note also from equation 1.5 that I am assuming that the bargaining game in one sector
is not directly affected by the unemployment value in the other sectors. In my model, an
employed individual (or an individual who has just found a job) behaves as if he/she is
“locked-up” in the sector, i.e., his/her outside option at the bargaining stage in sector k
is independent of the preference shocks νk′(l) in all other sectors. If I further assume that
workers also benefit from this preference shock while they are employed, implying that a
worker in sector k gets a total of W tk,i(x) + νk(l), then wages will not depend directly on
the ν’s. This assumption is similar to the one used in Mitra and Ranjan (2010).
Job Creation and Job Destruction
Before workers decide on a sector to look for an open vacancy, job creation and job
destruction take place in this economy:
9The Gumbel cumulative distribution with parameters (−γζ, ζ) is given by S(z) = e−e−(z−γζ)/ζ and I
have that E(z) = −γζ + γζ = 0 and V ar(z) = pi2ζ2/6, where pi ≈ 3.1415 and γ ≈ 0.5772.
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ut+1k,i = u
t
k,i −m(utk,i, vtk,i) + ρG(Rtk,i)(1− utk,i). (1.9)
The unemployment rate in period t+ 1 is equal to the rate at period t reduced by the
number of new matches and inflated by the number of individuals who become unemployed
(all terms expressed as a fraction of the labour force). One implicit assumption is that
the labour force remains constant during this process, i.e., all movement of workers has
already taken place. Notice also that this process takes place at the variety level, but the
fact that the varieties are symmetric will permit me to easily aggregate it up to the sector
level.
International Trade
All goods are tradable. Each variety j from sector k can be purchased at home at price
ptk,i(j) (which is equivalent to the term p
t
k,i used in my description of the labour market, the
only difference being that I now make explicit that it is a country-market specific variable),
but local consumers can take advantage of the option provided by a foreign country and pay
a better price. In short, consumers will pay for variety j the min{dk,oi ptk,o(j); o = 1, ..., N},
where dk,oi is an iceberg transportation cost between exporter o and importer i, meaning
that delivering a unit of the good requires producing dk,oi > 1 units. I assume that
dk,ii = 1 and that is always more expensive to triangulate products around the world than
exporting goods bilaterally (dk,oidk,ii′ > dk,oi′).
In any country i, the productivity component zk,i is drawn from a Frechet distribution
Fk,i(z) = e
−(Ak,i)λz−λ , i.i.d for each variety in a sector. The parameter Ak,i > 0 is related to
the location of the distribution: A bigger Ak,i implies that a higher efficiency draw is more
likely for any variety. It reflects home country’s absolute advantage in the sector. λ > 1
pins down the amount of variation within the distribution and is related to comparative
advantage: a lower λ implies more variability, i.e., comparative advantage will exert a
stronger force in international trade.
As in Eaton and Kortum (2002), the fact that consumers shop for the best price
around the world implies that each country i will spend a share pitk,oi of its income on
goods from country o in sector k. It is not trivial to calculate this share, however. In the
next subsection I will show that some equilibrium properties will deliver relatively simple
expressions for it. For now, I just assume that it is possible to find an expression for these
expenditure shares. In any case markets must clear
Y tk,o =
∑
i′
pitk,oi′Y
t
i′ , (1.10)
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where Y ti′ =
∑
k Y
t
k,i′ is aggregate income in country i
′. Following Krause and Lubik
(2007) and Trigari (2006), I assume that the government pays for unemployment benefits
and vacancy costs through lump sum taxes/transfers. This implies that aggregate income
in a sector is given by the total revenue obtained from sales around the world.
1.2.2 Steady State
I analyze the steady state of the economy, henceforth omitting the superscript “t”. My first
key equation is the Beveridge Curve, the point where transition from and to employment
are equal. I find it by using Equation 1.9 and my definition of θ = v/u. I then obtain
uk,i =
ρG(Rk,i)(1− uk,i)
θq(θk,i)
. (1.11)
From the free entry condition 1.7 above combined with equation 1.1, I can find the
value of the highest productivity job,
Jk,i(1) =
(1 + r)κpk,izk,i
q(θk,i)
. (1.12)
Equation 1.12 is the zero profit condition, which equates job rents to the expected cost
of finding a worker. By manipulating expression 1.2 and using equation 1.12, I obtain the
following expression:
κ
q(θk,i)
=
(1− βk,i)(1−Rk,i)
r + ρ
. (1.13)
This is the job creation condition. It equates the expected gain from a job to its
expected hiring cost. Note that this expression is independent of zk,i and pk,i because
both revenue and costs for the firm are affected by these variables linearly.
I can find a relatively simple expression for wages by combining equations 1.3 and 1.4,
the sharing rule 1.5 and the job creation condition 1.13. It is given by
wk,i(x) = (1− βk,i)bi + βk,ipk,izk,i(x+ κθk,i). (1.14)
Wages are increasing in prices and in the productivity parameters. And the job de-
struction condition can then be derived by manipulating expression 1.2,
bi
pk,izk,i
+
βk,iκθk,i
1− βk,i = Rk,i +
ρ
r + ρ
1∫
Rk,i
(s−Rk,i)dG(s). (1.15)
Symmetric varieties will permit me to find relatively simple expressions for the trade
shares of each country around the world. Since the term pk,izk,i is constant across varieties
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and zk,i is a random variable, it must be that the price of each variety is also a random
variable inversely proportional to zk,i. There are some ways to see this. One of them is
to use my wage equation 1.14 to find the highest wage in the sector, wk,i(1), and subtract
from it the lowest wage, wk,i(Rk,i). This will imply that:
pk,i(j) =
1
zk,i(j)
wk,i(1)− wk,i(R)
βk,i(1−Rk,i) =
w˜k,i
zk,i(j)
. (1.16)
w˜k,i is simply a way of writing the slope of the wage profile in the sector. For everything
else constant, a steeper wage profile implies that the wage bill in the country is higher,
and prices will also be higher.
I am now in the position to calculate trade shares around the world. Given iceberg
trade costs, prices of goods shipped between an exporter o and an importer i are a draw
from the random variable Pk,oi =
dk,oi w˜k,o
Zk,o
. The probability that country o offers the
cheapest price in country i is
Hk,oi(p) = Pr(Pk,oi ≤ p) = 1− Fk,o(dk,oi w˜k,o/p) = 1− e−(pAk,o/dk,oi w˜k,o)λ , (1.17)
and since consumers will pay the minimum price around the world, I have that the
distribution of prices actually paid by country i is
Hk,i(p) = 1−
N∏
o′=1
(1−Hk,o′i(p)) = 1− e−Φk,ipλ , (1.18)
where Φk,i =
∑
o′(Ak,o′/dk,o′i w˜k,o′)
λ, is the parameter that guides how labour market
variables, technologies and trade costs around the world govern prices. Each country takes
advantage of international technologies, discounted by trade costs and the wage profile of
each country.
Hence, I can calculate any moment of the price distribution, including the exact price
index for tradable goods in steady state,
Pk,i = γ(Φk,i)
(−1upslopeλ), (1.19)
where γ = [Γ(λ+1−σλ )]
1/(1−σ) and Γ is the Gamma function.
As in Eaton and Kortum (2002), I calculate the probability that a country o provides
a good at the lowest price in country i in a given sector:
pik,oi =
(Ak,o/dk,oi w˜k,o)
λ
Φk,i
. (1.20)
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Eaton and Kortum also show that the price per variety, conditional on the variety
being supplied to the country, does not depend on the origin, i.e., the price of a good that
i actually buys from any exporter o also has the distribution Hk,i(p). This implies that
average expenditure does not vary by country of origin. Exporters with cheaper wages or
with lower trade costs take advantage by exporting a wider range of goods. Because there
is a continuum of goods, it must be that the expenditure share of country i on varieties
coming from o is given by the probability that o supplies a variety to i,
Xk,oi
Xk,i
= pik,oi, (1.21)
where Xk,oi is country i’s expenditure on goods from o, and Xk,i =
∑
o′ Xk,o′i is its
total expenditure in a given sector.
To close the model I have to find an expression for income in country i. Income in the
sector is given by its total revenue10
Yk,o = w˜k,oLk,o(1− uk,o)(G(Rk,o) +
1∫
Rk,o
sdG(s)). (1.22)
The market clearing condition in steady state implies that
Yk,o =
∑
i′
Xk,oi′ =
∑
i′
pik,oi′µk,i′Yi′ . (1.23)
Finally, the Gumbel distribution allows me to calculate a simple expression for the
number of individuals attached to each sector by using expression 1.8. I must have that
the share of workers in each sector equals the probability that a worker is looking for a job
in that sector whenever he/she is unemployed. And it can be shown that this probability
will be equal to:11
Lo,k∑
k′ Lo,k
=
eUk,i/ζ∑
k′ e
Uk′,i/ζ
, (1.24)
where Uk,i =
1+r
r (bi +
βk,i
(1−βk,i)κpk,izk,iθ).
10To calculate production I follow Ranjan (2012). First, note that output changes over time equals
(i) the output from new jobs created at maximum productivity θk,iq(θk,i)uk,i, plus (ii) the output of the
existing jobs that are hit by a shock and survive ρ
1∫
Rk,i
sdG(s), minus (iii) the loss in production due to
destroyed jobs ρQk,i, where Qk,i equals production per worker in the sector. Setting the total change to
zero, I find Qk,i = (1−uk,i)(G(Rk,i) +
1∫
Rk,i
sdG(s)). I then subtract vacancy costs, multiply it by the total
workers and the value w˜k,i in each variety market and integrate over the mass of varieties being produced
to find revenue. The only non-constant term among varieties is the number of workers, that must sum up
to Lk,i. I also use the fact that in Pissarides’ model rescaling the labour force does not affect equilibrium
outcomes.
11See Artuc¸ et al. (2010), online Appendix, for a similar proof.
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To find my steady state equilibrium, note that from the labour market equations (1.11,
1.13 and 1.15) I can find the values of Ri,k, θi,k and ui,k as a function of w˜i,k for every
country and sector. I can then use the trade share equation, also expressed as a function
of w˜i,k, together with my market clearing condition above to find the relative values of
the slope of the wage profile that balance trade around the world. Finally, the labour
force size in each of the sectors can be determined through the equation that determines
the share of unemployed individuals in each sector. Naturally, all these effects take place
simultaneously, and hence, I have to solve the system of non-linear equations described
above to find my endogenous variables.
In short, I use the Beveridge curve (1.11), the job creation (1.13) and job destruc-
tion (1.15) conditions, the market clearing equation (1.23) together with the trade share
expressions (1.20) and the unemployment share condition (1.24), to find my endogenous
variables Ri,k, θi,k, ui,k, w˜i,k, Li,k for al i’s and k’s. There are a total of NxK equations
of the type of Equation 1.23, but only NxK − 1 independent ones. I have to assume that
the sum of all countries’ income is equal to a constant.
1.2.3 Implications of the Model
Consider a rise in productivity (Ak,oi) in a foreign country o or a fall in trade costs (dk,oi)
from the same foreign country to home country i, holding productivity in the home country
fixed. Consumers in the home country will benefit as they have access to cheaper goods
coming from abroad. However, this can also have negative effects in the labour market.
If the demand for goods produced locally fall, prices of local goods will fall, implying that
jobs will have to be destroyed in the home country12 and nominal wages will decrease.
Note that the jobs destroyed in any country-sector following a bad shock are the ones with
low idiosyncratic productivity x. These are the low-paid (low-productivity) jobs in the
sector that become non-profitable after a fall in prices.
The effect on real wages is ambiguous, however. For example, if the rise in productivity
takes place in a sector k in which the home country has a high level of production and
most part of it is exported (meaning that the consumption share µk,i is low in the home
country), real wages will tend to fall at home in sector k, as the benefits from cheaper
prices are small (if µk,i is zero there is no benefit at all) and nominal wages decrease in this
sector as the foreign country increases its market share around the world. On the other
hand, if home country i has a low production level in sector k but has a high consumption
12Note that the assumption that the unemployment benefit b is constant plays an important role in my
model. It will imply that wages will not absorb all the impact from shifts in productivity/prices in the
new equilibrium and, consequently, such shocks will have an effect on the unemployment rate even in the
long-run.
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share in this sector (high µk,i), then real wages will most likely rise as the fall in prices
will tend to be the dominant effect in the home country.
Workers have preferences over sectors in my model. This means that after a trade/productivity
shock some (but not all) unemployed workers will be willing to move from sectors that
experience losses and to start looking for jobs in other sectors. Which sectors lose or
gain in each country will depend on the new configuration of comparative and absolute
advantages around the world following the trade/productivity shock.
The model also delivers interesting dynamic implications that are deeper investigated in
my numerical exercise performed in the next section. After analyzing the results obtained
with my counterfactuals, I test some of the observed partial-equilibrium implications of
the model in Section 1.4 by drawing on detailed worker-level micro-data from one open
developed economy, the UK.
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1.3 Quantification of the Model
My model provides a rich set of mechanisms that are difficult to study analytically. In this
section, I perform a counterfactual numerical exercise to analyze how advanced economies
responded to the emergence of China in a world with imperfect labour markets. This will
allow me to analyze both the transition path to a new equilibrium and the heterogeneous
effects across sectors within countries. My calculations take into account not only that
labour markets are imperfect and that workers do not move freely across sectors, but also
that exporting sectors can gain from more trade with China and that consumers have
access to cheaper imported goods.
In the first part of this section, I estimate three parameters that will be used in my
counterfactual. In the second part, I demonstrate how to obtain the remaining parameters
(either by calibration from data or from previous papers) and the methodology used to
construct my numerical exercise. In the last part, I present the results and conduct a few
robustness tests considering different parameter values.
1.3.1 Structural Estimation
I start by estimating a sub-set of the parameters for the UK (ζ and ρ). Then, I proceed
to estimate the trade elasticity (λ) using bilateral trade flows. The labour share (β), the
expenditure share (µ) and the productivity parameter that drives absolute advantage (A)
will be taken directly from the data. All the other parameters will either be calibrated or
taken from previous papers.
Labour Market Parameters
I estimate the probability of an idiosyncratic shock arriving to a job (ρ) and the parameter
that governs labour mobility frictions across sectors (ζ).
These labour market parameters are estimated only for the UK and used for all other
countries in my counterfactuals. Naturally, it would be more accurate to estimate the
parameters for all the countries considered in the next sub-section, and I recognize that this
approximation may be unsuitable especially for economies that are very distinct, but data
restrictions do not allow me to follow this route and I believe that applying UK parameters
to other countries can still provide important qualitative insights for adjustment dynamics.
Estimating these parameters for other countries is an important topic for future work but
is beyond the scope of this paper.
The data used to estimate labour market variables are from different sources and the
regressions used to obtain ρ and ζ are at the industry level (ISIC3 2-digit), at yearly
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frequency from 2002 to 2007. Total employment, job creation, and job destruction by
industry are from the Business Structure Database (BSD). Unemployment by sector is
obtained from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) micro-data. I assume that unemployed
individuals are attached to the last industry they worked for, and this information is
available in the LFS.13 Wage data are from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings
(ASHE) and vacancy data are from the NOMIS, provided by the UK Office for National
Statistics.
I calculate βk’s as the share of labour costs in value added in each sector in the UK.
They are obtained from firm-level micro-data, the Annual Respondent Database (ARD),
which I aggregate up to the 2-digit ISIC3 level. I set the interest rate r = 0.031 —a value
in the range used by (Artuc¸ et al., 2010) that corresponds to a time discount factor of
approximately 0.97.
I estimate ρ by using the fact that the total number of jobs destroyed in a sector at any
point in time is ρG(Rtk)(1 − utk)Ltk. My empirical job destruction measure is calculated
using the BSD. It is the sum of all jobs lost in an industry either because firms decreased
size or ceased to produce in a particular year. I then run the following industry-level
regression,
ln(JobDestructiontk) = ln(ρ) + ln((1− utk)Ltk) + ln(G(Rtk)) + εtk, (1.25)
and since I do not observe G(), I control for a polynomial function (of 4th degree)
of Rtk (the idiosyncratic productivity threshold below which jobs are destroyed) in the
sector.14 The first column of Table 1.1 shows my OLS result. The second column restricts
the coefficient of ln((1− utk)Ltk) to be equal to one, while column 3 additionally includes
instruments suggested by the model: the lagged right-hand side variables. Observe that
the value of ρ decreases in the 2SLS estimates. The value I use in my counterfactuals
(column 3) corresponds to approximately ρ = 0.0129.
ζ can be found using the shares of workers employed in each sector. My model predicts
that the number of workers increase in a sector whenever wages increase and/or it is easier
to find a job. So, I use an equation that relates increases in the number of employed
individuals to changes in wages and job-finding rates in a sector. To obtain this equation,
13Not all unemployed in the LFS respond to the question related to the last industry of work, so I
assume that the industry share of unemployed individuals is equal to the industry share of unemployed
that actually responded to this question, something that is likely to add measurement error to my estimates.
14I obtain Rtk using ARD. First, I calculate average labour productivity by firm. To adjust for outliers
I windsorize the labour productivity measure per industry, both at the top 99th percentile and at the
bottom 1st percentile. Second, I divide each firm-level labour productivity by the maximum value in the
industry, such that the distribution of productivity in each sector is between zero and one as suggested
by the model. Third, I obtain Rtk as the minimum of the normalised labour productivity measure in each
sector.
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Table 1.1: Estimates of ρ
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS 2SLS
Total Job Destruction
ln(ρ) -2.697** -2.901** -4.342*
(1.228) (1.163) (2.421)
Restricted Coefficients - Yes Yes
Obs 282 282 282
NOTES: ln(ρ) is the constant term in equation 1.25, which has total job destruction as a dependent variable and a
4th degree polynomial function of Rtk and the logarithm of the total number of employed individuals (ln((1−utk)Ltk))
as controls. Yearly data (from 2002 to 2007) at the industry-level (ISIC3 2-digit) obtained from ARD, BSD, NOMIS
and LFS. Column (3) uses the lagged control variables as instrument. Clustered standard errors at the industry-level
in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
I make the strong assumption that the economy is in a different steady state in every year
of my sample.
From the steady state versions of equations 1.3 and 1.4, I can write the following
expression:15
∆ln(Lk) =
1
ζ
∆
JFRkwk(1)
1 + r
+ ψk + ψt + εˆ
t
k, (1.26)
where JFRtk (equivalent to θ
t
kq(θ
t
k) in my model) is the probability of a worker finding
a job in the sector. This is obtained directly as total job creation (from BSD) divided by
the total number of unemployed (calculated using LFS and BSD). wtk(1) represents the
maximum wage in the sector. To account for possible outliers in the data, I use the 95th
percentile of the wages in the industry from ASHE instead of the maximum value. The
estimates consider normalised wage values such that the average in the sample is equal to
1. My results are shown in the table below:
Column 1 shows my OLS estimates, while the second column presents the 2SLS esti-
mates using the lagged value JFRkwk(1) as an instrument. My estimates of ζ are higher
than the ones in Artuc¸ et al. (2010), corresponding to ζ = 36.57 on column 2, the value
that will be used in my counterfactuals. Indeed, in my model this coefficient should be
higher as it captures all the labour movement frictions between sectors, while in their
15First, from 1.3 and 1.4 I can write U tss1k − U tss0k = JFR
tss1
k w
tss1
k (1)
1+r
− JFRtss0k wtss0k (1)
1+r
+ Θ(k, t), where
JFRtk is the job finding rate (equivalent to θ
t
kq(θ
t
k) in my model) and w
t
k(1) is the maximum wage in
the sector. t = tss0 and t = tss1 represent the final and initial steady state, respectively. Θ(k, t) is a
sector-time-level function that depends on present and future variables in the sector, which I approximate
using two distinct fixed effects, one for time and the other for sectors. Obviously this is not a very rich
approximation, but permits me to take a very simple equation to the data, which is obtained by taking
logs and first differences of 1.24 and using the value of U tss1k − U tss0k written above.
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Table 1.2: Estimates of ζ
(1) (2)
OLS 2SLS
Change in the Labor Force
1/ζ 0.032*** 0.027
(0.008) (0.029)
95thPercentile Yes Yes
Obs 285 285
NOTES: ζ is the coefficient of ∆
JFRkwk(1)
1+r
in equation 1.26, which uses the change in the number of workers in
a industry over time as a dependent variable and fixed effects for time and industry as controls. ∆
JFRkwk(1)
1+r
is the difference over time between the product of the job finding rate and maximum wages (calculated as the
95th percentile) in the sector. Yearly data (from 2002 to 2007) at the industry-level (ISIC3 2-digit) obtained from
ASHE, BSD, NOMIS and LFS. Column (2) has the lag of
JFRkwk(1)
1+r
as instrument. Estimates consider normalised
wage values such that the average in the sample is equal to 1. Clustered standard errors at the industry-level in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
paper part of the rigidity is also captured by high fixed moving costs.16 So, using their
estimates in my model would imply that workers are much more mobile than they actu-
ally are, possibly leading my real income per capita calculations to overestimate gains (or
underestimate losses).
Matching Function, Idiosyncratic Productivity and Vacancy Costs
I assume the following constant returns to scale matching function:
m(vtk, u
t
k) = m(u
t
k)
1−δ(vtk)
δ.
I use the estimates from Borowczyk-Martins et al. (2013, Table 1), δ = 0.412. To find
m, I start with an estimate of 0.231 (from the same paper) and adjust the parameter such
that the probabilities of finding workers and vacancies are always between 0 and 1. The
value that will be used is m = 0.19.
In all my counterfactuals I assume that idiosyncratic productivity shocks are uniformly
distributed between zero and one (Ranjan, 2012). This assumption was not used in my
previous estimates. To verify the robustness of my counterfactuals to this and other as-
sumptions I perform additional counterfactual exercises with alternative parameter values.
The parameter κ, the cost of posting vacancies, is also obtained from another paper.
I consider the same value used in Shimer (2005): 0.213.
16Another reason is that in my model this is the elasticity of employed and unemployed workers in the
UK, while in their model they consider only employed individuals in the US. Hence, workers in their model
take into account only wages when moving across sectors, while here workers also look at the probability of
finding a job. Secondly, they consider average wages, while I consider the maximum wage (95th percentile)
as suggested by my model.
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Trade Parameters
The trade elasticity λ is estimated using a gravity equation. First, I obtain bilateral
trade flows from the World Input Output Database (WIOD).17 Information on labour
market characteristics by sector and country comes from the EU KLEMS dataset.18 As
in Costinot et al. (2012), I measure the variation in productivity across countries and
industries using differences in producer price indexes. Producer price data is taken from the
GGDC Productivity Level Database, which is calculated from raw price data observations
at the plant level for several thousand products (often with hundreds of products per
industry, which can be associated with varieties in my model, as in Costinot, Donaldson,
and Komunjer, 2012).19 These prices are aggregated into a producer price index at the
industry level using output data. I use the inverse of this measure as my Atk to identify
the trade elasticity.
All my gravity estimations are based on the year 2005, and 1997 lags are used as
instruments for my productivity parameter Atk (GGDC data is available only for these
two years). To compare my estimates to Costinot et al. (2012), I restrict my sample to the
same 21 developed countries they consider plus China, and I exclude the so called non-
tradable sectors (services). I add China as an importer in all regressions and whenever
possible as an exporter since GGDC (1997) and KLEMS data are not available for this
country.
By taking logs of expression 1.20, I obtain the following gravity equation: ln(Xkoi) =
λln(Ako) + ln(X
k
i /Φk,i)− λln(w˜ko ) + λln(dk,oi).
Following Head and Mayer (2013), I replace ln(Xki /Φk,i) with an importer-product
fixed effect. I do not observe w˜ko .
20 In order to control for the last two terms of the gravity
equation and still be able to identify λ as the coefficient of Atk, I replace their values by
a sector fixed effect, an exporter fixed effect, an importer-exporter fixed effect and a 4th
degree polynomial function of labour compensation, total employment, hourly wage and
labour share for each exporter-sector pair.21 So, I run the following regression at the
sector-exporter-importer-level
ln(Xkoi) = λln(A
k
o) + f¯k,o + χik + χk + χo + χoi + ε¯k, (1.27)
where the χ are the respective fixed effects and f¯k,o is the 4
th degree polynomial of
17See Stehrer et al. (2014) for more details on this database.
18See O’Mahony and Timmer (2009) for details on the methodology used to construct the dataset.
19See Inklaar and Timmer (2008) for more details.
20With the data used in the paper, w˜ko could be recovered only for the UK.
21Including measures for trade costs such as distance, RTA’s and common language do not change the
coefficient values significantly, and it is difficult to interpret their coefficients as they are obtained only
after some fixed effects are dropped. Hence, I choose to omit them.
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exporter labour market variables. The results are shown in the table below:
Table 1.3: Estimates of λ
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Bilateral Trade Flows
λ 1.120*** 1.791*** 1.178*** 4.934***
(0.458) (0.471) (0.331) (1.327)
China as an Exporter Yes - - -
Labor Market Controls - - Yes Yes
Obs 6866 6194 6194 6194
NOTES: λ is the coefficient of the productivity measure Ako in equation 1.27, which uses bilateral trade flows at
the sector level as the dependent variable and fixed effects for industry, importer-sector and exporter fixed effects.
Labour Market Controls is a 4th degree polynomial function of labour compensation, total employment, hourly
wage and labour share for each exporter-sector pair. Data is a cross-section of bilateral trade data in 2005 at the
WIOD industry-level (roughly ISIC3 2-digit). Data obtained from WIOD, KLEMS and GGDC. Column (4) has
the lag of Ako (1997 value) as instrument. Clustered standard errors at the exporter-industry level in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Controlling for labour market characteristics decreases the coefficient, while using
lagged productivity values as instruments increases it considerably. I use the value of
4.934 in my counterfactuals, which is not far from Costinot et al. (2012) estimates.
1.3.2 Counterfactuals
The counterfactuals performed are meant to understand how the rise of China affected
other countries in the world, especially the UK. The trade shock I have in mind is one
whereby Chinese productivity increases (Ak,CHN rises 25%) and all trade costs between
China and the rest of the world fall (dk,oCHN and dk,CHNi fall 25%) in all sectors apart
from services. This shock implies that China’s export shares around the world increases
from 0.12 to 0.2 between the two steady states. This corresponds to a growth of 64%
in China’s share of world exports, a magnitude not very different from the one observed
between 2000 (the year before China joined the WTO) and 2004 in the WIOD data (65%).
So, my shock aims to mimic the four year period following China’s entry into the WTO
in terms of percentage change in the its export share. I study how countries respond to
this shock during the transition to a new steady state.
To calculate the initial equilibrium, I use the parameters estimated in the previous
subsection. My counterfactuals also require values for worker’s labour share (βk,i) and the
size of the labour force in each country, both obtained from the WIOD - Socio Economic
Accounts.22 Labour shares are calculated as labour compensation divided by value added
22Available at http://www.wiod.org/newsite/database/seas.htm.
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(at the same level as the WIOD bilateral trade data, roughly the ISIC3 2-digit industry).23
The expenditure share of each country on goods from a particular sector (µk,i) is calculated
from the WIOD data. The values of βk,i’s and µk,i’s can be seen in the Appendix, Table
1.7.
In my counterfactual exercise, I reduce the number of countries to six due to compu-
tational reasons. The “countries” chosen are China, US, UK, European Union (EU), the
Rest of the World (RoW) Developed and the RoW Developing. The last economies are
an aggregation of the remaining WIOD countries, which were separated in high-income
(Australia, Japan, Canada, South Korea and Taiwan) and low-income countries (Brazil,
India, Indonesia, Mexico, Turkey and Russia). I also aggregate the economy into five sec-
tors: Energy, Agriculture and Mining, Services, and High-Tech, Mid-Tech and Low-Tech
Manufacturing. The manufacturing rank of technology is based on R&D intensity in the
US in 2005 from OECD STAN database. My sector aggregation is given by:
-Energy and Others: Energy, Mining and quarrying; Agriculture, Forestry and fishing;
-Low-Tech Manufacturing : Wood products; Paper, printing and publishing; Coke and
refined petroleum; Basic and fabricated metals; Other manufacturing.
-Mid-Tech Manufacturing : Food, beverage and tobacco; Textiles; Leather and footwear;
Rubber and plastics; Non-metallic mineral products.
-High-Tech Manufacturing : Chemical products; Machinery; Electrical and optical
equipment; Transport equipment.
-Services: Utilities; Construction; Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles
and motorcycles; Retail sale of fuel; Wholesale trade; Retail trade; Hotels and restau-
rants; Land transport; Water transport; Air transport; Other transport services; Post and
telecommunications; Financial, real estate and business services; Government, education,
health and other services; Households with employed persons.
The productivity measure (Ak,i) are from the GGDC database (described above). I
aggregate countries and sectors using value added as weights. The productivity parameters
used in the counterfactuals are displayed in Table 1.8, which indicates that China has an
absolute advantage in all the sectors. This advantage is most likely because GGDC is
based on price data, and China provides the cheapest goods globally. This measure does
not take into account, for example, that the UK produces higher quality goods such as
airplanes and more advanced cars. Thus, instead of estimating trade costs, I calibrate an
additional parameter that includes trade costs such that trade shares (pik,oi) are as close as
23I intentionally decrease China’s share of value added in agriculture to the second-highest value in
agriculture, which in this world is 0.32. The original value corresponded to an extremely high value of 0.8
and was generating problems in my numerical simulations.
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possible to the values observed in the WIOD. Put another way, I substitute for dk,oi (the
iceberg trade cost described previously) in all my expressions using d¯k,oi = dk,oi ∗ ωk,oi,
where ωk,oi is an unobserved component that accounts, for example, for quality difference
across countries. Then, I calibrate the d¯k,oi’s such that trade shares are as close as possible
to the ones observed in the data. The fact that trade costs are not identified does not play
a large role in my counterfactuals, since I am interested in their relative changes (and also
in relative income changes).24
In my initial steady state equilibrium, I set the unemployment benefit (bi) to a fraction
of the average wage in each country: UK 0.36, China 0.18, US 0.4, EU 0.5, RoW Developed
0.5 and RoW Developing 0.14.25 These values will be fixed throughout my counterfactual
exercises, as described in the model. This assumption is not innocuous. It will imply that
wages will not absorb all the impact from shifts in productivity/prices, and consequently,
such shocks will have an effect on the unemployment rate.
My parameter ζ is held as 36.57 times the average wage in each country in the initial
equilibrium, and then kept fixed as well.26 The summary of all the parameters used are
in Table 1.4.
I am then able to find the values of Rk,i, uk,i, θk,i, w˜k,i and Lk,i in my initial steady
state. The model performs relatively well in terms of fitting the size of the labour force in
each sector.27
Details about the method used to compute the transition path can be found in the
Appendix (Subsection 1.B.2). The objective is to find a rational expectations path between
the initial and the final steady state. I use a type of multiple shooting algorithm that builds
on Artuc¸ et al. (2010) and Lipton et al. (1982). In my algorithm I have to assume a certain
number of years for the transition period to occur.28 I consider 25 years in my numerical
exercises, but the higher the number of years assumed the closer the variables of the system
24I also assume that d¯k,oo = 1 for all countries, as I am able to calibrate only relative values for d¯’s. One
consequence of calibrating trade costs this way is that China and the RoW developing will have access
to the cheapest goods in the world because they are produced by these two countries and their exporting
costs are relatively high. This implies that in my initial equilibrium, the rich countries (the UK, US and
Eurozone) have a high expenditure on goods around the world but not necessarily the highest real income.
25These values are based on Munzi and Salomaki (1999) and Vodopivec and Tong (2008), for the UK,
EU, RoW Developed and China. The UK value is relatively low because much of the retained income
after a job loss in the UK does not come from unemployment benefits, as this is quite small (Job Seekers’
Allowance (JSA) nowadays in the UK varies between £57.35 and £113.70 per week and covers a period of
approximately 6 months). The US value is based on Shimer (2005), and the value of RoW developing was
set slightly below that of China. In my initial steady, state unemployment rates are 0.0479, 0.0575, 0.0256,
0.0399, 0.0391 and 0.0235 in the UK, EU, China, US, RoW Developed and RoW developing, respectively.
26This implies that different countries will have different values for this parameters, but all the countries
will have the same labour market frictions as the variance of the unobserved preference over sectors will
be the same in each country.
27The labour force predicted by the model and the labour force observed in the data have a correlation
of 63%.
28Such types of non-linear systems of equations can only be guaranteed to converge asymptotically - see
Lipton et al. (1982).
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are to their new steady state values in the final period of the algorithm. In my numerical
simulations approximately 90% of the real income adjustment has taken place in year 25.
Results
Real income (or real consumption) is defined as Yi/Pi, where Pi is the price index in
country i.29 The analysis will be relative to the initial equilibrium values. Following
several papers in the international trade literature, I use real income per capita as a proxy
for welfare.30
Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of countries’ real income per capita (or real consumption
per capita) over the 25 years following the fall in trade costs and productivity gains in
China. One can see that income instantly increases in all countries, either because the
countries are able to export more to China or because consumers have access to cheaper
goods.31 All countries benefit in the new steady state as well. Chinese citizens experience
large income gains of more than 24% during the transition period (see Figure 1.2).
Some countries, such as the UK and the EU, experience an initial overshooting in real
income (initial gains of approximately 2.4% and 1.3%, respectively). One reason behind
this is that after the shock wages (and prices) do the majority of the “heavy-lifting” in
the short-run to keep markets cleared, as production is rigid (especially upwards) because
it takes time for jobs to be created due to the search and matching frictions in the labour
market. Immediately after the shock, nominal wages rise in the exporting sectors and fall
in the ones facing fierce import competition from China. Hence, the overshooting of wages
accruing to UK/EU workers (together with the fact that consumers have access to cheaper
goods) excessively benefits these countries in the short-run. Other countries such as the
US exhibit an initial jump in real income (1.35%) and then experience an increasing path
toward the new steady state. This is so because the overshooting of wages accruing to
workers is mild or non-existent, generating gains that are lower in the short-run.
Overshooting of nominal wages in a sectors occurs whenever the amount of labour
used in the final steady state is large relative to its initial equilibrium value. If this is the
case, many jobs will have to be created after the shock, and hence, many workers and
firms need to be “attracted” to the sector. This implies an overshooting of job surplus
29The price index is defined as Pi =
∏
k(Pk,i)
µk , where Pk,i = γ(Φk,i)
(−1upslopeλ), and Φk,i =∑
o′(Ak,o′/dk,o′i w˜k,o′)
λ.
30In my setup, a more precise welfare calculation would have to incorporate changes workers’ utility
from switching sectors.
31Itskhoki and Helpman (2014) carefully characterize the transition period following a trade shock with
imperfect labour markets. They also show that countries gain in the short-run because benefits from trade
arise instantaneously after a fall in trade costs.
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Figure 1.1: World Real Income
NOTES: Transition path following an unanticipated fall of 25% in trade costs between China and the world and
a rise of 25% in Chinese productivity in all sectors apart from Services. Real income relative to the initial steady
state equilibrium.
EU : Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Romania, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.
RoW Developed : Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea (south) and Taiwan.
RoW Developing: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey.
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Figure 1.2: China Real Income
NOTES: Transition path following an unanticipated fall of 25% in trade costs between China and the world and
a rise of 25% in Chinese productivity in all sectors apart from Services. Real income relative to the initial steady
state equilibrium.
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immediately after the shock, and hence, in wages.32 The undershooting of wages tends
to be less pronounced and it is more difficult to be observed as job destruction can take
place faster than job creation.33 Hence, real income overshooting takes place in countries
such as the UK because the number of workers initially in sectors that benefit from more
Chinese trade (experiencing overshooting of wages) is sufficiently high (two sectors), while
in countries like the US this is not the case (one sector).
Countries experience different levels of income changes. These levels depend on how the
shock changes comparative advantages around the globe and on countries’ consumption
share (µ in the model) in each sector. For example, after the shock, China’s comparative
advantages tend to increase for manufacturing goods, especially in Low-Tech manufac-
turing. This implies that China will be able to export more goods at cheaper prices. If
a country has a significant amount of resources allocated to the production of Low-Tech
manufacturing products in the initial equilibrium, it will be hurt more severely by China.
This seems to be the case for the RoW Developing, i.e., those with the smallest gain in
real income.
The effects are not only heterogeneous across countries but also across sectors within
countries, as shown in Figures 1.3 and 1.4, which plot the adjustment in real wages in the
UK and in the US, respectively. The only sector that experiences a fall in real wages is
the Low-Tech Manufacturing one. The competition from Chinese imports is so severe in
this area that the positive effects arising from cheaper Chinese goods are not sufficient to
offset the negative effects associated with a fall in demand for UK/US goods. The falls in
wages can be as high as 1.7% in the US and 1% in the UK. It is also interesting to note
that real wages drop and then continue to fall before improving slightly. The rise is mainly
because price indexes increase over time in both countries (and also because conditions in
the sector improve slightly over time).
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 display unemployment by sector in the UK and in the US. Initially,
there is a rise in unemployment in the manufacturing sectors (especially in the Low-Tech
and High-Tech in the UK and in all manufacturing in the US), followed by another jump
downwards. This pattern occurs because after the initial shock, a mass of jobs is destroyed
in these sectors. Then, in period 2, unemployed workers start to move toward sectors in
which conditions are better (Energy and Others in the UK; Services and Energy and Others
32This overshooting also increases the production cost in the sector and help to keep markets clear in
the short-run.
33In addition, because the overshooting of wages happens more frequently, and this implies higher costs
that are passed-through prices, the price indexes will generally decrease over time until the new steady is
reached. This is the case for the US and for the UK, for example.
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in the US).34 The Services industry is almost neutral in terms of labour force change in
both countries. Labour moves toward the Energy and Others sector for two reasons. First,
in the GGDC dataset countries such as the UK and the US have a comparative advantage
in this sector (see Table 1.8).35 Second, China has a high expenditure share in this
sector compared to other countries. So, as China rises, countries with higher comparative
advantages in Energy and Others, including the UK and the US, benefit by sending more
goods to China.
Figures 1.7 and 1.8 display import exposure to China (pi in the model) by sector. One
can see that negative effects in terms of employment and earnings take place in industries
that face stronger import competition from China.
An additional interesting point is illustrated in Figure 1.11 in the Appendix. Wage
inequality, the ratio of the maximum to the minimum wage in the UK, falls after the
trade shock. In import competing sectors, the least productive (worst paid) jobs are the
ones that are destroyed, implying that the intra-sector gap between the minimum and
the maximum wages will close.36 In the exporting sectors, it is possible that the opposite
takes place, i.e., the gap between the minimum and the maximum wage may be widening,
as lower productive jobs can now exist in this sector due to a rise in demand. Overall, the
first effect is the dominant one in the UK, bringing wage inequality down.37 The fall in
wage inequality is small, however.
34Figures 1.9 and 1.10 in the Appendix, which present the relative size of the labour force in each sector
following the trade shock, show more clearly which sectors grow or shrink relative to the initial size of the
labour force.
35Considering the way this database is constructed, one can infer that this may also reflect that goods
in these industries are cheaper.
36This result is common to some models with endogenous job destruction. After a “bad” technology
shock in a sector, the least paid jobs destroyed. This will tend to increase overall productivity in any
country following an increase in import competition. Moreover, this will always decrease wage inequality
within an industry but does not generate clear predictions regarding country overall wage inequality in a
multi-sector case.
37Wage inequality falls considering also another measure, the ratio between the maximum wage and the
unemployment benefit (see Figure 1.12 in the Appendix).
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Figure 1.3: UK Relative Real Wages per Sector
NOTES: Transition path following an unanticipated fall of 25% in trade costs between China and the world and a
rise of 25% in Chinese productivity in all sectors apart from Services. Real wages are relative to the initial steady
state equilibrium.
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Figure 1.4: US Relative Real Wages per Sector
NOTES: Transition path following an unanticipated fall of 25% in trade costs between China and the world and a
rise of 25% in Chinese productivity in all sectors apart from Services.
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Figure 1.5: UK Unemployment per Sector
NOTES: Transition path following an unanticipated fall of 25% in trade costs between China and the world and a
rise of 25% in Chinese productivity in all sectors apart from Services.
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Figure 1.6: US Unemployment per Sector
NOTES: Transition path following an unanticipated fall of 25% in trade costs between China and the world and a
rise of 25% in Chinese productivity in all sectors apart from Services.
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Figure 1.7: UK Import Shares from China by Sector
NOTES: Transition path following an unanticipated fall of 25% in trade costs between China and the world and a
rise of 25% in Chinese productivity in all sectors apart from Services. Real wages are relative to the initial steady
state equilibrium.
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Figure 1.8: US Import Shares from China by Sector
NOTES: Transition path following an unanticipated fall of 25% in trade costs between China and the world and a
rise of 25% in Chinese productivity in all sectors apart from Services.
Robustness
I also verify the robustness of my results to changes in parameters values. With the ex-
ception of the new value of λ, taken from the Costinot et al. (2012) preferred specification,
all the other new parameter values are taken from previous estimates not used in my main
exercise. In my robustness exercises, I consider only the aggregate effects by country and
the effects by sector in the UK only.
For example, reducing labour mobility frictions across sectors (using ζ = 31.25 from
Table 1.2, column 1) indicates that real income levels increase both in the transition and
in the new steady state (see Figure 1.13 in the Appendix), but the difference is small. The
number of workers that decide to relocate to other sectors is also higher. This exercise
suggests that reducing labour mobility frictions allows countries to benefit more from trade
shocks.
Increasing the trade elasticity λ to 6.453, as in Costinot et al. (2012), reduces overall
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income gains, as countries benefit less from differences in comparative advantages around
the world following the shock (see Figure 1.14).
An increase in job destruction (setting ρ = 0.0674 from Table 1.1, column 1) does
not change the aggregate results considerably (see Figure 1.15). However, unemployment
levels are extremely high at every point in time (including the initial steady state), and
the reallocation of workers across sectors is slightly different.
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1.4 Micro Implications of the Model
The previous counterfactual results show that all countries gain from more trade with
China. However, workers in the low-tech manufacturing sector experience a fall in real
wages and a rise in unemployment levels following the emergence of China. This occurs
because in this sector the levels of import competition are strong, and hence, workers
suffer the negative effects from a fall in demand for goods produced domestically. In
this particular case, the negative effects generated by more import exposure to Chinese
products outweighs the positive effects from a fall in consumption prices.
In this section, I test three micro implications of my model using detailed employer-
employee micro-data. I test whether more Chinese import competition: i) decrease
worker’s earnings; ii) increase worker’s number of years spent out of employment; or
iii) has a stronger impact on low-paid workers. The last effect is related to the pattern of
job destruction in my model, i.e., when a sector receives a bad shock (such as high import
competition from China) the low-paid (low-productivity) jobs are destroyed.
Autor et al. (2013a) and Autor et al. (2013b) study the impact of the rise of China on
workers in the US and find that more Chinese import competition negatively affected some
manufacturing industries, reducing their employment level. More imports from China
also reduced manufacturing worker’s earnings. In this section, I build on the latter paper
to investigate how UK workers are affected by more import competition from China.
Quantitative trade exercises usually focus on the US, but as a very large and rich country,
I find it useful to test the predictions of my model on a smaller and more open economy, the
UK. Drawing on detailed UK data also allows me to investigate outcomes not previously
analysed by Autor et al. (2013b), such as hourly earnings. In the rest of the section I
describe the data used in my reduced form analysis. I then present my empirical strategy
and the results obtained by testing the partial-equilibrium implications of the model.
1.4.1 Empirical Strategy
I use a combination of a series of rich data sources in my analysis. At the worker level, my
main dataset is the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE). It is an administrative
dataset containing one per cent of all workers and the sample is based on the last 2 digits
of the National Insurance Number (equivalent to the social security number in the US)
every year since 1997.38 ASHE is a panel dataset and allowed me to extract information
38Information is given considering only a reference period, usually some point in April, and includes
weekly and hourly earnings, as well as the main industry of activity of the workplace. While limited in
terms of personal characteristics compared to other surveys, the responses in ASHE are considered to be
more accurate, because they are provided by employers rather than from the employees themselves. ASHE
covers neither the self-employed nor individuals without payment in the reference period.
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on individuals’ earnings and employment history.
To measure UK exposure to China, I use the same import penetration measure derived
in my model (pik,oi), which is the value of imports from a particular country divided by
UK total expenditure on all goods:
Chinese Import Exposure ≡ ImportschiExpenditure ,
where expenditure equals total imports plus total UK sales (shipments) minus exports.
I construct this measure by combining the Business Structure Database (sales per industry)
and the UN COMTRADE database (imports and exports). More details about these
databases can be found in the Appendix. I consider only China, i.e., I do not include
Hong-Kong and Macao in my import exposure measure.39
Data on sales, exports and imports are at the 4-digit industry-level (ISIC3) and are
expressed in real terms (2005 thousand of GBP) deflated by the most disaggregated Pro-
ducer Price Index (PPI) provided by ONS (4-digit SIC for local production and 2-digit
SIC for imports and exports).40
Table 1.9 in the Appendix shows the import exposure measure in the tradable sec-
tors at the 2-digit ISIC3 industry level (agriculture, mining and manufacturing). The
highest levels of import exposure occurred in the low-tech manufacturing sectors. Figure
1.16 indicates a negative relationship between changes in ln(employment) and changes in
Importschi
Expenditure from 2000 to 2007 at the 4-digit industry level.
41 The fact that employment
falls more in industries more affected by an import shock from China is closely related to
my counterfactual results of Section 1.3.
My identification is motivated by Autor et al. (2013b). I observe workers’ industry of
activity in 2000 and compute its change in import exposure up to 2007. Under a certain
level of mobility frictions between sectors (an assumption in my model), import shocks to
the workers’ initial industry should affect his/her employment and earnings history from
2001 onwards, as workers can spend more time looking for a job in the sector and/or will
observe a fall in earnings while employed. My basic estimation equation is:
ylk01/07 = ylk97/00 + β˜1∆00/07
Importslkchi
Expenditurelk
+ β˜′2Z
lk + lk.
The outcomes I analyze are represented by ylk97/00, which will be one of four possible
39My results in the next subsection do not change substantially if I include these two Special Adminis-
trative Regions.
40Imports and exports deflators are available in two categories: European Union and Non-European
Union flows.
41All my import penetration measures (considering changes or levels) are winsorised at the top 99% and
at the bottom 1%.
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variables for employee l working in industry k (in 2000) in the period 2001 to 2007: i)
Total Working Years - the number of years employed; ii) log of Average Weekly Earnings;
iii) log of Average Hourly Earnings; and iv) log of Total Earnings - which is equal to Total
Working Years multiplied by average annual earnings.42 All earnings measures are in real
terms (2005 as the base year) and winsorised at the top 99% and at the bottom 1%, and
all regressions consider only workers between 17 and 59 years old in the initial period.
The change in import exposure from China between 2000 and 2007 in the worker’s
industry of activity in 2000 is given by ∆00/07
Importslkchi
Expenditurelk
. The measure is industry
specific. The indexes emphasize it corresponds to worker l’s initial industry k.
I select 2001 as my reference point for workers’ outcomes because China joined the
WTO at the end of this same year. China’s trade liberalisation was a gradual process that
started earlier, but to gain access China had to commit to several measures to further
liberalize trade, such as the reduction of importing duties. China’s entry into WTO also
meant that restrictive importing quotas imposed by the European Union (mainly in textiles
and apparel) would be lifted. Finally, the entry of China into the WTO also implied a
considerable reduction in uncertainty for Chinese exporters. Handley and Limao (2013)
show that this reduction in uncertainty in the US indeed contributed to China’s export
boom to the US after the WTO accession.43
The error term, lk, represents unobserved components that affect workers’ outcomes
of interest. This term might be correlated with contemporaneous labour demand shocks in
the UK. To identify the “real China effect” in the UK labour market caused by productivity
gains in China (or falling trade barriers between the two countries), I adopt an instrumental
variable (IV) strategy similar to Bloom et al. (2015). My IV is given by:
IVchi =
Importslk97chi
Expenditurelk97
∆00/07IEchi,world.
To capture the supply driven Chinese effect I instrument using an interaction be-
tween two components. The first one is the industry import exposure to China in 1997
(
Importslk97chi
Expenditurelk97
- time invariant). I normalize this measure by the overall exogenous change
in Chinese import shares (Chinese imports divided by total imports) in the world (exclud-
ing the UK and considering all tradable industries)44 between 2000 and 2007. The identi-
fication assumption is that Chinese exports after 2000 were stronger in industries in which
42Average annual earnings is equal to Average Weekly Earnings multiplied by 52, the number of weeks
in a year.
43Even though tariffs were largely unchanged after 2001, China joining the trading club led the US to
implement the permanent most favored nation (MFN) status in the following year, which ended the annual
threat to impose high tariffs on Chinese goods. China was not subject to such annual reviews in Europe.
On the other hand, China’s negotiations with the EU were completed later than with the US and much
closer to its accession (2000-2001).
44This is simply a normalisation as this component is constant.
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China had higher levels of import exposure to China in 1997. The instrument will suffer
from reverse causality if trade with China and/or UK production in 1997 are affected by
any type of anticipation of post 2000 shocks. To try to mitigate some of these endogeneity
concerns, I add a series of additional controls in my regressions, and I also construct two
different instruments and analyze the robustness of my results to these alternative IV’s -
see Subsection 1.4.3 below.
The vector Z lk contains individual and industry controls, depending on each regression
specification. All my regressions include average hourly earnings, average weekly earnings
and average time employed between 1997 and 2000. Controlling for these lagged variables
mitigates the concern that I am only picking up worker-level heterogeneity associated
with changes in Chinese imports. I am interested to see how individuals with similar pre-
period characteristics (including previous earnings and labour force attachment) working
in industries that are affected differently by China performed between 2001 and 2007 in
terms of employment and earnings.
I control for some worker’s characteristics, in particular age and sex. ASHE does
not provide information on individuals’ education. To compare individuals with similar
educational backgrounds and working in similar jobs, I control for occupation fixed effects
at the 4-digit level. I also control for whether the individual was a part-time worker or a
full-time worker in 2000.
I am interested in comparing individuals in similar industries. To accomplish this
I control for several industry characteristics. I use real (log) industry sales, industry
employment level, and real (log) industry exports to China. To rule out that Chinese
imports are simply capturing a general increase in the trend of UK imports, I also control
for the change in import exposure to China and the rest of the world between 1997 and
1999 and for industry import exposure from the rest of the world in 2000, all at the 4-digit
level. I include a very broad measure of outsourcing in 2000: the share of input costs
in the output value at the 2-digit industry level. This value is obtained from UK input-
output tables. I also control for previous trends in employment by including pre-period
employment growth and pre-period employment changes for two different periods, from
1986 to 1991 (2-digit industry) and from 1994 to 1996 (4-digit industry).
To compare industries with similar levels of technologies, I also include R&D intensity
(investment in R&D normalised by value added), real purchase of computer services and
real investment in machinery at the 4-digit industry level in 2000. These variables are
available at the firm level in the ARD, which I then aggregate to a 4-digit industry average
using sample weights.
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1.4.2 Validation of the Results
I start by testing whether more Chinese imports decreased earnings and/or time out of
employment. Table 1.5 presents my main empirical findings. In all the panels, the first
column is a simple OLS, and the remaining columns are estimated by IV and using a
different set of controls. In particular, I add the lagged dependent variables to all columns
(excluding them only makes the results stronger). “Worker Controls” in columns 3 and
5 represent all the individual-level characteristics described previously, while “Industry
Controls” in columns 4 and 5 encompass the industry-level ones.
Table 1.5 shows that individuals working in industries more exposed to Chinese imports
suffered more negative effects than those who were in industries with a lower exposure.
Each one of the four panels A, B, C and D represent a different dependent variable: Log
of total earnings, total working year, log of average weekly earnings and log of average
hourly earnings, respectively (panels A, C and D exclude individuals with zero years of
employment - see table notes for further details and mean value of dependent variable in
the full sample). In the first column, which presents the OLS results, one can observe that
the coefficients are negative and significant. The IV estimation in column 2 increases the
absolute value of the coefficients, indicating that my OLS estimates in column 1 are biased
toward zero, possibly because labour demand shocks in the UK are positively correlated
with imports from China in this simpler specification without other controls. My first
stages are strong, as indicated by the Kleibergen-Paap statistics (significant at all reason-
able levels) in the lower part of the panels. When I control for worker’s characteristics
in column 3, the coefficients fall but remain significant. This fall is mainly due to the
addition of the 4-digit occupation fixed effects. Controlling for industry characteristics
in column 4 also decreases the coefficients relative to column 2. In column 5, the most
demanding specification that includes the full set of controls, the coefficients are smaller
but remain significant at standard levels, the exception being the coefficient in Panel B.
In column 5, Panel A indicates a negative effect of imports from China on Total
Earnings (defined as the log of the sum of annual earnings between 2001 and 2007).
With the help of Table 1.10 in the Appendix, comparing a worker initially employed
in an industry at the 90th percentile of Chinese import exposure (∆00/07
Importslkchi
Expenditurelk
=
0.079) with a worker employed in an initial industry at the median of Chinese exposure
(∆00/07
Importslkchi
Expenditurelk
= 0.007), column 5 shows that an employee in the 90th percentile
oberved his Total Earnings fall by 4.11% = 100 ∗ (−0.572) ∗ (0.079− 0.007) more than an
employee at the median.
In Panel B, one can see that Chinese import exposure decreases the number of years
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spent on employment (Total Working Years) between 2001 and 2007. In column 4 of this
same panel, a worker initially employed in an industry at the 90th percentile of Chinese
import exposure spent 0.14 = (−2.005) ∗ (0.079 − 0.007) more years without a job when
compared to a worker at the median. The only non-significant result in the table is the
one in column 5 of the same panel.
Panel C presents the effects on Average Weekly Earnings (defined as the log average
of weekly earnings between 2001 and 2007 considering only the years that the individual
was employed). Comparing individuals initially employed in industries at the 90th and at
the median of Chinese import exposure, column 5 shows that the individual in the highly
affected industry earned 2.25% = 100 ∗ (−0.313) ∗ (0.079− 0.007) less when compared to
a worker at the median.
Panel D shows the effects on Hourly Earnings (defined as log average hourly earnings
between 2001 and 2007 considering only the years that the individual was employed).
Comparing the same two groups of workers (90th percentile and median workers), column
5 shows that workers at the 90th percentile earned 1.58% = 100∗ (−0.220)∗ (0.079−0.007)
less. Considering the results presented in Panel B, one can conclude that Chinese exposure
had a greater impact on weekly earnings. This suggests that workers may be working fewer
hours in industries exposed to more Chinese imports.
In sum, Table 1.5 indicates that more import exposure to China significantly decreases
the time spent in employment and real average earnings. This confirms the qualitative
predictions shown in my counterfactuals results in Section 1.3, validating some of the
partial-equilibrium effects predicted by the model.
I now study the effect of Chinese imports on distinct groups of workers in terms of
earnings in the pre-period (1997-2000). I use this as a proxy for the skill level of workers,
assuming that a a low wage implies a low skill level. A rise in import penetration should
have a greater impact on the low-paid workers, especially in terms of employment as
predicted by the model.
My strategy consists of adding an interaction of the change in Chinese import exposure
(2000-2007) with average hourly earnings between 1997 and 2000 (H¯E97/00). If low-paid
workers are more affected in terms of employment and earnings, the coefficient of this
interaction should be positive.
Table 1.6 presents the results. All the columns are estimated using the IV and including
the full set of controls. In column 2, which considers the effects on Total Working Years,
the positive coefficient of the interaction indicate that low-paid workers are more affected
by China in terms of employment, validating this other implication of the model. The
effects on earnings (columns 1, 3 and 4) do not show any clear pattern, and the coefficients
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Table 1.5: Employment and Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel A Total Earnings
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure -0.849*** -1.224*** -0.804*** -1.040*** -0.572**
(0.287) (0.314) (0.240) (0.338) (0.282)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 42.504
∗∗∗ 37.586∗∗∗ 41.109∗∗∗ 36.881∗∗∗
(8.700) (7.37) (9.120) (7.532)
KP F Stat 23.867 26.009 20.319 23.974
Observations 23433 23428 23427 22800 22799
Panel B Total Working Years
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure -2.003*** -2.639*** -2.086** -2.005* -1.459
(0.646) (0.908) (0.886) (1.030) (1.043)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 42.441
∗∗∗ 37.574∗∗∗ 41.256∗∗∗ 37.162∗∗∗
(8.855) (7.514) (9.094) (7.57)
KP F Stat 22.97 25.007 20.582 24.099
Observations 24888 24882 24881 24195 24194
Panel C Average Weekly Earnings
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure -0.422** -0.775*** -0.499*** -0.648*** -0.313**
(0.178) (0.179) (0.150) (0.178) (0.130)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 42.504
∗∗∗ 37.586∗∗∗ 41.109∗∗∗ 36.881∗∗∗
(8.700) (7.37) (9.120) (7.532)
KP F Stat 23.867 26.009 20.319 23.974
Observations 23433 23428 23427 22800 22799
Panel D Average Hourly Earnings
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure -0.343** -0.566*** -0.459*** -0.376** -0.220**
(0.142) (0.175) (0.138) (0.173) (0.112)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 42.505
∗∗∗ 37.598∗∗∗ 41.085∗∗∗ 36.846∗∗∗
(8.704) (7.373) (9.132) (7.542)
KP F Stat 23.845 26.006 20.242 23.87
Observations 23418 23413 23412 22785 22784
HE97/00, WE97/00 and Working97/00 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker Controls No No Yes No Yes
Industry Controls No No No Yes Yes
Nclusters 66 66 66 61 61
NOTES: Panels A, B, C and D respectively represent the following dependent variables for employee i working in
industry j (in 2000) in the period that goes from 2001 to 2007. Panel A) log of Total Earnings - which is equal to
Total Working Years multiplied by average annual earnings [mean in the full-sample = 11.372]). Panel B) Total
Working Years - the number of years employed [mean in the full-sample = 4.540]; Panel C) log of Average Weekly
Earnings [mean in the full-sample = 5.97]); Panel D) log of Average Hourly Earnings [mean in the full-sample
= 2.335]; Panels A, C and D exclude individuals with zero years of employment from 2001 to 2007. Column
1 estimated by OLS and columns 2-5 by 2SLS. Change in import penetration (2000-2007) relative to workers’
industry of employment in 2000. All regressions include average years of employment (Working97/00 ) and average
hourly and weekly earnings (HE97/00 and WE97/00) between 1997 and 2000. “Worker Controls” include sex, age,
occupation fixed effects (4-digit) and a part-time job dummy. “Industry Controls” include pre-period employment
growth and pre-period employment changes for two different periods, from 1986 to 1991 (2-digit industry) and
from 1994 to 1996 (4-digit industry) and a broad outsourcing measure (share of input costs in value added at
the 2-digit industry level); and other 4-digit industry measures such as pre-period change (1997-1999) in import
penetration from China and the rest of the world (RoW); levels of import penetration from the RoW, real (log)
sales, employment level, real (log) exports to China, R&D intensity, real purchase of computer services and real
investment in machinery, all in 2000. Instrument for change in industry Chinese import penetration, IVchi, is equal
to industry import penetration from China in 1997 interacted with the change in Chinese import share in the world
(2000-2007), excluding the UK and considering all tradable industries. Standard errors clustered by industry (ISIC3
- 3-digit) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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are not statistically significant. This suggests heterogeneous effects of Chinese imports on
the unemployment rates of individual workers, not on their wages conditional on having
a job.
Table 1.6: Heterogeneous Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Total Average Average
Total Working Weekly Hourly
Earnings Years Earnings Earnings
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure -1.715 -8.504*** -0.422 0.279
(1.142) (3.059) (0.704) (0.548)
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure ∗HE97/00 0.580 3.596** 0.056 -0.253
(0.601) (1.547) (0.383) (0.306)
HE97/00 0.407*** 0.186** 0.375*** 0.647***
(0.044) (0.089) (0.023) (0.027)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 42.477
∗∗∗ 43.314∗∗∗ 42.477∗∗∗ 42.475∗∗∗
(11.257) (11.267) (11.257) (11.281)
IVchi*HE97/00 39.269
∗∗∗ 39.968∗∗∗ 39.269∗∗∗ 39.234∗∗∗
(7.646) (7.499) (7.646) (7.647)
KP F Stat 12.467 12.507 12.467 12.42
Observations 22799 24194 22799 22784
HE97/00, WE97/00 and Working97/00 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nclusters 61 61 61 61
NOTES: Each column represents a different dependent variable. The last three columns exclude individuals with
zero years of employment from 2001 to 2007. All columns estimated by 2SLS. Change in import penetration (2000-
2007) relative to workers’ industry of employment in 2000. All regressions include average years of employment
(Working97/00 ) and average hourly and weekly earnings (HE97/00 and WE97/00) from 1997 to 2000. “Worker
Controls” include sex, age, occupation fixed effects (4-digit) and a part-time job dummy. “Industry Controls”
include pre-period employment growth and pre-period employment changes for two different periods, from 1986
to 1991 (2-digit industry) and from 1994 to 1996 (4-digit industry) and a broad outsourcing measure (share of
input costs in value added at the 2-digit industry level); and other 4-digit industry measures such as pre-period
change (1997-1999) in import penetration from China and the rest of the world (RoW); levels of import penetration
from the RoW, real (log) sales, employment level, real (log) exports to China, R&D intensity, real purchase of
computer services and real investment in machinery, all in 2000. Instrument for change in industry Chinese import
penetration, IVchi, is equal to industry import penetration from China in 1997 interacted with the change in
Chinese import share in the world (2000-2007), excluding the UK and considering all tradable industries. I also
instrument for the interactions above using this same instrument interacted with average hourly earnings. Standard
errors clustered by industry (ISIC3 - 3-digit) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
1.4.3 Empirical Robustness
In this subsection, I verify whether the micro implications of my model are robust to
different specifications. I also test the implications of the model using BSD firm-level
data.
Alternative IV’s
I make use of another instrument that builds on Bloom et al. (2015). The instrument uses
information on pre-period quotas imposed on Chinese products in textiles and apparel
industries (see the Appendix for a more detailed description of the IV). Table 1.11 shows
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that the results are qualitatively similar to the ones in Subsection 1.4.2, giving further
support to the implications of my model.
The second alternative IV that I construct is a shift-share type of instrument similar
to the one employed by Autor et al. (2013b). It is given by:
˜IV chi =
Importslk97chi
Expenditurelk97
∆00/07IE
lj¯
chi,world,
where ∆00/07IE
lj¯
chi,world is the change in Chinese import exposure (defined as imports
divided by expenditure) in the world (excluding the UK) between 2000 and 2007 in
the worker’s initial 2-digit ISIC3 industry.45 This change in imports is interacted with
1997 Chinese import exposure in the workers’ 4-digit initial industry of employment,
Importslk97chi
Expenditurelk97
. This instrument does not rely solely on pre-existing conditions, and hence,
will not satisfy the exclusion restriction if there are demand or technology shocks that
shift Chinese exports and are common to all countries in the world. For example, the
growth of Chinese imports around the world may only reflect that many countries chose
to diminish employment in low-tech labour-intensive sectors in which China had a compar-
ative advantage, and China simply “filled the gap” in these markets. Table 1.12 indicates
that the qualitative predictions of my model are generally robust to this alternative IV.
For example, comparing the same two groups of workers (90th percentile and median
workers), Panel D, column 5, shows that workers at the 90th percentile earned 4.45%
= 100 ∗ (−0.618) ∗ (0.079 − 0.007) less, and the coefficient is statically significant at 1%
level (standard error of 0.169).46
Alternative Specification
To compare my UK results with those of the US from Autor et al. (2013b), I perform an
exercise in which I use a specification more similar to theirs.47 My estimation equation is
now given by:
wlk01/07/wlk97/00 = β˜1
∆00/07Imports
lk
chi
Expenditurelk00
+ β˜′2Z
lk + lk.
First, I consider in my sample only individuals employed in all fours year between 1997
and 2000 to study only workers with high labour force attachment in the pre-period, as in
Autor et al. (2013b). Second, I use a different measure of Chinese import exposure, which
is now defined as the change in Chinese imports between 2000 and 2007 divided by the
45This measure is constructed using the WIOD database described previously.
46Although this second IV hinges on stronger identification assumptions, this specification also allows
me to add levels of Chinese exposure in 2000 as a control - see columns 4 and 5 of Table 1.12.
47See equation 5 and table 1 in their paper.
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expenditure in the UK in 2000 at the 4-digit ISIC3 level in the worker’s initial industry
of employment in 2000,
∆00/07Imports
lk
chi
Expenditurelk00
. The IV strategy used is the same one from my
main results in Table 1.5, as well as the set of controls Z lk.
The results are displayed in the Appendix, Table 1.13. In this specification the de-
pendent variable (wlk01/07/wlk97/00) is one of four possible outcomes. In Panel A, the
dependent variable is defined as total earnings (not log earnings) between 2001 and 2007
divided by average annual earnings between 1997 and 2000 (Normalised Total Earnings).
In Panel B, Total Working Years is the total number of working years between 2001 and
2007. In Panel C, Normalised Average Weekly Earnings is equal to average weekly earn-
ings between 2001 and 2007 divided by average weekly earnings between 1997 and 2000. In
Panel D, Normalised Average Hourly Earnings is equal to average hourly earnings between
2001 and 2007 divided by average hourly earnings between 1997 and 2000.
The outcomes in Panel A are comparable to the ones in Autor et al. (2013b).From this
point forward, I compare the same groups of workers as they do (75th vs 25th percentiles of
Chinese import exposure). In column 5 the coefficient of 2.641 implies that comparing an
individual initially employed in an industry at the 75th percentile of the Chinese import
exposure measure (
∆00/07Imports
lk
chi
Expenditurelk00
= 0.026) to one at the 25th percentile (
∆00/07Imports
lk
chi
Expenditurelk00
= 0.002), the implied differential in earnings is 6.33% = 100 ∗ (−2.641) ∗ (0.026 − 0.002)
of the worker’s initial earnings. Comparing the same two groups of workers in the US,
Autor et al. find a value of 45.8% for a 16-year period (between 1992 and 2007). When
I divide both coefficients by the number of years used in each analysis (7 and 16), the
effects in the UK and in the US are 0.90% and 2.86%, respectively. This comparison is
interesting as it corroborates my counterfactual results that indicate that US workers in
low-tech manufacturing are also more affected by Chinese imports than employees in the
UK in terms of real earnings.
My results show that employment effects in the UK are strong, whereas Autor et al.
find almost no effect for the US. In Panel B of Table 1.13, column 5, comparing the same
two groups of workers (75th vs 25th percentiles), the implied differential in the number of
years spent out of employment is 0.06 = (−2.486) ∗ (0.026− 0.002), i.e., 0.71 more months
out of employment. In Panel C, the results do not indicate a clear effect on Normalised
Average Weekly Earnings, as the coefficients are not significant and switch signs occasion-
ally. Panel D, however, shows a strong significant effect on Normalised Average Hourly
Earnings, an outcome not analysed by Autor et al. The earnings differential between a
worker at the 75th percentile and one at the 25th is 0.82% of initial hourly earnings.
Hence, the comparisons between the US and the UK indicate that the earnings effect
is stronger in the US, while the employment effect is stronger in the UK. This may be an
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indication that wages are more flexible in the US than in the UK.
Firm-Level Data
In the Appendix, I additionally demonstrate using the BSD firm-level dataset (Table
1.14) that plants in industries that faced more Chinese import exposure shut down more
frequently and/or reduce their size following an import penetration shock. This implies
that the partial-equilibrium effects predicted by my model are robust to firm’s outcomes
as well.
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1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I study how countries responded to the recent rise of Chinese trade. I build
a tractable dynamic trade model that delivers simple expressions and incorporates several
features that are important when studying the welfare impact of trade shocks, namely,
imperfect labour markets, job heterogeneity and partial mobility frictions across sectors.
I structurally estimate the model using country-sector level data to quantify both the
losses associated with labour market adjustments and the gains to consumers generated
by cheaper Chinese goods. My counterfactuals show that a fall in trade barriers between
China and the world benefits all countries not only in the new steady state but also
along the transition period. In import competing sectors, however, workers bear a costly
transition, experiencing lower wages and a rise in unemployment.
I also carry out an empirical analysis using UK employer-employee panel data to
validate the micro implications of my model. Consistent with my model predictions, I
find that employees in sectors highly affected by Chinese imports spent more time out
of employment and experienced a drop in earnings when compared to workers in less
affected sectors between 2001 (the year China joined the WTO) and 2007 (the year before
the Great Recession). I also find that low-paid workers are more affected by Chinese
import exposure.
The results raise important policy questions. The first point is that even facing a
fierce competitor such as China brings benefits to developed economies, implying that any
policy that aims to restrict trade in the name of more protection for workers should be
reconsidered. The trade shock, however, generate winners and losers in the labour market.
Hence, it may be welfare improving finding a way to compensate the losing individuals,
and let the adjustment take place without any type of intervention that hinders trade.
The reader should bear in mind that the gains stemming from trade calculated in
my counterfactuals are likely to be lower bounds, because many other GDP per capita
improving channels associated with trade such as access to cheaper inputs, immigration,
increases in R&D intensity, and vertical production chains, to cite just a few, are not
considered in my analysis.
Finally, my tractable theoretical framework allows for studying other questions that
were beyond the scope of this paper. For example, it is possible to analyze local im-
plications of foreign labour market policies (minimum wage implementation, change in
unemployment benefits and creation/destruction of unions that change workers’ bargain-
ing power).
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Appendix
1.A Theory
I provide a proof sketch for the fact that ptk,izk,i must be equal across markets that produce
in equilibrium (see Sub-subsection 1.2.1). First I will show that this holds in Steady State.
Consider two varieties j and j′ (all the variables associated with variety j′ will be
identified with a “′”). Note that workers are completely mobile across varieties. Then,
using equation 1.3 and condition 1.6 we can write:
θ′k,iq(θ
′
k,i)(W
′
k,i − U ′k,i) = θk,iq(θk,i)(Wk,i − Uk,i). (1.28)
Now, suppose that p′k,iz
′
k,i and pk,izk,i are not equal, and without loss of generality
assume that p′k,iz
′
k,i > pk,izk,i. This implies that the surplus accruing to workers in market
j′ is higher than in market j (W ′k,i−U ′k,i > Wk,i−Uk,i), and that wages paid in market j′
are also higher. Hence, for equation 1.28 to hold we must have that θk,iq(θk,i) > θ
′
k,iq(θ
′
k,i),
which is satisfied if and only if θk,i > θ
′
k,i.
From Pissarides (2000), page 38, we know that the value of posting a vacancy is
increasing in pk,izk,i and we can also see from equation 1.1 that Vk,i is decreasing in θk,i.
Hence, p′k,iz
′
k,i > pk,izk,i and θk,i > θ
′
k,i imply that V
′
k,i > Vk,i. Consequently, condition 1.7
cannot be satisfied and no firm will post vacancies in market j. This shows that for both
markets j and j′ to exist in steady state the equality p′k,iz
′
k,i = pk,izk,i must hold.
To see that this must also hold outside the steady state, we can rewrite 1.28 considering
the time period immediately before the steady state T :
θ′k,i
T−1q(θ′k,i
T−1)(W ′k,i
T − U ′k,iT ) = θT−1k,i q(θT−1k,i )(W Tk,i − UTk,i). (1.29)
Given that I showed that p′k,i
T z′k,i = p
T
k,izk,i must hold in T (implying that W
′
k,i
T −
U ′k,i
T = W Tk,i − UTk,i), for equation 1.30 to be satisfied we must have that θ′k,iT−1 = θT−1k,i .
And from the firm side (using equation 1.1, condition 1.7 and the fact that J ′k,i
T = JTk,i),
the following must hold:
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p′k,i
T−1z′k,i = q(θ
′
k,i
T−1)J ′k,i
T (1)/κ(1 + r) = q(θT−1k,i )J
T
k,i(1)/κ(1 + r) = p
T−1
k,i zk,i. (1.30)
Using the same steps, we can also show that this is valid for any previous period
(T − 2, T − 3, ...). This completes the proof sketch.
1.B Counterfactuals and Robustness
1.B.1 Additional Parameters
Table 1.7: Country-Sector Labour Shares (βk,i) and Expenditure Shares (µk,i)
Agriculture Low-Tech Mid-Tech High-Tech Services
Manufacturing Manufacturing Manufacturing
Panel A: βk,i
UK 0.19 0.75 0.71 0.76 0.59
EU 0.32 0.55 0.61 0.50 0.55
China 0.32 0.34 0.37 0.36 0.41
US 0.27 0.47 0.56 0.64 0.56
RoW Developed 0.13 0.44 0.54 0.52 0.52
RoW Developing 0.18 0.27 0.28 0.32 0.39
Panel B: µk,i
UK 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.79
EU 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.70
China 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.21 0.40
US 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.75
RoW Developed 0.03 0.10 0.07 0.14 0.66
RoW Developing 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.56
NOTES: Panel A shows the labour share of value added in each sector (βk,i) while panel B show the expenditure
share on a particular sector (µk,i). Author’s calculation using WIOD and WIOD - Socio Economic Accounts
database. Data is originally disaggregated by country and industry-level (roughly ISIC3 2-digit).
EU : Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Romania, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.
RoW Developed : Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea (south) and Taiwan.
RoW Developing: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey.
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Table 1.8: Country-Sector Productivity Parameters: Ak,i
Agriculture Low-Tech Mid-Tech High-Tech Services
Manufacturing Manufacturing Manufacturing
UK 1.26 1.02 1.11 1.24 0.89
EU 1.84 1.22 1.54 1.42 1.27
China 2.60 2.97 2.54 2.44 2.98
US 1.79 1.38 1.23 1.20 0.94
RoW Developed 0.70 1.28 1.19 1.44 1.11
RoW Developing 2.51 2.02 2.53 1.31 2.58
NOTES: Author’s calculation using GGDC database. Data is originally disaggregated by country and industry-level
(roughly ISIC3 2-digit). Productivity is the inverse of the producer price index, aggregated into sector/countries
using value added as weights.
EU : Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Romania, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.
RoW Developed : Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea (south) and Taiwan.
RoW Developing: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey.
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1.B.2 Transition
I want to find a set of value functions that is consistent with a path that converges to
the new steady state. First, one can verify that my wage equation 1.14 holds inside and
outside of steady state. Second, V tk,i = 0 will always hold due to the free entry condition.
I will use numerical simulations to find a transition path toward the new steady state.
I am neither claiming that this is the first best path nor the unique one. I am simply
finding one set of value functions compatible with a rational expectations path.
First, I use equation 1.3, substitute for W tk,i(1) − U tk,i using the sharing rule 1.5 and
the value of J tk,i(1) from equation 1.1 (remember that V
t
k,i = 0) to get:
U tk,i = bi +
βk,iκθ
t
k,iw˜
t
k
(1− βk,i) +
U t+1k,i
1 + r
. (1.31)
To find the transition path I use a type of multiple shooting algorithm that builds
on Artuc¸ et al. (2010) and Lipton et al. (1982). Even though this algorithm updates
explicitly only U tk,i, it implies value functions for workers and firms that are consistent
with a rational expectations path (more details below).
The economy is in equilibrium at time t=0. My counterfactuals consider an unantic-
ipated shock where China’s productivity increase 25% and Chinese bilateral trade costs
around the world decrease 25% in all sectors apart from Services at time t=1.
First I calculate the new steady state equilibrium as described in Subsection 1.2.2.
Then I conjecture that the system will converge to a new steady state in a certain amount
of time, say Tss = 25 years.
48 I guess an initial vector of values stk,i for U
t
k,i (for all
countries, sectors and time t = 1 to time t = Tss). This will permit me to use equations
1.13, 1.15 and 1.23 to solve for R1k,i, θ
1
k,i and w˜
1
k,i, noting that L
1
k,i and u
1
k,i are fixed
at this moment.49 Before workers move across sectors, job creation and job destruction
take place and I can calculate the new number of unemployed individuals in each sector
according to equation 1.9. Subsequently, I pin down the share of individuals attached to
each sector from equation 1.24 (remembering that now the value function depends on time)
and unemployed individuals are reallocated according to such shares.50 I proceed to t = 2
and continue like this up to time Tss to find a time path for R
t
k,i, θ
t
k,i, w˜
t
k,i, L
t
k,i and u
t
k,i. I
then update values s˜tk,i of s
t
k,i using equation 1.31, s˜
t
k,i = bi+
βk,iκθ
t
k,iw˜
t
k
(1−βk,i) +
st+1k,i
1+r , and use the
48Note that this type of non-linear systems of equations can only be guaranteed to converge asymptoti-
cally - see Lipton et al. (1982).
49Note that assuming that 1.13, 1.15 and 1.23 hold outside the steady state is an approximation. I later
confirm that this approximation is a reasonable one.
50I am always using the Gumbel distribution to calculate the total number of individuals attached to
each sector and allowing only the unemployed to move such that these shares are satisfied. A possibly more
precise (and more complicated) alternative would be to find the distribution of unemployed individuals
conditional on individuals previous sector choices and then find the share of individuals moving across
sectors.
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assumption that the system is in steady state at Tss, s˜
Tss−1
k,i = bi +
βk,iκθ
Tss−1
k,i w˜
Tss−1
k
(1−βk,i) +
sTssk,i
1+r .
I then compare s˜tk,i to s
t
k,i and if they are close enough according to my tolerance I stop.
Otherwise, I restart the algorithm using my updated values. The algorithm converges
quickly to a high degree of precision. Even though this algorithm updates explicitly only
U tk,i, the transition path found is almost equal to one where I update other value functions
as well.51
I keep Tss always equal to 25, but the higher its value the closer the variables are to
the new steady state counterfactual equilibrium. In my exercises, approximately 90% of
the real income adjustment has already taken place by Tss = 25.
51To verify this I use an algorithm where I update both Jtk,i(1) and U
t
k,i, and W
t
k,i(1) can then be
found by the surplus sharing condition. These value functions, together with the endogenous variables are
sufficient to calculate all other value functions. In this algorithm I do not assume that 1.13, 1.15 and 1.23
hold outside steady state, but the fact that the two transition paths (the one calculated with this algorithm
and the one used in the paper) are almost indistinguishable show this was a reasonable approximation.
The downside of this second algorithm is that it is sensitive to the initial guess, converging only for initial
values of Jtk,i(1) and U
t
k,i around the ones obtained in the final iteration of the first algorithm used in the
paper.
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1.B.3 Labour Movement Across Sectors
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Figure 1.9: UK Relative Labour Force per Sector
NOTES: Transition path following an unanticipated fall of 25% in trade costs between China and the world and a
rise of 25% in Chinese productivity in all sectors apart from Services. Labour force in each sector is relative to the
initial steady state equilibrium.
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Figure 1.10: US Relative Labour Force per Sector
NOTES: Transition path following an unanticipated fall of 25% in trade costs between China and the world and a
rise of 25% in Chinese productivity in all sectors apart from Services. Labour force in each sector is relative to the
initial steady state equilibrium.
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1.B.4 Wage Inequality in the UK
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Figure 1.11: UK Wage Inequality
NOTES: Transition path following an unanticipated fall of 25% in trade costs between China and the world and a
rise of 25% in Chinese productivity in all sectors apart from Services. Wage inequality defined as the ratio between
the maximum and the minimum wage in the UK, considering only employed individuals.
Chapter 1 70
0 5 10 15 20 25
4.485
4.490
4.495
4.500
4.505
4.510
Time
M
ax
 W
ag
e 
to
 U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t B
en
ef
it 
Ra
tio
Figure 1.12: UK Alternative Measure of Wage Inequality
NOTES: Transition path following an unanticipated fall of 25% in trade costs between China and the world and a
rise of 25% in Chinese productivity in all sectors apart from Services. Inequality defined as the ratio between the
maximum wage and the value of unemployment benefit in the UK.
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1.B.5 Counterfactuals Robustness to Changes in Parameters
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Figure 1.13: Change in parameter: ζ = 31.25
NOTES: Transition path following an unanticipated fall of 25% in trade costs between China and the world and a
rise of 25% in Chinese productivity in all sectors apart from Services. Inequality defined as the ratio between the
maximum wage and the value of unemployment benefit in the UK. Legends of Panels B, C and D can be found in
Panel B.
EU : Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Romania, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.
RoW Developed : Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea (south) and Taiwan.
RoW Developing: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey.
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Figure 1.14: Change in parameter: λ = 6.453
NOTES: Transition path following an unanticipated fall of 25% in trade costs between China and the world and a
rise of 25% in Chinese productivity in all sectors apart from Services. Inequality defined as the ratio between the
maximum wage and the value of unemployment benefit in the UK. Legends of Panels B, C and D can be found in
Panel B.
EU : Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Romania, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.
RoW Developed : Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea (south) and Taiwan.
RoW Developing: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey.
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Figure 1.15: Change in parameter: ρ = 0.0674
NOTES: Transition path following an unanticipated fall of 25% in trade costs between China and the world and a
rise of 25% in Chinese productivity in all sectors apart from Services. Inequality defined as the ratio between the
maximum wage and the value of unemployment benefit in the UK. Legends of Panels B, C and D can be found in
Panel B.
EU : Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Romania, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.
RoW Developed : Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea (south) and Taiwan.
RoW Developing: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey.
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1.C Micro Implications of the Model: Data and Results
1.C.1 Data Sources
BSD
To calculate sales per industry, a measure used in my import penetration variable, I use
the Business Structure Database (BSD). It contains information on employment, sales and
industry of activity for almost all business organisations in the UK. The BSD is derived
mainly from the Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR), which is a live register
of data collected by HM Revenue and Customs via VAT and Pay As You Earn records.
The IDBR data are complimented using business surveys from the Office for National
Statistics (ONS). If a business is liable for VAT and/or has at least one member of staff
registered for the Pay as you Earn52 tax collection system, then the business will appear
on the IDBR (and hence in the BSD). Businesses listed on the IDBR accounted for almost
99 per cent of economic activity in the UK around 2004. Only very small businesses (such
as the self-employed) were not found on the register.
ARD
I use another firm data source, the Annual Respondent Database (ARD). The ARD is a
census of large businesses, and a sample of smaller ones.53 The advantage of ARD is that
it encompasses much more detailed information than BSD. Hence, I am able to calculate,
for example, firm’s labour productivity, R&D intensity, wage bill and other important
information used also for the structural estimation of my model in Section 1.3.
UN COMTRADE
Data on exports and imports use in the validation of the micro implications of the model
come from the UN COMTRADE database. It carries information on all bilateral trade
flows between any given pair of countries available at the 5-digit standard international
trade classification revision 3 (SITC3). To create a correspondence between this trade clas-
sification and the industry classification in ASHE, BSD and ARD (5-digit UK standard
industrial classification - UK SIC) I considered a third classification: the 4-digit interna-
tional standard industrial classification revision 3 (ISIC3). Both SITC3 and UK SIC can
be easily aggregated to ISIC3, providing a consistent classification for my analysis.
1.C.2 UK Import Exposure to China
Table 1.9 shows which industries were affected by China between 2000 and 2007 and the
size of those industries in terms of employment in 2000. The greatest increase in import
52PAYE is the system that HM Revenue and Customs uses to collect Income Tax and National Insurance
contributions from employees.
53For more details see http://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue?sn=6644.
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penetration occurred in low-tech manufacturing sectors. Several industries that faced more
Chinese competition had sizeable shares of the labour force in tradable sectors (agriculture,
mining and manufacturing) in 2000. The heavily affected industries are generally linked
to textiles, furniture and machinery production. The sectors that observed lower increase
in import penetration are inside agriculture and mining.
Table 1.9: Industry Employment and Import Exposure
Sector ∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure (
Importschi
Expenditure)00 (Employment Share)00
Wearing Apparel 0.173 0.069 3.21%
Tanning and Dressing of Leather 0.146 0.179 0.6%
Office, Accounting and Computing Machinery 0.097 0.048 1.11%
Radio, Television and Communication Equipment 0.081 0.023 3.04%
Textiles 0.080 0.030 3.48%
Furniture and Manufacturing n.e.c. 0.071 0.063 4.97%
Electrical Machinery 0.034 0.029 4.61%
Machinery and Equipment 0.033 0.015 9.21%
Wood and Cork (except furniture) 0.030 0.010 1.86%
Basic Metals 0.029 0.004 2.40%
Fabricated Metal Products ∗A 0.028 0.020 5.14%
Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 0.023 0.005 3.36%
Rubber and Plastic 0.014 0.020 5.68%
Medical, Optical and Other Instruments ∗B 0.009 0.016 3.61%
Paper 0.009 0.003 2.53%
Forestry and Logging 0.005 0.007 0.25%
Chemicals 0.005 0.007 6.58%
Publishing and Printing ∗C 0.004 0.004 8.20%
Other Transport Equipment 0.003 0.005 3.81%
Other Mining and Quarrying 0.003 0.002 0.87%
Fishing 0.003 0.001 0.28%
Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semi-Trailers 0.002 0.000 5.18%
Mining of Coal and Lignite 0.002 0.004 0.32%
Food and Beverages 0.002 0.001 11.61%
Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 0.000 0.001 0.66%
Tobacco 0.000 0.000 0.22%
Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas 0.000 0.000 0.35%
Agriculture and Hunting -0.000 0.004 6.86%
Total 100%
NOTES: Table considers only tradable industries (agriculture, manufacturing and mining). Changes in Chines
import penetration from 2000 to 2007, Chinese import penetration measure in 2000 and employment shares in 2000
by industry (ISIC3 2-digit). The denominator of this last measure considers only tradable industries.
∗A Excludes machinery and equipment.
∗B Includes watches and clocks.
∗C Includes reproduction of recorded media.
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Figure 1.16: Changes in industry log Employment against Chinese Import Exposure
NOTES: Figure plots changes in employment between 2000 and 2007 against changes in exposure to Chinese imports
in the UK at the 4-digit ISIC3 industry level. All points (and fitted line) consider industry employment size in 2000
as weights. β represents the coefficient of the fitted line (standard error of 0.53).
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1.C.3 Summary Statistics
Table 1.10: Summary Statistics
Average Average Total Total
Hourly Weekly Earnings Working HE97/00 ∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure IVquota
Earnings Earnings Years
Obs 23418 23433 23433 24888 24888 24888 24888
Mean 2.335 5.971 11.372 4.540 2.210 0.025 0.020
Std. Dev 0.467 0.537 0.829 2.124 0.456 0.038 0.099
Min - - - - - -0.014 0
10th Pctile 1.791 5.341 10.227 1.000 1.659 0.000 0.000
50th Pctile 2.281 5.984 11.510 5.000 2.180 0.007 0.000
90th Pctile 2.957 6.600 12.271 7.000 2.798 0.079 0.000
Max - - - - - 0.165 0.603
NOTES: Summary statistics for the full sample of individuals from years 2000 to 2007. Some statistics are omitted
because of data confidentiality reasons.
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1.C.4 Empirical Robustness
I also make use of another instrument based on Bloom et al. (2015). This IV uses the
idea that many Chinese products in the textile industry had importing quotas until China
entered in the WTO (2001). Since these quotas were first implemented in the fifties and
their phased abolition negotiations started in the eighties, it is natural to assume that they
are exogenous to current demand and supply shocks in the UK. As quotas started to be
liberalised, imports in these protected sectors increased significantly. To build my IV I first
calculate the fraction of products54 that were under quota restriction in a given industry
k before the liberalisation phase in the 2000’s. The number of industries under quotas is
extremely small under the ISIC3 classification55, which makes this simple fraction a poor
IV. To add more variability to my instrument, I use the average value of the quota share
in the industries where each worker was between 1997 and 2000. My new IV is given by:
IVquota =
∑
t<2001
quotalkt
T
,
where T is the number of years that an individual was employed between 1997 and 2000
and quotalkt is the share of products that had quotas in worker’s industry of activity at
time t. Clearly this IV has its own issues. Even though I use workers’ pre-period industry
switch, this information may still reflect anticipation to China shocks. In this case my
IV would not be strictly exogenous. Bloom et al. (2015) claim that this anticipation
effect is unlikely to have had larger effects on R&D investment as there was considerable
uncertainty about quota liberalisations at that point.56
The results are not qualitatively different from the ones in Subsection 1.4.2, giving
further support to my findings. The size of the coefficients in Table 1.11 are larger. For
example, the effect on Total Working Years, column 5, implies that an individual in the
90th percentile of import penetration experienced 0.36 more years out of employment when
compared to a median worker. The first stage statistics are slightly weaker than in Table
1.5, but are still significant at standard levels.
54Bloom et al. (2015) use the same idea but have a value weighted share as the instrument.
55The 7 industries with non-zero values and respective quota measures are: 1711 Preparation and spin-
ning of textile fibres (0.51); 1721 Manufacture of made-up textiles (0.068); 1722 Manufacture of carpets
and rugs (0.087); 1723 Manufacture of cordage, rope, twine and netting (0.5); 1729 Manufacture of textiles
n.e.c ( 0.016); 1730 Manufacture of knitted crochet fabrics (0.375); 1810 Manufacturing of wearing apparel
(0.603).
56The authors find no correlation between their quota instrument and pre-period R&D adjustments.
This suggests that this anticipation effect would also be small or nonexistent regarding pre-period labour
adjustments.
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Table 1.11: Employment and Earnings: Industry Quotas as IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel A Total Earnings
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure -0.849*** -1.900*** -1.263*** -1.760*** -1.372***
(0.287) (0.189) (0.182) (0.275) (0.273)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVquota .189
∗∗∗ .164∗∗∗ .193∗∗∗ .174∗∗∗
(.045) (.044) (.046) (.043)
KP F Stat 17.888 13.927 17.579 16.507
Observations 23433 23433 23432 22805 22804
Panel B Total Working Years
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure -2.003*** -4.713*** -4.667*** -5.093*** -5.010***
(0.646) (0.810) (0.924) (1.155) (1.136)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVquota .189
∗∗∗ .165∗∗∗ .193∗∗∗ .175∗∗∗
(.044) (.044) (.046) (.043)
KP F Stat 18.334 13.983 17.851 16.411
Observations 24888 24888 24887 24201 24200
Panel C Average Weekly Earnings
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure -0.422** -1.048*** -0.508*** -0.862*** -0.566***
(0.178) (0.139) (0.095) (0.139) (0.115)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVquota .189
∗∗∗ .164∗∗∗ .193∗∗∗ .174∗∗∗
(.045) (.044) (.046) (.043)
KP F Stat 17.888 13.927 17.579 16.507
Observations 23433 23433 23432 22805 22804
Panel D Average Hourly Earnings
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure -0.343** -0.816*** -0.619*** -0.744*** -0.618***
(0.142) (0.196) (0.159) (0.198) (0.169)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVquota .189
∗∗∗ .164∗∗∗ .193∗∗∗ .174∗∗∗
(.045) (.044) (.046) (.043)
KP F Stat 17.874 13.936 17.565 16.502
Observations 23418 23418 23417 22790 22789
HE97/00, WE97/00 and Working97/00 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker Controls Yes Yes
Industry Controls II Yes Yes
Nclusters 66 66 66 61 61
NOTES: Panels A, B, C and D respectively represent the following dependent variables for employee i working in
industry j (in 2000) in the period that goes from 2001 to 2007. Panel A) log of Total Earnings - which is equal to
Total Working Years multiplied by average annual earnings [mean in the full-sample = 11.372]). Panel B) Total
Working Years - the number of years employed [mean in the full-sample = 4.540]; Panel C) log of Average Weekly
Earnings [mean in the full-sample = 5.97]); Panel D) log of Average Hourly Earnings [mean in the full-sample
= 2.335]; Panels A, C and D exclude individuals with zero years of employment from 2001 to 2007. Column
1 estimated by OLS and columns 2-5 by 2SLS. Change in import penetration (2000-2007) relative to workers’
industry of employment in 2000. All regressions include average years of employment (Working97/00 ) and average
hourly and weekly earnings (HE97/00 and WE97/00) between 1997 and 2000. “Worker Controls” include sex, age,
occupation fixed effects (4-digit) and a part-time job dummy. “Industry Controls” include pre-period employment
growth and pre-period employment changes for two different periods, from 1986 to 1991 (2-digit industry) and
from 1994 to 1996 (4-digit industry) and a broad outsourcing measure (share of input costs in value added at
the 2-digit industry level); and other 4-digit industry measures such as pre-period change (1997-1999) in import
penetration from China and the rest of the world (RoW); levels of import penetration from the RoW, real (log)
sales, employment level, real (log) exports to China, R&D intensity, real purchase of computer services and real
investment in machinery, all in 2000. Instrument for change in industry Chinese import penetration, IVquota, is
the average value of the quota share in the industries where each worker was between 1997 and 2000. Quota share
is the fraction of Chinese products that were under quota restriction in a given industry before the liberalisation
phase in the 2000’s. Standard errors clustered by industry (ISIC3 - 3-digit) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 1.12: Employment and Earnings: Shift-Share IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel A Total Earnings
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure -0.849*** -1.376*** -0.974*** -1.475*** -0.930*
(0.287) (0.301) (0.244) (0.569) (0.550)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 46.78
∗∗∗ 43.821∗∗∗ 41.713∗∗∗ 37.676∗∗∗
(5.977) (6.568) (8.948) (8.508)
KP F Stat 61.256 44.507 21.734 19.608
Observations 23433 23433 23432 22805 22804
Panel B Total Working Years
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure -2.003*** -2.884*** -2.618** -2.849 -2.210
(0.646) (0.802) (0.823) (1.799) (2.038)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 46.901
∗∗∗ 44.08∗∗∗ 41.18∗∗∗ 37.16∗∗∗
(5.952) (6.531) (8.959) (8.587)
KP F Stat 62.085 45.559 21.13 18.727
Observations 24888 24888 24887 24201 24200
Panel C Average Weekly Earnings
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure -0.422** -0.710*** -0.385*** -0.829*** -0.487**
(0.178) (0.175) (0.099) (0.273) (0.224)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 46.78
∗∗∗ 43.821∗∗∗ 41.713∗∗∗ 37.676∗∗∗
(5.977) (6.568) (8.948) (8.508)
KP F Stat 61.256 44.507 21.734 19.608
Observations 23433 23433 23432 22805 22804
Panel D Average Hourly Earnings
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure -0.343** -0.404** -0.324*** -0.357 -0.296
(0.142) (0.167) (0.099) (0.280) (0.196)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 46.829
∗∗∗ 43.903∗∗∗ 41.72∗∗∗ 37.697∗∗∗
(5.974) (6.567) (8.959) (8.521)
KP F Stat 61.445 44.695 21.683 19.571
Observations 23418 23418 23417 22790 22789
HE97/00, WE97/00 and Working97/00 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker Controls No No Yes No Yes
Industry Controls II No No No Yes Yes
Nclusters 66 66 66 61 61
NOTES: Panels A, B, C and D respectively represent the following dependent variables for employee i working in
industry j (in 2000) in the period that goes from 2001 to 2007. Panel A) log of Total Earnings - which is equal to
Total Working Years multiplied by average annual earnings [mean in the full-sample = 11.372]). Panel B) Total
Working Years - the number of years employed [mean in the full-sample = 4.540]; Panel C) log of Average Weekly
Earnings [mean in the full-sample = 5.97]); Panel D) log of Average Hourly Earnings [mean in the full-sample
= 2.335]; Panels A, C and D exclude individuals with zero years of employment from 2001 to 2007. Column
1 estimated by OLS and columns 2-5 by 2SLS. Change in import penetration (2000-2007) relative to workers’
industry of employment in 2000. All regressions include average years of employment (Working97/00 ) and average
hourly and weekly earnings (HE97/00 and WE97/00) between 1997 and 2000. “Worker Controls” include sex, age,
occupation fixed effects (4-digit) and a part-time job dummy. “Industry Controls II” include pre-period employment
growth and pre-period employment changes for two different periods, from 1986 to 1991 (2-digit industry) and from
1994 to 1996 (4-digit industry) and a broad outsourcing measure (share of input costs in value added at the 2-digit
industry level); and other 4-digit industry measures such as pre-period change (1997-1999) in import penetration
from China and the rest of the world (RoW); levels of import penetration from the RoW and from China, real
(log) sales, employment level, real (log) exports to China, R&D intensity, real purchase of computer services and
real investment in machinery, all in 2000. Instrument for change in industry Chinese import penetration, IVchi, is
equal to industry import penetration from China in 1997 interacted with the change in Chinese import share in
the world (2000-2007), excluding the UK and considering the worker’s initial 2-digit ISIC3 industry of employment.
Standard errors clustered by industry (ISIC3 - 3 digit) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 1.13: Normalised Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel A Normalized Total Earnings
∆00/07Importschi
Expenditure00
-1.364 -4.392*** -2.855** -3.624** -2.461
(1.669) (1.184) (1.114) (1.597) (1.547)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 48.028
∗∗∗ 43.616∗∗∗ 45.853∗∗∗ 42.232∗∗∗
(7.594) (6.789) (7.649) (6.693)
KP F Stat 39.995 41.27 35.933 39.809
Observations 20140 20137 20136 19572 19571
Panel B Total Working Years
∆00/07Importschi
Expenditure00
-2.774*** -4.032*** -3.006*** -3.272*** -2.486**
(0.979) (1.004) (0.951) (1.081) (1.151)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 47.931
∗∗∗ 43.505∗∗∗ 45.807∗∗∗ 42.314∗∗∗
(7.707) (6.941) (7.630) (6.694)
KP F Stat 38.673 39.289 36.042 39.954
Observations 21412 21409 21408 20791 20790
Panel C Normalized Average Weekly Earnings
∆00/07Importschi
Expenditure00
0.161 -0.125 0.010 0.073 0.183
(0.206) (0.183) (0.232) (0.306) (0.349)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 48.028
∗∗∗ 43.616∗∗∗ 45.853∗∗∗ 42.232∗∗∗
(7.594) (6.789) (7.649) (6.693)
KP F Stat 39.995 41.270 35.933 39.809
Observations 20140 20137 20136 19572 19571
Panel D Normalized Average Hourly Earnings
∆00/07Importschi
Expenditure00
0.124 -0.266* -0.193 -0.409* -0.344*
(0.246) (0.150) (0.140) (0.215) (0.191)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 48.024
∗∗∗ 43.637∗∗∗ 45.830∗∗∗ 42.210∗∗∗
(7.599) (6.795) (7.657) (6.702)
KP F Stat 39.939 41.240 35.828 39.668
Observations 20124 20121 20120 19556 19555
Worker Controls. No No Yes No Yes
Industry Controls No No No Yes Yes
Nclusters 66 66 66 61 61
NOTES: Panels A, B, C and D respectively represent the following dependent variables for employee i working in
industry j (in 2000) in the period that goes from 2001 to 2007. Panel A) Normalised Total Earnings - total earnings
between 2001 and 2007 divided by average annual earnings between 1997 and 2000 [mean in the full-sample = 5.85]).
Panel B) Total Working Years - the number of years employed between 2001 and 2007 [mean in the full-sample =
4.58]; Panel C) Normalised Average Weekly Earnings - average weekly earnings between 2001 and 2007 divided by
average weekly earnings between 1997 and 2000 [mean in the full-sample = 1.201]); Panel D) Normalised Average
Hourly Earnings - average hourly earnings between 2001 and 2007 divided by average hourly earnings between 1997
and 2000 [mean in the full-sample = 1.162].; Panels C and D exclude individuals with zero years of employment from
2001 to 2007. Column 1 estimated by OLS and columns 2-5 by 2SLS. Change in import penetration (2000-2007)
relative to workers’ industry of employment in 2000. “Worker Controls” include sex, age, occupation fixed effects
(4-digit) and a part-time job dummy. “Industry Controls” include pre-period employment growth and pre-period
employment changes for two different periods, from 1986 to 1991 (2-digit industry) and from 1994 to 1996 (4-digit
industry) and a broad outsourcing measure (share of input costs in value added at the 2-digit industry level); and
other 4-digit industry measures such as pre-period change (1997-1999) in import penetration from China and the
rest of the world (RoW); levels of import penetration from the RoW, real (log) sales, employment level, real (log)
exports to China, R&D intensity, real purchase of computer services and real investment in machinery, all in 2000.
Instrument for change in industry Chinese import penetration, IVchi, is equal to industry import penetration from
China in 1997 interacted with the change in Chinese import share in the world (2000-2007), excluding the UK
and considering all tradable industries. Standard errors clustered by industry (ISIC3 - 3-digit) in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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1.C.5 Firms
Using information from the BSD I also investigate firms’ outcomes that are tightly related
to unemployment and earnings. My empirical approach is similar to the one presented in
Subsection 1.4.1, but i indexes firms instead of workers. My initial time period is still 2000,
but different from the worker analysis I now include new entrants in my sample, i.e., I also
consider firms that entered in any year after (and including) 2001 in some specifications.
I allocate to all firms the same import shock (change in import penetration 2000/2007).
My dependent variables are either: i) Activity Status, a dummy variable equals to 1
if a firm was alive in 2007 and 0 otherwise; or ii) Employment Growth, defined as change
in ln(employment) between 2000 and 2007 considering only surviving plants.
I focus on local units, which is generally equivalent to plant level data. My set of
controls in Table 1.14, “Firm Level Controls”, include enterprise birth date fixed effects
and a dummy for enterprise foreign ownership in the starting period. “Industry Controls”
include the same variables described in the main text.
The results are strong both in the extensive and in the intensive margin of job de-
struction, giving further support to the partial-equilibrium effects generated by my coun-
terfactuals. Looking at the 5th column, a 1 percentage point increase in Chinese import
penetration leads to an increase of 0.96 percentage points in the probability of death of
a firm and to a reduction of 2.256 percentage points in the annual employment growth
between 2000 and 2007. Hence, plants shut down and/or reduce their size following an
import penetration shock.
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Table 1.14: Firms - Local Units
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel A Activity Status
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure -1.670*** -2.021*** -1.364*** -0.998* -0.964*
(0.460) (0.649) (0.313) (0.570) (0.542)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 18.233
∗∗∗ 17.504∗∗∗ 14.345∗∗∗ 14.172∗∗∗
(2.222) (2.552) (1.976) (1.982)
KP F Stat 67.316 47.035 52.702 51.144
Observations 364814 363777 297002 270819 216224
Panel B Employment Growth
∆00/07
Importschi
Expenditure 0.375 -0.335 -1.879*** -1.766*** -2.256***
(0.568) (0.939) (0.509) (0.593) (0.453)
1st Stage(s) Statistics
IVchi 17.602
∗∗∗ 16.587∗∗∗ 13.358∗∗∗ 13.308∗∗∗
(2.822) (3.109) (2.359) (2.351)
KP F Stat 38.909 28.457 32.074 32.03
Observations 124083 123888 123888 73055 73055
Firm Controls No No Yes No Yes
Industry Controls No No No Yes Yes
Nclusters 66 66 66 62 62
NOTES: Estimations considering plant level data. Each panel represents a different dependent variable. Panel A)
Activity Status, a dummy variable equals to 1 if a firm was alive in 2007 and 0 otherwise [mean in the full-sample
= 0.499]; Panel B) Employment Growth, defined as change in ln(employment) between 2000 and 2007 considering
only surviving plants [mean in the full-sample = 1.44]. Panel B considers only surviving plants from 2000 to 2007,
while Panel A considers dead and surviving plants, as well as new entrants. Column 1 estimated by OLS and
columns 2-5 by 2SLS. Change in import penetration relative to plants’ industry of employment in 2000 or plants’
industry in its entry year if plant enters after 2000. “Industry Controls” include pre-period employment growth and
pre-period employment changes for two different periods, from 1986 to 1991 (2-digit industry) and from 1994 to
1996 (4-digit industry) and a broad outsourcing measure (share of input costs in value added at the 2-digit industry
level); and other 4-digit industry measures such as pre-period change (1997-1999) in import penetration from China
and the rest of the world (RoW); levels of import penetration from the RoW, real (log) sales, employment level,
real (log) exports to China, R&D intensity, real purchase of computer services and real investment in machinery, all
in 2000. “Firm Controls” include enterprise birth date fixed effects and a dummy for enterprise foreign ownership
in the starting period. Instrument for change in industry Chinese import penetration, IVchi, is equal to industry
import penetration from China in 1997 interacted with the change in Chinese import share in the world (2000-2007),
excluding the UK and considering all tradable industries. Robust standard errors clustered by industry (ISIC3 -
3-digit) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Chapter 2
Winners and Losers from a
Commodities-for-Manufactures
Trade Boom
2.1 Introduction
China’s recent emergence as a major force in the world economy is one of the largest
economic events of recent times. The combination of China’s exceptionally high rates of
economic growth, its increasingly deep engagement with the rest of the world via inter-
national trade, and the sheer size of its stock of labour, land and capital has generated a
set of economic shocks whose influence stretches worldwide. Much of the attention on the
effects of China on the economies of other countries has focused on the import competition
shock associated with the massive growth of the Chinese manufacturing sector. However,
China is also an increasingly large consumer of goods produced abroad: if China has been
the source of a large supply shock, it must also have been the source of a large demand
shock. We will consider the heterogeneous effects of these supply-side and demand-side
‘China shocks’ on developing-country labour markets, by examining the case of Brazil.
For developing countries, the ‘China demand shock’ has taken a distinctive form: in-
creasingly, outside of the manufacturing supply chains of East and Southeast Asia, the
goods being sent to China by non-high-income countries are products of the agricultural
and extractive sectors. Panel A of Figure 2.1 shows that while there has been a gradual
rise in the share of agricultural and extractive sectors in the exports of non-high-income
countries (excluding those in East and Southeast Asia) to destinations other than China,
the importance of these industries in their exports to China has changed much more dra-
matically, rising from less than 20% in 1995 to nearly 70% in 2010. Meanwhile, developing
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countries’ imports from China have become increasingly concentrated in manufactures:
Panel B of Figure 2.1 shows that the share of products of the agricultural and extractive
sectors in the imports of non-high-income countries from China, already small (6%) in
1995, had dwindled to 1% by 2010. This shift towards a commodities-for-manufactures
trade relationship with China has coincided with a sharp increase in China’s overall im-
portance in developing countries’ foreign trade (Panel A of Figure 2.2).
Just as the import side of this boom in trade with China has often been met with
suspicion by policymakers and commentators concerned about effects on local industry
(see e.g. Economist 2012), China’s rising demand for unglamorous agricultural and mining
products has similarly not always been treated with enthusiasm. Before a visit to China in
2011, Brazil’s president pledged that she would be “working to promote Brazilian products
other than basic commodities,” amid concern that “overreliance on exports of basic items
such as iron ore and soy” might result in ‘de-industrialisation’ (LA Times 2011). Similarly,
a former trade minister of Brazil has spoken of the “need to iron out distortions in the
trade relationship, in which Brazil sells commodities and China manufactures” (Bloomberg
2011).
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Figure 2.1: Evolution of the share of agricultural and extractive sectors in the exports and
imports of non-high-income countries
NOTES: These graphs present the evolution of the share of products of the agricultural and extractive sectors
(agriculture, forestry, fisheries/aquaculture and mining) in the exports and imports of non-high-income countries
(excluding those in East and Southeast Asia) from 1995 to 2010. Sources: CEPII BACI for trade data; definition
of high-income countries from the World Bank.
In our study of Brazil, we examine the changing labour market outcomes of regions
producing manufactures affected by rising Chinese import supply and localities specializing
in raw materials demanded by China. We find that while labour markets in ‘loser’ regions
indeed appear to have suffered from Chinese import competition via slower growth in
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manufacturing wages and rising wage inequality, it is also the case that ‘winner’ regions
have gained from Chinese export demand, through faster wage growth, lower takeup of
social assistance and shifts in the local economy towards ‘good jobs’.
Brazil provides an excellent context for a study of China’s impact on developing coun-
tries’ labour markets for several reasons. First, the importance of China in both the
imports and exports of Brazil has risen steeply in recent years, as seen in Panel B of
Figure 2.2. In 2000, Brazil received approximately 2.3% of its imports by value from
China and sent 2.0% of its exports to China; by 2010, these shares were 14.5% and 15.1%
respectively. Second, the pattern of Brazil-China trade has followed the broad trends out-
lined above for the wider set of non-high-income countries: Brazilian exports to China are
increasingly products of the agricultural and extractive sectors, while Brazilian imports
from China have remained concentrated in manufacturing (see Figure 2.3). Third, Brazil
is particularly large and has a diverse geography, generating a set of local labour markets
that are highly varied in their comparative advantages, and thus allowing for identifica-
tion of the heterogeneous effects of trade with China without relying on cross-country
regressions. Fourth, the Brazilian population census captures a variable of particular rel-
evance in developing countries: informality. This is important both because the informal
sector is large – in Brazil, approximately half of the employed population in 2000 were
either informal salaried workers or self-employed – and because the (de-)formalisation of
labour markets is a potentially important but understudied effect of trade shocks affecting
developing countries.
In order to identify the effects of demand and supply shocks originating from China on
local labour markets in Brazil, we use the shift-share methodology of Bartik (1991), which
has previously been applied to the study of trade shocks by Topalova (2007), Autor et al.
(2013a) and others. This method compares locations with different initial comparative
advantages, tracing the fortunes of regions whose basket of industries has been faced with
steeper increases in Chinese supply or demand, as compared to locations whose indus-
tries have been relatively unaffected by China’s emergence. Because some agricultural,
extractive and manufacturing industries have been affected more than others by China,
we are able to compare regions with identical initial employment shares in each of these
three broad categories. For example, our identification strategy relies on comparisons of
regions with the same share of employment in agriculture in 2000 but different patterns
of specialisation across crops. Our measures of Chinese supply and demand shocks are
based on changes in actual trade flows between China and Brazil, but we instrument for
these variables to ensure that our results capture neither Brazil-specific shocks nor changes
in world prices that are not directly due to China. We also run robustness checks that
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Figure 2.2: Evolution of the share of China in the imports and exports of non-high-income
countries and Brazil
NOTES: Panel A presents the evolution of the share of China in the imports and exports of non-high-income
countries (excluding those in East and Southeast Asia) from 1995 to 2010. Panel B presents the time series of
the share of China in the imports and exports of Brazil from 1995 to 2010. Sources: CEPII BACI for trade data;
definition of high-income countries from the World Bank.
account for the possibility that our results are driven by other region-specific trends.
We consider the changes between 2000 and 2010 in several key characteristics of local
labour markets that can be observed using Brazilian census data: wages, employment
rates, in-migration rates, informality and occupational skill level, along with participation
in one of the largest cash transfer programs in the world, Bolsa Famı´lia. We find that
locations subject to larger increases in Chinese import competition experienced slower
growth in manufacturing wages and in-migration rates during this period, as well as a
greater rise in local wage inequality. Our estimates suggest that for a local labour market
at the 80th percentile of the ‘China supply shock’, wage growth in manufacturing sectors
was lower by 2.4 percentage points over the ten years between 2000 and 2010, while wage
inequality rose by an additional 0.8% relative to average 2000 levels. On the other hand,
the supply shock does not appear to have been associated with a fall in employment rates.
Instead, there is some evidence of a rise in the employment rates of affected locations,
though this appears to have involved a shift in the local structure of employment towards
unskilled jobs in nontraded sectors and a decline in the share of the workforce in skilled
manufacturing jobs.
Meanwhile, in locations more exposed to rising demand from China, average hourly
wages increased more quickly during the period of study: a local labour market at the 80th
percentile of the shock to Chinese demand experienced wage growth in the agricultural
Chapter 2 88
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
Sh
ar
e 
of
 a
gr
icu
ltu
ra
l/e
xt
ra
ct
ive
 s
ec
to
rs
 in
 e
xp
or
ts
1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Exports to China
Exports to all other destinations
Exports
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
Sh
ar
e 
of
 a
gr
icu
ltu
ra
l/e
xt
ra
ct
ive
 s
ec
to
rs
 in
 im
po
rts
1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Imports from China
Imports from all other origins
Imports
Share of agricultural and extractive sectors
in trade of Brazil
Panel A Panel B
Figure 2.3: Evolution of the share of agricultural and extractive sectors in the exports and
imports of Brazil
NOTES: These graphs present the evolution of the share of products of the agricultural and extractive sectors
(agriculture, forestry, fisheries/aquaculture and mining) in the exports and imports of Brazil from 1995 to 2010.
Sources: CEPII BACI for trade data; definition of high-income countries from the World Bank.
and extractive sectors that was four percentage points higher over the course of the decade.
This wage effect appears to have spilled over to workers in other local industries, and to
have occurred without an associated increase in wage inequality. Bolsa Famı´lia takeup
rates were also lower in 2010 in regions benefiting more from Chinese demand. Moreover,
while there is little evidence of an effect of demand from China on local employment rates,
we do observe positive effects on job quality: an increase in the share of formal employment
at the expense of informal jobs, and a rise in the proportion of the local workforce in skilled
agricultural or extractive sector occupations.
This chapter contributes to a growing literature on the worldwide effects of the rise of
China. This includes papers that have studied the impact of Chinese import competition
on economic variables such as manufacturing employment (Pierce and Schott 2013, Autor
et al. 2013a), worker earnings (Pessoa 2014), skill upgrading (Hsieh and Woo 2005, Mion
and Zhu 2013), firm and product selection (Iacovone et al. 2013) and innovation (Bloom
et al. 2011). There are a much smaller number of papers which, like this chapter, also
take account of demand-side effects. Dauth et al. (2014) take a reduced-form approach,
examining the impact of rising imports from and exports to China and Eastern Europe on
local labour market variables in Germany. Dauth et al. study a developed-country context
in which agricultural and extractive sectors are relatively unimportant, and so focus on
the effects of these trade shocks on the manufacturing and services sectors. General
equilibrium analyses of China’s effect on the world economy (such as Hsieh and Ossa 2011
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and di Giovanni et al. 2014) also take account of both the supply and demand effects of
China on other countries, but these studies summarize the impact of China on aggregate
welfare rather than distinguishing between the potentially heterogeneous impacts of rising
Chinese import competition and export demand.
Our work also relates to the wider literature studying the impact of trade shocks
on labour markets. Several other papers investigate the effect of trade on workers in
Brazil (e.g. Gonzaga et al. 2006, Menezes-Filho and Muendler 2011, Helpman et al.
2012, Kovak 2013, Dix-Carneiro 2014), with particular attention given to Brazil’s early
1990s trade liberalisation. Most research on trade and labour markets, including much
of the literature on Brazil, is limited to studying workers in formal employment. Our
work also fits into the smaller literature on trade and informality, including Goldberg and
Pavcnik (2003), Nataraj (2011), McCaig and Pavcnik (2014) and Paz (2014). Finally, the
chapter contributes to the literature on the local labour market effects of shocks involving
nonmanufacturing sectors; one particularly relevant study is Arago´n and Rud (2013), who
examine the local economic impact of a Peruvian gold mine.
The chapter is organised as follows: we first describe our data sources and present
our identification strategy in Section 2.2. We then discuss the results of our empirical
analysis in Section 2.3, and draw conclusions in Section 2.4. Additional figures and tables
are included in an attached appendix.
2.2 Data and empirical strategy
This section describes the data used in the study and outlines our empirical strategy,
discussing our baseline OLS specification, instrumental variables and robustness checks.
2.2.1 Data sources
We use individual-level labour market and socioeconomic data from the long form Brazilian
Demographic Census (Censo Demogra´fico) for 2000 and 2010, sourced from the Brazilian
Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE); some specifications also use individual-level
data from the 1991 census. The data contains a number of labour market variables, includ-
ing employment status, monthly income from employment and hours worked per week,
along with information on migration and other demographic variables; we will discuss the
variables we use in our analysis in greater depth below. We restrict our sample to the sub-
population most likely to participate in the labour market, defining the workforce as every
individual between 18 and 60 years old. We then aggregate the data to the geographical
unit ‘microregion’, a level of aggregation that has been constructed by IBGE by grouping
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Brazilian municipalities according to information on integration of local economies. Our
sample includes all of the 558 Brazilian microregions, each of which contains an average
of 10 municipalities.
We draw information on informality from a question in the census asking employed
individuals about their job type: government worker; employee registered at the Brazilian
Ministry of Labour and Employment (com carteira assinada); employee not registered
at the Ministry of Labour and Employment (sem carteira assinada); self-employed; or
in unpaid work. We include the final three categories in our definition of the informal
sector.1 We also use information on individuals’ occupations from the 2000 and 2010
censuses, defining ‘skilled occupations’ and ‘unskilled occupations’ using the definition of
occupational skill level from the 2008 International Standard Classification of Occupations
(ISCO-08). In particular, we define a skilled occupation as one associated with skill level
3 or 4 in the ISCO-08 classification; this covers managers, professionals, technicians and
associate professionals. While the occupational classification in the 2010 Brazilian census
is almost identical to ISCO-08, we need to use publicly available concordances between
the Brazilian occupational classification CBO-02 and ISCO-88, and between ISCO-88 and
ISCO-08, to classify the occupations observed in the 2000 census into skilled and unskilled
occupations.
Our data on international trade in goods is from the BACI database developed by
Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII), which reconciles
the data separately reported by importers and exporters in the United Nations Statistical
Division’s COMTRADE database. CEPII BACI contains the total annual value of bilat-
eral trade at the 6-digit level of the Harmonized System classification for more than 200
countries from 1995 to 2010; we use data for 2000 and 2010 in the analysis below. The
CEPII data is denominated in thousands of current US dollars; we convert 2000 values to
2010 US dollars using the US GDP deflator from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Our empirical strategy requires us to classify employed individuals in the 2000 census
data and products in the 2000 and 2010 trade data into sectors. In the 2000 Brazilian
census, individuals are asked to state their sector of activity according to the 5-digit CNAE
Domic´ılio classification.2 We thus construct a concordance assigning products in the trade
data to CNAE Domic´ılio sectors, which requires us to combine some of the traded goods
1Although a self-employed worker could be registered with the federal government, these cases con-
stitute a small fraction of all self-employed individuals. Publicly available administrative data from the
Relac¸ao Anual de Informac¸oes Sociais (RAIS) database – the official records of the Ministry of Labour and
Employment – show that only 0.9% and 0.8% of the workforce were registered as self-employed in 2000
and 2010, respectively. We observe total rates of self-employment of 18.3% and 15.7% of the workforce in
these two years’ censuses.
2This is defined as the main sector of activity of the firm or other institution of an employed person or
the nature of the activity of a self-employed person.
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sectors in CNAE Domic´ılio when these cannot be separately identified in the trade data.
We are left with a total of 82 traded goods sectors, including 32 agricultural and extractive
sectors (22 agricultural sectors, 8 mining sectors, forestry and fishing/aquaculture) and 50
manufacturing sectors; see Table 2.9 for a full list.3
2.2.2 Baseline specification
To estimate the heterogeneous impacts of supply and demand shocks at the microregion
level, we first create sector-level measures of each shock and then define exposure to
a shock according to local comparative advantage across sectors, as measured by the
sectoral composition of employment in each microregion in 2000. This is the ‘shift-share’
methodology of Bartik (1991), as applied to trade shocks by Topalova (2007) and to the
effect of China on US labour markets by Autor et al. (2013a). Given the existence of
migration across microregions, which we will show is correlated with the trade shocks
we study, our regression results should be interpreted as identifying effects of China on
local labour markets as geographical units varying in their initial comparative advantages,
rather than effects on the set of workers present in those labour markets in the year 2000.
Our baseline specification is as follows:
∆ym = βIISm + βXXDm +W
′
mγ + m. (2.1)
Here, ∆ym is the change in a given labour market outcome between 2000 and 2010 in
microregion m, ISm and XDm are microregion-level measures of the import supply and
export demand shocks due to China between 2000 and 2010, and Wm is a set of controls.
To construct ISm and XDm, we first define an import (export) shock in sector k as
the difference in the value of Brazilian imports (exports) from China in sector k between
2000 and 2010, ∆Ik = Ik,2010 − Ik,2000 and ∆Xk = Xk,2010 − Xk,2000, denominated in
thousands of 2010 US dollars. We then allocate each shock across microregions according
to the fraction of Brazil’s workers in sector k sited in a given microregion m in 2000; i.e.
Lkm,2000
Lk,2000
∆Ik and
Lkm,2000
Lk,2000
∆Xk, where Lkm,2000 is the number of workers in sector k and
microregion m in year 2000, and Lk,2000 =
∑
m Lkm,2000.
4 Since microregions differ in
size, which affects each sector’s relevance for the local labour market, we normalize the
trade shock by the number of employed workers in each microregion in 2000 (excluding
workers employed outside the private sector), giving us the expressions
Lkm,2000
Lk,2000
∆Ik
Lm,2000
and
3Several products from the Harmonized System classification, mostly waste or scrap (e.g. scrap metal,
used clothing) could not be concorded to the CNAE Domic´ılio classification; these products make up less
than 1% of Brazilian trade by value.
4The underlying assumption here is that the trade shock is distributed uniformly across workers in each
sector.
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Lkm,2000
Lk,2000
∆Xk
Lm,2000
.5 Finally, we define the total local exposure per worker to each trade shock
as the sum of these expressions across sectors, so that our microregion-level measures of
the import supply and export demand shocks are, respectively:
ISm =
∑
k
Lkm,2000
Lk,2000
∆Ik
Lm,2000
XDm =
∑
k
Lkm,2000
Lk,2000
∆Xk
Lm,2000
.
As measured by ISm and XDm, the average Brazilian microregion received an im-
port competition shock from China of US$225 per worker and an export demand shock
of US$594 per worker.6 The dispersion of the export demand shock is also larger (with a
standard deviation of 1.31 for XDm as compared to 0.27 for ISm), though both distribu-
tions are highly skewed to the right, as shown in Figure 2.7. The microregion at the 20th
percentile of ISm received an import supply shock of US$73 per worker, while the supply
shock to the microregion at the 80th percentile of ISm was US$313 per worker. The cor-
responding figures for XDm are US$38 and US$647, respectively. Figure 2.4 shows that
the two shocks affected different sets of microregions, as the unconditional distributions
of the two measures are nearly orthogonal, with a correlation of 0.07.
Table 2.1 charts the characteristics of microregions in the top 20% of ISm and XDm in
2000, while the geographical distribution of microregions in the top 20% of each of the two
measures are plotted in Figure 2.5. Table 2.1 shows that the microregions most exposed to
Chinese imports tended to have a lower proportion of workers engaged in agriculture and a
higher proportion working in manufacturing in 2000 as compared to the average region, as
well as a much smaller share of rural residents. On average, these regions also had a larger
working-age population, a higher share of the workforce in private sector employment and
a greater proportion of workers in skilled occupations than the mean microregion. The
average wage in these regions in 2000 was also relatively high.7
Table 2.1 also suggests that the microregions most affected by Chinese export demand
were somewhat less populous than the mean microregion and much smaller in population
than high-ISm microregions in 2000. At the same time, microregions with large values
of XDm had an average share of the workforce employed in the private sector, share of
workers in formal jobs and average hourly wage somewhat higher than that of the mean
5The means across microregions of the distributions of these sector-microregion-level variables are shown
in columns (3) and (5) of Table 2.9.
6These two figures differ in magnitude even though trade between China and Brazil was approximately
in balance in both 2000 and 2010; this is because both measures include a microregion-level per-worker
normalisation.
7Unsurprisingly, the three microregions with the highest ISm are all major industrial centers: Manaus,
Sa˜o Jose´ dos Campos and Santa Rita do Sapuca´ı. The last of these regions is sometimes referred to as the
‘Electronic Valley’ due to the size of its electronics industry.
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Figure 2.4: Import supply vs export demand measures
NOTES: This graph presents a scatter plot of the export demand shock measure XDm against the import supply
shock measure ISm at the microregion level. The line plots the results of a linear regression of XDm on ISm. Both
variables are denominated in thousands of 2010 US dollars per worker. Sources: 2000 Brazilian Census, and CEPII
BACI.
Panel A - Import supply Panel B - Export demand
Figure 2.5: Geographical distributions of top quintile of import supply and export demand
measures
NOTES: These maps display the spatial distributions of microregions in the top quintile of the import supply shock
measure ISm and microregions in the top quintile of the export demand shock measure XDm. The maps also
depict the borders between Brazilian regions. Sources: 2000 Brazilian Census, and CEPII BACI.
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Table 2.1: Brazilian microregion-level summary statistics 2000
2000
All microregions Top quintile of ISm Top quintile of XDm
(1) (2) (3)
Workforce (thousands) 170.952 417.095 138.593
Private sector workers .589 .624 .608
Agriculture .167 .078 .161
Extractive .002 .002 .004
Manufacturing .068 .123 .069
Nontraded .352 .421 .375
Formal jobs .177 .299 .205
Informal jobs .412 .326 .403
Skilled occupations .094 .124 .099
Unskilled occupations .496 .501 .509
Rural residents .313 .137 .271
Inmigrated in the last 5 years .083 .084 .088
Average hourly wage (R$) 2.21 3.14 2.46
Skilled occupations 5.07 6.72 5.55
Unskilled occupations 1.70 2.28 1.92
Wage inequality (Gini) .542 .528 .556
NOTES: This table displays descriptive statistics of the Brazilian labour market in 2000, averaged at the microregion
level. Column (1) includes all microregions, column (2) includes only microregions among the top 20% of ISm, and
column (3) includes only microregions in the top 20% of XDm. All figures are shares of the total workforce, except
as indicated. The workforce is defined here as the total number of citizens between 18 and 60 years old. Average
hourly wage is in current Real. Sources: 2000 Brazilian Census, and CEPII BACI.
microregion, though again smaller than the top quintile of ISm. They were relatively more
rural than the high-ISm regions as of 2000, and slightly less rural on average than the
mean microregion. Unsurprisingly, the average share of workers in the extractive sector
was particularly high in these microregions, though the overall size of the extractive sector
relative to total local employment was very small even in these locations. In terms of most
other labour market variables, regions in the top 20% of XDm were similar on average
to the mean Brazilian microregion in 2000, and in general they were more similar to the
average microregion than were the locations in the top quintile of ISm.
8
Our baseline specifications also include a set of microregion-level controls Wm; key
among these are the share of each microregion’s workforce employed in agricultural sectors,
extractive sectors and manufacturing sectors in 2000.9 This means that our results depend
on comparisons between microregions with the same initial economic structure (in terms
of the distribution of local employment across these three broadly defined categories) but
specialised in different particular agricultural, extractive and manufacturing sectors.
This strategy is feasible because the distribution of Brazil-China trade growth is skewed
8The three microregions with the largest values of XDm include a major center for the offshore oil
industry (Macae´), an important outpost of the iron ore mining complex (Itabira) and a small microregion
specialised in soybean production (Na˜o-me-Toque, Rio Grande del Sul).
9Forestry and fisheries/aquaculture are defined here as agricultural sectors.
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across sectors on both the import and export sides. Approximately 40% of the total growth
in Brazil’s imports from China between 2000 and 2010 (i.e.
∑
k ∆Ik) is accounted for by
electronics (19%), machinery (13%) and electrical equipment (8%). Meanwhile, just three
sectors, all of which are agricultural or extractive sectors, were responsible for 82% of the
growth in Brazil’s exports to China between these two years: mining of nonprecious metals
(45%), soybeans (23%) and oil and gas (14%).10 This breakdown actually understates the
level of concentration of Brazil’s exports to China, since its exports in the ‘mining of
nonprecious metals’ sector are almost exclusively made up of exports of iron ore. This
high degree of concentration in a few commodities is a typical pattern of exports to China
among developing countries for whom trade with China is important.11
The controls in our baseline regressions also include the workforce size, the share of
the workforce employed in nontraded sectors, the share employed in informal jobs, and the
proportion of rural residents, all measured at the microregion level for the year 2000, along
with a cubic polynomial of 2000 microregion-level income per capita. In all regressions,
in order to allow for spatial correlation of errors across microregions, we cluster standard
errors at the level of the mesoregion. Like the microregion, this geographical unit has
been defined by IBGE according to measures of local market integration; there are 138
mesoregions in Brazil. Also, in order to prevent our regression results from being driven
by outliers or very small microregions, we assign values of ISm and XDm below the 1st
and above the 99th percentiles to the values of the 1st and 99th percentiles, and weight
all regressions by the share of the national workforce in each microregion. We include all
558 Brazilian microregions in all regressions.
2.2.3 Instrumental variables and robustness checks
Our goal is to identify the causal effect of the two ‘China shocks’ on local labour market
dynamics in Brazil. However, regression equation (2.1) does not capture causality in
the presence of any additional shocks that are both relevant for our dependent variables
10To calculate these measures, we take the difference between the 2010 and 2000 values of Brazil’s
imports from China (or exports to China) in each sector and divide by the aggregate difference between
2010 and 2000 Brazilian imports from China (or exports to China). The resulting figures for each of the
82 traded goods sectors may be found in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.9. The value of imports from
China actually decreased in several sectors, but their total decline constitutes a tiny proportion of the
total difference in imports, so that the total of all positive values only slightly exceeds 1; the same is true
of exports to China. As noted above, some Harmonized System codes (mostly waste and scrap) are not
concorded to any sector; trade in these products is included in the denominator but not listed in Table 2.9.
11According to the CEPII BACI data, in all 27 non-high-income countries outside East and Southeast
Asia for whom exports to China constituted a minimum of 10% of total exports by value in 2010, at least
80% of exports to China were concentrated in three or fewer of the sectors defined in this chapter (82
sectors plus a residual ‘waste and scrap’ category). In 16 of these 27 countries (including Brazil), at least
80% of exports to China were in agricultural and/or extractive sectors; in a further five, at least 80%
of exports were concentrated in up to two agricultural or extractive sectors and either the ‘basic metals’
manufacturing sector or scrap metal.
Chapter 2 96
and correlated with our exposure measures ISm and XDm. In particular, given the
sector-level variation that underlies our identification strategy, one potential issue would
be the existence of Brazil-specific supply or demand shocks in sectors in which Brazil
also experienced a relatively large change in trade with China. For example, changes
in Brazil-China trade patterns might be capturing sector-specific productivity growth or
Engel effects in Brazil rather than changes in China.
Several other studies of the cross-country transmission of shocks have addressed this
concern by using an instrumental variables strategy that exploits information on trade
between the shocks’ country of origin (in this case, China) and countries other than
the ‘destination’ country of interest (Brazil).12 For instance, one might instrument our
microregion-level import supply and export demand variables with measures calculated in
the same way as ISm and XDm, but using the change between 2000 and 2010 in imports
from China (or exports to China) for a set of countries that does not include Brazil. A key
assumption underlying this approach is that the changes in the pattern of trade between
China and these other countries are unrelated to Brazil-specific shocks.
The main issue with this strategy is that it does not account for changes in world prices
or quantities traded that are not due to China: if the world price of a given product rises
due to other factors, or all countries trade more intensively in the products of some sector
due to a worldwide technology or demand shock, this will be reflected in the trade flows of
all countries. This is a particular issue for our study given its focus on commodities, whose
world prices were on an upward trajectory over the course of the decade we study. If, for
instance, the share of oil by value increased in the import baskets of all countries between
2000 and 2010 due to rises in its world price, both our baseline regression specification and
the IV strategy described above would assign this effect to China. However, while China
likely played a pivotal role in changes in world prices in many sectors during this period,
we do not want to ascribe world price or quantity changes to China when these actually
resulted from other factors.
We thus adapt the IV approach described above by considering changes in China’s
sector-level imports and exports relative to those of other countries. To do this, we first
define I˜ikt and X˜ikt to be the total imports (exports) of country i in sector k in year t
from (to) all countries other than Brazil. We then run the following auxiliary regressions,
using data on I˜ikt and X˜ikt in 2000 and 2010 for all countries available in the CEPII trade
12This is a standard approach in the ‘China shock’ literature; see e.g. Bloom et al. (2011), Autor et al.
(2013a) and Iacovone et al. (2013).
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data except Brazil:
∆I˜ik
I˜ik,2000
= αk + ψChina,k + νik
∆X˜ik
X˜ik,2000
= γk + δChina,k + µik
The left-hand side of the two regressions above is the growth rate of the imports (exports)
of a country in a given sector, net of its imports from (exports to) Brazil. The sector
fixed effect αk (or γk) then captures the mean growth rate, across countries, of net-of-
Brazil imports (or exports) in that sector. The regressions are weighted by 2000 import
(export) volumes, so that the values of these fixed effects are not driven by large positive
or negative growth rates in countries with small shares of world trade. This means that
the China-specific dummies ψChina,k and δChina,k represent the deviation in the growth
rates of China’s imports and exports in sector k excluding trade with Brazil, as compared
to this weighted cross-country average.
We then relate the resulting estimates ψˆChina,k and δˆChina,k to the microregion-level
shock measures defined in Section 2.2.2. We first multiply these estimates by the values
of Brazil-China imports and exports in 2000, redefining the sector-level ‘China shocks’ as
∆Iˆk ≡ Ik,2000δˆChina,k and ∆Xˆk ≡ Xk,2000ψˆChina,k. Our instrumental variables are then
constructed at the microregion level using these new shock measures in the same way as
for ISm and XDm:
13
ivISm =
∑
k
Lkm,2000
Lk,2000
∆Iˆk
Lm,2000
ivXDm =
∑
k
Lkm,2000
Lk,2000
∆Xˆk
Lm,2000
.
If Chinese trade with the rest of the world (excluding Brazil) had evolved in the same
way as that of the (weighted) average country in each sector, all of these shocks would be
equal to zero. In practice, however, this is not the case: the two vectors ∆Iˆk and ∆Xˆk,
like the ‘raw’ measures ∆Ik and ∆Xk, vary widely across sectors. Indeed, the raw shocks
and these IV shock measures are highly correlated, with correlation coefficients of 0.93 for
the sector-level import supply shocks ∆Ik and ∆Iˆk and 0.86 for the export demand shocks
∆Xk and ∆Xˆk. Scatter plots of ISm against ivISm and XDm against ivXDm are shown
in Figure 2.6.
Even if these instrumental variables were to fully capture the sectoral mix of Chinese
13The averages across microregions of the sector-microregion-level variables analogous to those in Section
2.2, but constructed using ∆Iˆk and ∆Xˆk, may be found in columns (4) and (6) of Table 2.9.
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Figure 2.6: Raw measures vs instrumental variables measures
NOTES: This graph presents scatter plots of microregion-level import supply and export demand shocks (ISm and
XDm) against the instrumental variables ivISm and ivXDm. The lines depict the results of simple regressions of
ISm on ivISm (coefficient 1.286, s.e. 0.021 and t-statistic 60.09) and XDm on ivXDm (coefficient 2.076, s.e. 0.053
and t-statistic 39.16). Sources: 2000 Brazilian Census, and CEPII BACI.
supply and demand shocks, it is naturally still possible that these shocks were correlated
to supply and demand shocks in Brazil during this period. The variable ivXDm might
be particularly vulnerable to this problem, since it is driven mainly by export growth in
two nonmanufacturing sectors (soybeans and iron ore).14 It could bias our results, for
example, if Brazil discovered major new sources of iron ore just as China began importing
it in much larger quantities.
Reassuringly, however, there is evidence that the rise in Brazil-China exports in these
two sectors was mainly due to a Chinese demand shock. First, the share of Brazil in world
trade by value in the two sectors changed relatively little between 2000 and 2010: Brazil
accounted for 23% of world exports of soybeans in 2000 and 27% in 2010, and for 13%
of world exports of nonprecious metal ores in 2000 and 17% in 2010. Meanwhile, China’s
share of world imports in these two sectors rose much more steeply during this period:
from 21% to 56% for soybeans, and from 10% to 45% for nonprecious metal ores. Exports
to China accounted for 98% of the growth in the total quantity of soybeans exported from
Brazil, and 87% of the growth in the quantity of Brazil’s exports of nonprecious metal
14While the oil and gas sector was responsible for 14% of the growth in exports from Brazil to China
between 2000 and 2010 (as noted in Section 2.2), its importance is greatly diminished in the IV shock
measure, since ∆Xˆoil accounts for only 2% of
∑
k ∆Xˆk. The point in the upper left of the scatter plot of
XDm against ivXDm (see Figure 2.6) is the offshore oil center (Macae´) mentioned in Footnote 8.
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ores, between the two years.15
It is also possible that the outcomes we observe were driven by other circumstances
specific to individual Brazilian regions. Indeed, the maps in Figure 2.5 suggest that the
incidence of Chinese trade shocks is spatially correlated within Brazil. We thus run a
robustness check in which we add fixed effects for Brazil’s five regions to our IV specifi-
cation, so as to check whether the results are robust to accounting for contemporaneous
region-specific trends in the dependent variable ∆ym. That is, in this specification we
investigate the within-region effects of the two ‘China shocks’.
Finally, we also conduct an additional robustness check to address the concern that
any results we observe simply represent the continuation of local labour market trends
that began in years before our period of study. For example, Brazil underwent a major
trade liberalisation episode in the late 1980s and early 1990s that is known to have had a
significant impact on affected local labour markets (see e.g. Menezes-Filho and Muendler
2011, Kovak 2013); adjustments resulting from this shock might still have been occurring
between 2000 and 2010. Thus, in order to account for pre-sample-period trends, we use
data from the 1991 Brazilian census to add a lagged dependent variable to the right-hand
side of specifications for which this data is available; that is, we control for microregion-level
changes between 1991 and 2000 in the outcome of interest. Because of likely correlation
between the lagged dependent variable and the residual m, we instrument for this variable
using 1991 levels, as suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1981).16
2.3 Results
In this section, we provide empirical evidence of the heterogeneous effects of the import
supply shock and export demand shock from China on local labour markets across Brazil.
We begin by considering the effects of these shocks on average hourly wages, wage inequal-
ity within local labour markets and takeup of the cash transfer program Bolsa Famı´lia.
We then look at the impact of the ‘China shocks’ on migration, employment rates and the
pattern of employment across sectors. Finally, we examine the evolution of ‘good jobs’
and ‘bad jobs’ in local labour markets affected by the shocks, considering the proportion of
the local workforce in formal and informal jobs, and in skilled and unskilled occupations.
15Notably, Bustos et al. (2013) present evidence of non-Brazil-specific technological change in the soy-
bean sector via the development in the US of a genetically modified soybean variety in 1996, and suggest
that the adoption in Brazil of this technology in the early 2000s led to increases in agricultural productivity
per worker, decreases in the labour intensity of agricultural production, rising manufacturing employment
shares and declining manufacturing wages in affected locations. Bustos et al. also discuss a Brazil-specific
technological change in the maize sector (milho safrinha) which they find is associated with rises in labour
intensity, declines in manufacturing employment shares and increases in wages.
16Note that the consistency of our estimates then depends on the assumption that 1991 levels are
uncorrelated with m.
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The coefficients and standard errors in all tables are normalised by multiplying by 100, so
that they may generally be interpreted as the effect of a US$1000 increase in imports or
exports per worker on changes in the dependent variable in percentage points.17
2.3.1 Wages and wage inequality
Table 2.2 displays the results of microregion-level regressions of differences in log average
hourly wages between 2000 and 2010 on ISm, XDm and controls. In Panel A, the sample
of wage-earners includes workers in all sectors, while Panels B, C and D only consider
workers in the agricultural and extractive, manufacturing and nontraded sectors respec-
tively. The OLS estimates in column (1) of Panel A suggest that larger export demand
shocks are associated with higher growth in wages over these ten years, and that this
effect is statistically significant. Columns (2) through (5) of Panel A show that the result
is qualitatively unchanged by our instrumental variables strategy and robustness checks,
including specifications with region fixed effects (column (3)), a lagged dependent variable
(column (4)) and both of these two additional controls (column (5)). In our preferred
specification, column (2), a US$1000 per worker increase in exports to China is associated
with higher decadal growth in wages of approximately 1.76 percentage points.
Panels B through D suggest that the largest effect of rising export demand from China
was on the set of industries most directly affected by this shock: the agricultural and
extractive sectors. The baseline IV specification in column (2) of Panel B indicates that a
microregion subject to the average demand shock of US$594 per worker saw wage growth
in these sectors that was higher by 3.7 percentage points over the course of the decade.
Given that the average wage in agricultural and extractive sectors increased by 52% during
this period, a back-of-the-envelope calculation would suggest that the estimated effect of
the ‘China demand shock’ is equal to 7.2% of the observed wage increase in these sectors.
Panels C and D indicate that growth in wages in agricultural and extractive sectors also
spilled over to other industries, as average wages in the manufacturing and nontraded
sectors also grew faster in microregions more exposed to Chinese export demand, though
only the result for manufacturing is statistically significant in our preferred specification.
Meanwhile, while the results in Panel A suggest that the Chinese import supply shock
is not associated with statistically significant changes in average wages overall, Panel C
indicates that it did have an effect for manufacturing, the sector most directly affected
by Chinese import competition. The IV results in column (2) of Panel C indicate that a
microregion exposed to the average import supply shock of US$225 per worker experienced
17This interpretation is, of course, approximate when the dependent variable is measured as a long
difference of logarithms, but exact when the dependent variable is in long differences of shares.
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Table 2.2: Results - log average hourly wages
OLS IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. All Sectors
ISm -3.46 -3.19 -.70 -3.57 -1.06
(2.90) (2.87) (2.48) (2.84) (2.40)
XDm 1.98*** 1.76** 2.26*** 1.84*** 2.33***
(.62) (.74) (.73) (.71) (.71)
Panel B. Agricultural/Extractive Sectors
ISm 1.15 -.92 2.40 -6.39 .36
(6.31) (7.61) (7.82) (6.94) (7.26)
XDm 5.98*** 6.31*** 6.74*** 7.02*** 6.96***
(1.93) (2.29) (2.08) (1.93) (1.93)
Panel C. Manufacturing Sectors
ISm -7.84*** -7.69*** -7.19*** -8.51*** -7.16***
(1.42) (1.24) (1.42) (1.43) (1.42)
XDm 2.93*** 2.95*** 3.22*** 2.78*** 3.23***
(.61) (.64) (.68) (.62) (.69)
Panel D. Nontraded Sectors
ISm -4.23 -3.85 -1.70 -4.72* -1.69
(2.62) (2.47) (2.04) (2.45) (2.03)
XDm .94* .61 .95* .93* .94*
(.49) (.50) (.55) (.51) (.53)
Region Fixed Effects X X
Lag Dep. Variable X X
1st Stage (KP F-stat.) 334.7 250.3 245.2 195.3
NOTES: This table displays estimated effects of Chinese import and export shocks on changes between 2000 and
2010 in log average hourly wages, as captured by βI and βX from equation (1). Panel A presents results for
all sectors, Panel B for agricultural and extractive sectors, Panel C for manufacturing sectors, and Panel D for
nontraded sectors. Each column corresponds to a different regression with specification indicated. In the columns
marked with IV, we instrument imports from (exports to) China using a measure based on growth in Chinese
exports to (imports from) all countries, excluding Brazil, relative to a weighted cross-country average. The unit of
observation is a microregion (N=558). Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100, so that the unit of
the coefficients is roughly percentage increase. All regressions include a constant and the following controls: 2000
workforce, 2000 share of workforce in agricultural sectors, 2000 share of workforce in extractive sectors, 2000 share of
workforce in manufacturing, 2000 share of workforce in nontraded sectors, 2000 share of workforce in informal jobs,
2000 share of workforce in rural areas, and a cubic polynomial of income per capita in 2000. Regressions in columns
(3) and (5) include region fixed effects, and in columns (4) and (5) include the lag of the dependent variable for
the period 1991-2000, instrumented with 1991 levels. All regressions are weighted by share of national workforce.
Standard errors are clustered by mesoregion, 138 clusters. Source: 1991, 2000 and 2010 Brazilian Census, and
CEPII BACI. *** p¡.01, ** p¡.05, * p¡.1.
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Table 2.3: Results - Log Average Hourly Wages by Formality and Occupation
OLS IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Formal Jobs
ISm -6.37*** -5.83*** -3.46* -4.67*** -2.77
(1.74) (1.60) (1.91) (1.38) (1.74)
XDm 1.45*** 1.12** 1.40*** .91** 1.23***
(.48) (.47) (.43) (.46) (.42)
Panel B. Informal Jobs
ISm 2.47 3.24 6.00 2.55 5.20
(5.31) (5.50) (5.20) (5.43) (5.02)
XDm 2.34** 2.14* 2.64** 2.24** 2.76***
(1.03) (1.17) (1.08) (1.13) (1.03)
Panel C. Skilled Occupations
ISm -.62 -.85 .71
(3.13) (3.36) (3.15)
XDm 1.13* .72 1.16**
(.60) (.64) (.59)
Panel D. Unskilled Occupations
ISm -5.22*** -5.14*** -2.22
(1.79) (1.76) (2.01)
XDm 2.33*** 2.24*** 2.47***
(.72) (.81) (.67)
Region Fixed Effects X X
Lag Dep. Variable X X
1st Stage (KP F-stat.) 334.7 250.3 245.2 195.3
NOTES: This table displays estimated effects of Chinese import and export shocks on changes between 2000 and
2010 in log average hourly wages, as captured by βI and βX from equation (1). Panel A presents results for workers
in formal jobs, Panel B for workers in informal jobs, Panel C for workers in skilled occupations, and Panel D for
workers in unskilled occupations. A skilled occupation is defined as an occupation of skill level 3 or 4 according
to the ISCO-08 classification. Each column corresponds to a different regression with specification indicated. In
the columns marked with IV, we instrument imports from (exports to) China using a measure based on growth
in Chinese exports to (imports from) all countries, excluding Brazil, relative to a weighted cross-country average.
The unit of observation is a microregion (N=558). Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100, so that
the unit of the coefficients is roughly percentage increase. All regressions include a constant and the following
controls: 2000 workforce, 2000 share of workforce in agricultural sectors, 2000 share of workforce in extractive
sectors, 2000 share of workforce in manufacturing, 2000 share of workforce in nontraded sectors, 2000 share of
workforce in informal jobs, 2000 share of workforce in rural areas, and a cubic polynomial of income per capita in
2000. Regressions in columns (3) and (5) include region fixed effects, and in columns (4) and (5) include the lag
of the dependent variable for the period 1991-2000, instrumented with 1991 levels. All regressions are weighted by
share of national workforce. Standard errors are clustered by mesoregion, 138 clusters. Source: 1991, 2000 and
2010 Brazilian Census, and CEPII BACI. *** p¡.01, ** p¡.05, * p¡.1.
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Table 2.4: Results - inequality and social assistance
OLS IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Wage Inequality (Gini Coefficient)
ISm 1.34*** 1.40*** 1.12** 1.40*** 1.11**
(.39) (.41) (.46) (.41) (.46)
XDm .07 .06 .09 .06 .09
(.11) (.10) (.12) (.10) (.12)
Panel B. Bolsa Familia
ISm -.20 -.15 .07
(.30) (.33) (.19)
XDm -.25* -.25** -.14*
(.14) (.13) (.07)
Region Fixed Effects X X
Lag Dep. Variable X X
1st Stage (KP F-stat.) 334.7 250.3 245.2 195.3
NOTES: This table displays estimated effects of Chinese import and export shocks, as captured by βI and βX
from equation (1), on two outcomes. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the change in microregion-level wage
inequality, as measured by the wage Gini coefficient, between 2000 and 2010. In Panel B, the dependent variable
is the share of workforce participating in Bolsa Familia in 2010. Each column corresponds to a different regression
with specification indicated. In the columns marked with IV, we instrument imports from (exports to) China
using a measure based on growth in Chinese exports to (imports from) all countries, excluding Brazil, relative to a
weighted cross-country average. The unit of observation is a microregion (N=558). Coefficients and standard errors
in both panels are multiplied by 100, so that the coefficients in Panel B are in percentage points. All regressions
include a constant and the following controls: 2000 workforce, 2000 share of workforce in agricultural sectors,
2000 share of workforce in extractive sectors, 2000 share of workforce in manufacturing, 2000 share of workforce
in nontraded sectors, 2000 share of workforce in informal jobs, 2000 share of workforce in rural areas, and a cubic
polynomial of income per capita in 2000. Regressions in columns (3) and (5) include region fixed effects, and in
columns (4) and (5) include the lag of the dependent variable for the period 1991-2000, instrumented with 1991
levels. All regressions are weighted by share of national workforce. Standard errors are clustered by mesoregion,
138 clusters. Source: 1991, 2000 and 2010 Brazilian Census, and CEPII BACI. *** p¡.01, ** p¡.05, * p¡.1.
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growth in manufacturing wages that was smaller by 1.7 percentage points over this period.
Table 2.3 breaks down the effects of the shocks on the growth in average wages of
workers in formal and informal jobs (Panels A and B), and in skilled and unskilled oc-
cupations (Panels C and D). The wage effects of ISm appear to be concentrated in the
formal sector; the estimated coefficient on ISm is negative for the subcategory of formal
jobs and positive (though insignificant) for informal jobs. Also, although the wage effect
of Chinese import competition on workers in skilled occupations remains insignificantly
different from zero, higher values of ISm are significantly associated with slower aver-
age wage growth for workers in unskilled occupations in the baseline IV specification in
Panel D. This result becomes smaller and loses statistical significance after controlling for
region-specific trends. Meanwhile, the export demand shock is associated with positive
wage growth for all four of these categories – for both skilled and unskilled occupations,
and for both formal and informal jobs.
These heterogeneous effects of ISm on different subgroups of the workforce imply that
Chinese import competition may have affected levels of inequality. Indeed, when we con-
sider effects on local wage inequality in Panel A of Table 2.4, we find that import shocks
but not export shocks are associated with relatively higher growth in wage inequality, as
measured by the microregion-level wage Gini coefficient. Since we multiply all coefficients
by 100, the estimate in column (2) implies that in locations experiencing an import compe-
tition shock that was greater by US$1000, the wage Gini coefficient rose by an additional
0.014 between 2000 and 2010; this is equivalent to a 2.6% increase in wage inequality
relative to average 2000 levels. The coefficient on XDm is economically and statistically
indistinguishable from zero in each of the specifications; that is, we find no evidence that
the demand-side shock contributed to rises in local wage inequality.
In Panel B of Table 2.4, we consider the impact of the ‘China shocks’ on social as-
sistance in Brazil, by examining the distribution of takeup of the cash transfer program
Bolsa Famı´lia across microregions in 2010. While participation in Bolsa Famı´lia was on
a very large scale in 2010 – according to the census data, more than 7% of the Brazilian
workforce received Bolsa Famı´lia in this year – the program was implemented only after
2002. Thus, in this case, we use levels rather than long differences on the left-hand side
of our regressions, so that the dependent variable is the proportion of the local workforce
receiving Bolsa Famı´lia in 2010.18 The results suggest that a larger export demand shock
is associated with lower takeup of Bolsa Famı´lia in 2010; according to the baseline IV
specification, in a microregion experiencing the average export demand shock of US$594,
18As of 2000, Brazil had a similar program on a much smaller scale, Bolsa Escola, with a Brazil-wide
participation rate of less than 1%. The results are not affected if we instead use differences between Bolsa
Escola takeup rates in 2000 and Bolsa Famı´lia takeup rates in 2010 as the left-hand-side variable.
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the proportion of the local workforce receiving Bolsa Famı´lia in 2010 was lower by 0.15
percentage points. The estimated effects of Chinese import competition on participation
in Bolsa Famı´lia are statistically insignificant in all three specifications.
2.3.2 Migration and employment
We next consider whether the two ‘China shocks’ are also associated with changes in
the pattern of migration across microregions, and microregion-level employment rates.
In Table 2.5, we display the results of regressions whose dependent variable is the long
difference in the proportion of the workforce that migrated into the microregion within
the five years before the census.19 Column (2) reports that the change in the share of
recent migrants in the local workforce was 0.89 percentage points lower on average in
microregions experiencing a $1000 per worker higher import supply shock; these results
are robust across all five specifications. This suggests that in-migration grew by 4.9%
less in a microregion exposed to the average increase in import supply from China. The
analogous estimate for XDm is positive, but much smaller in magnitude and statistically
insignificant in each of the four IV specifications. The slowdown in local in-migration rates
associated with Chinese import competition is reminiscent of the findings of Kovak (2011),
who observes a migration response to the Brazilian trade liberalisation of the early 1990s
using 2000 census data.
Brazilians’ willingness to migrate – the census data indicates that the average share
of recent migrants across microregions was 8.3% in 2000 and 12.4% in 2010 – might
have served to dampen the effects of the trade shocks on microregion-level employment
rates. Indeed, while the damaging impact of Chinese import competition on employment
status has been an important finding of studies of high-income countries (e.g. Autor et
al., 2013a, for the US), Panel A of Table 2.6 shows that we do not observe a negative
correlation between ISm and changes in private sector employment rates of Brazilian
microregions from 2000 to 2010. On the contrary, our preferred specification yields a
positive coefficient that is marginally statistically significant. The estimate is magnified
and becomes significant at the 1% level in the specifications with region fixed effects; this
is a puzzling result. Meanwhile, the effect of the ‘China demand shock’ on the change
in the proportion of the local workforce employed in the private sector is very small and
statistically insignificant in all five specifications.20
Panels B to D of Table 2.6 provide a breakdown of the changes in employment structure
19These regressions thus examine changes in the microregion-level pattern of migration in the five years
before 2010 as compared to the five years before 2000.
20When comparing these results to our findings on takeup of Bolsa Famı´lia in Table 2.4, it is important
to note that eligibility for Bolsa Famı´lia is not directly conditional on employment status.
Chapter 2 106
Table 2.5: Results - in-migration
OLS IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ISm -.86* -.89* -.83** -.92* -.83**
(.44) (.46) (.35) (.54) (.41)
XDm .21** .11 .17 .13 .17
(.09) (.10) (.12) (.10) (.11)
Region Fixed Effects X X
Lag Dep. Variable X X
1st Stage (KP F-stat.) 334.7 250.3 245.2 195.3
NOTES: This table displays estimated effects of Chinese import and export shocks on changes between 2000 and
2010 in the share of the workforce that in-migrated to the microregion in the previous five years, as captured by
βI and βX from equation (1). Each column corresponds to a different regression with specification indicated. In
the columns marked with IV, we instrument imports from (exports to) China using a measure based on growth in
Chinese exports to (imports from) all countries, excluding Brazil, relative to a weighted cross-country average. The
unit of observation is a microregion (N=558). Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100, so that the
coefficients represent percentage point changes. All regressions include a constant and the following controls: 2000
workforce, 2000 share of workforce in agricultural sectors, 2000 share of workforce in extractive sectors, 2000 share of
workforce in manufacturing, 2000 share of workforce in nontraded sectors, 2000 share of workforce in informal jobs,
2000 share of workforce in rural areas, and a cubic polynomial of income per capita in 2000. Regressions in columns
(3) and (5) include region fixed effects, and in columns (4) and (5) include the lag of the dependent variable for
the period 1991-2000, instrumented with 1991 levels. All regressions are weighted by share of national workforce.
Standard errors are clustered by mesoregion, 138 clusters. Source: 1991, 2000 and 2010 Brazilian Census, and
CEPII BACI. *** p¡.01, ** p¡.05, * p¡.1.
associated with the two ‘China shocks’, using the difference between 2000 and 2010 in
the share of a microregion’s working-age population employed in the agricultural and
extractive, manufacturing and nontraded sectors as the dependent variables. This analysis
yields few statistically significant coefficient estimates. However, Panel D suggests that the
finding of rising employment rates in locations competing with Chinese imports appears to
have been driven by growth in the share of the workforce employed in nontraded sectors.
This result is similar to the findings of Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011), who observe
movement of Brazilian formal sector workers from manufacturing into services after the
early 1990s trade liberalisation.
2.3.3 Job quality
We now examine the effects of China’s emergence on the prevalence of ‘good jobs’ in
affected microregions, using two measures of job quality: informality and occupational
skill level. We first consider informality, which is widespread in the Brazilian economy:
in 2000, more than half of private sector workers were working in the informal sector as
defined in this chapter. Being part of the informal sector brings disadvantages for workers
and firms, since they are not granted some legal rights, such as property rights, and do
not benefit from some public services linked to employment.
Table 2.7 shows that shocks to export demand from China are associated with a shift
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Table 2.6: Results - private sector employment
OLS IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. All Sectors
ISm .56* .67* 1.24*** .28 .92***
(.33) (.34) (.33) (.38) (.34)
XDm .07 .08 .07 .07 .08
(.11) (.10) (.10) (.12) (.11)
Panel B. Agricultural/Extractive Sectors
ISm -.39 -.25 -.16 -.01 .06
(.26) (.28) (.32) (.25) (.28)
XDm .07 .06 -.01 .11 .06
(.18) (.18) (.15) (.14) (.13)
Panel C. Manufacturing Sectors
ISm -.20 -.29 .05 .34 .65
(.52) (.55) (.67) (.56) (.71)
XDm -.06 -.12 -.10 -.16 -.15
(.10) (.10) (.09) (.10) (.10)
Panel D. Nontraded Sectors
ISm 1.18* 1.21* 1.34* 1.39* 1.43*
(.63) (.67) (.73) (.72) (.78)
XDm .11 .18 .22 .04 .11
(.15) (.16) (.15) (.12) (.14)
Region Fixed Effects X X
Lag Dep. Variable X X
1st Stage (KP F-stat.) 334.7 250.3 245.2 195.3
NOTES: This table displays estimated effects of Chinese import and export shocks on changes between 2000 and
2010 in the share of the workforce employed in the private sector, as captured by βI and βX from equation (1).
Panel A presents results for all sectors, Panel B for agricultural and extractive sectors, Panel C for manufacturing
sectors, and Panel D for nontraded sectors. Each column corresponds to a different regression with specification
indicated. In the columns marked with IV, we instrument imports from (exports to) China using a measure based
on growth in Chinese exports to (imports from) all countries, excluding Brazil, relative to a weighted cross-country
average. The unit of observation is a microregion (N=558). Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100,
so that the coefficients represent percentage point changes. All regressions include a constant and the following
controls: 2000 workforce, 2000 share of workforce in agricultural sectors, 2000 share of workforce in extractive
sectors, 2000 share of workforce in manufacturing, 2000 share of workforce in nontraded sectors, 2000 share of
workforce in informal jobs, 2000 share of workforce in rural areas, and a cubic polynomial of income per capita in
2000. Regressions in columns (3) and (5) include region fixed effects, and in columns (4) and (5) include the lag
of the dependent variable for the period 1991-2000, instrumented with 1991 levels. All regressions are weighted by
share of national workforce. Standard errors are clustered by mesoregion, 138 clusters. Source: 1991, 2000 and
2010 Brazilian Census, and CEPII BACI. *** p¡.01, ** p¡.05, * p¡.1.
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towards ‘good jobs’ by this measure: a rise in formal-sector jobs at the expense of the
informal sector. The baseline IV results in Panels A and B suggest that a rise in exports
to China of US$1000 is associated with an average increase in the proportion of a microre-
gion’s workforce in formal jobs that is larger by 0.31 percentage points and an average
decline in the share of informal jobs that is greater by 0.24 percentage points, though the
result for the informal share is statistically insignificant. The size of these effects is similar
across all of the regression specifications in each case.21
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, our measure of occupational skill level, which is based
on an international definition, is a dummy variable broadly distinguishing between man-
agerial, professional and technical workers and workers directly involved in production.
Panel B of Table 2.8 shows that the proportion of the workforce in skilled occupations in
the agricultural and extractive sectors rose more quickly in areas more affected by Chi-
nese demand, while this was not the case for unskilled occupations in these sectors. Our
estimates suggest that a microregion subject to the mean Chinese export demand shock
experienced 18.6% higher growth in the share of the workforce employed in skilled agricul-
tural or extractive sector jobs. The results in Panel A indicate that this led to a positive
effect of XDm on the share of workers in skilled occupations overall, though this estimate
is not statistically significant.
Meanwhile, Panel C of Table 2.8 shows that the proportion of the working-age popula-
tion employed in skilled manufacturing occupations saw a statistically significant decline
in locations with higher ISm: an increase of US$1000 in Chinese imports was associated
with a reduction of approximately 0.28 percentage points in this share between 2000 and
2010 in the baseline IV specification. Given that the average share of the workforce em-
ployed in skilled occupations in manufacturing grew from 0.8% in 2000 to 1% in 2010, a
back-of-the-envelope counterfactual exercise suggests that the share of skilled jobs in the
manufacturing sector would have grown 31% more on average if it were not for rising im-
port competition from China. Taken together with the results in Table 2.3, it thus appears
that local labour markets were affected by the ‘China supply shock’ through declines in
both average unskilled wages and skilled manufacturing employment shares.
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 also provide additional insight on the nature of the shift towards the
nontraded sector in locations more affected by Chinese import competition, as documented
in Table 2.6. Table 2.8 indicates that growth in the share of nontraded sector employment
mainly occurred in relatively unskilled occupations, while Table 2.7 suggests that these
21Tables 2.10 and 2.11 show that the estimated effect of XDm on the proportion of the workforce in
formal agricultural or extractive sector jobs is positive in all five specifications, while the estimated impact
of XDm on the share of the workforce in informal jobs in agricultural or extractive sectors is negative in
all five specifications. None of these results is statistically significant.
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Table 2.7: Results – informality
OLS IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Formal Jobs
ISm .83*** .80*** 1.16*** .88** 1.25***
(.29) (.29) (.37) (.36) (.44)
XDm .36** .31** .31** .32** .32***
(.14) (.15) (.12) (.15) (.12)
Panel B. Informal Jobs
ISm -.28 -.13 .08 .11 .30
(.38) (.43) (.48) (.39) (.45)
XDm -.28** -.24 -.24 -.21 -.21
(.14) (.16) (.16) (.16) (.16)
Region Fixed Effects X X
Lag Dep. Variable X X
1st Stage (KP F-stat.) 334.7 250.3 245.2 195.3
NOTES: This table displays estimated effects of Chinese import and export shocks on changes between 2000 and
2010 in the share of the workforce employed in formal and informal private sector jobs, as captured by βI and βX
from equation (1). Panel A presents results for formal jobs and Panel B for informal jobs. Each column corresponds
to a different regression with dependent variable and specification indicated. In the columns marked with IV, we
instrument imports from (exports to) China using a measure based on growth in Chinese exports to (imports from)
all countries, excluding Brazil, relative to a weighted cross-country average. The unit of observation is a microregion
(N=558). Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100, so that the coefficients represent percentage point
changes. All regressions include a constant and the following controls: 2000 workforce, 2000 share of workforce in
agricultural sectors, 2000 share of workforce in extractive sectors, 2000 share of workforce in manufacturing, 2000
share of workforce in nontraded sectors, 2000 share of workforce in rural areas, and a cubic polynomial of income
per capita in 2000. Regressions in columns (3) and (5) include region fixed effects, and in columns (4) and (5)
include the lag of the dependent variable for the period 1991-2000, instrumented with 1991 levels. All regressions
are weighted by share of national workforce. Standard errors are clustered by mesoregion, 138 clusters. Source:
1991, 2000 and 2010 Brazilian Census, and CEPII BACI. *** p¡.01, ** p¡.05, * p¡.1.
jobs were primarily in the formal sector. This conclusion is supported by the results of
regressions with the share of the workforce in formal or informal agricultural/extractive,
manufacturing or nontraded jobs on the left-hand side, which may be found in Tables
2.10 and 2.11. Across all of the IV specifications, only the regressions for formal jobs in
nontraded sectors yield statistically significant coefficient estimates for ISm.
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Table 2.8: Results – occupational skill level
Skilled Occupations Unskilled Occupations
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. All Sectors
ISm -.21 -.04 .10 .77* .71 1.14**
(.22) (.33) (.38) (.41) (.50) (.55)
XDm .05 .07 .07 .02 .01 .00
(.06) (.07) (.08) (.13) (.13) (.14)
Panel B. Agricultural/Extractive Sectors
ISm -.03 -.04* -.04 -.36 -.21 -.12
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.25) (.27) (.30)
XDm .06** .05* .05* .01 .00 -.06
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.16) (.17) (.14)
Panel C. Manufacturing Sectors
ISm -.30** -.28** -.26* .09 -.00 .30
(.12) (.13) (.13) (.43) (.48) (.60)
XDm .01 .01 .02 -.08 -.13 -.11
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.09) (.09) (.08)
Panel D. Nontraded Sectors
ISm .11 .27 .38 1.07** .94* .96*
(.20) (.31) (.35) (.54) (.56) (.58)
XDm -.02 .00 .01 .13 .17 .21
(.05) (.06) (.06) (.16) (.18) (.17)
Region Fixed Effects X X
1st Stage (KP F-stat.) 334.7 250.3 334.7 250.3
NOTES: This table displays estimated effects of Chinese import and export shocks on changes between 2000 and
2010 in the share of the workforce employed in skilled and unskilled occupations, as captured by βI and βX from
equation (1). Panel A presents results for all sectors, Panel B for agricultural and extractive sectors, Panel C
for manufacturing sectors, and Panel D for nontraded sectors. Each column corresponds to a different regression
with dependent variable and specification indicated. The dependent variable in columns 1 to 3 is the change in
the share of workforce in skilled occupations, and in columns 4 to 6 it is the change in the share of workforce
in unskilled occupations. A skilled occupation is defined as an occupation of skill level 3 or 4 according to the
ISCO-08 classification. In the columns marked with IV, we instrument imports from (exports to) China using
a measure based on growth in Chinese exports to (imports from) all countries, excluding Brazil, relative to a
weighted cross-country average. The unit of observation is a microregion (N=558). Coefficients and standard errors
are multiplied by 100, so that the coefficients represent percentage point changes. All regressions include a constant
and the following controls: 2000 workforce, 2000 share of workforce in agricultural sectors, 2000 share of workforce
in extractive sectors, 2000 share of workforce in manufacturing, 2000 share of workforce in nontraded sectors, 2000
share of workforce in informal jobs, 2000 share of workforce in rural areas, and a cubic polynomial of income per
capita in 2000. Regressions in columns (3) and (6) include region fixed effects. All regressions are weighted by share
of national workforce. Standard errors are clustered by mesoregion, 138 clusters. Source: 2000 and 2010 Brazilian
Census, and CEPII BACI. *** p¡.01, ** p¡.05, * p¡.1.
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2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigate the effects of China’s ascent into one of the world’s largest
economies on local labour markets in Brazil. As in other developing countries, Brazil’s
imports from China are dominated by manufactures while most of the growth in its exports
to China has been concentrated in agricultural and extractive sectors. We use data from
the Brazilian demographic censuses of 2000 and 2010 to provide empirical evidence of the
heterogeneous effects on Brazilian labour markets of shocks to both Chinese import supply
and export demand. Using a shift-share methodology, we compare trends in local labour
markets with a similar initial employment structure (proportion of workers in agricultural,
extractive and manufacturing sectors) but differently exposed to these two ‘China shocks’
due to specialisation in different specific industries.
We find that local labour markets more affected by Chinese import competition expe-
rienced slower growth in manufacturing wages, greater increases in wage inequality and
a relative decline in the share of the workforce employed in skilled manufacturing jobs.
However, imports from China do not appear to have led to either a fall in employment
rates or higher takeup of social assistance (as measured by participation in the Bolsa
Famı´lia program of cash transfers) in affected regions. Meanwhile, in local labour mar-
kets experiencing larger growth in Chinese export demand, average hourly wages increased
more quickly and without an accompanying increase in wage inequality, while 2010 Bolsa
Famı´lia participation rates were lower. While there is little evidence of an effect of Chi-
nese demand on local employment rates, we do observe positive effects on job quality: an
increase in the share of formal employment at the expense of informal jobs, and a rise in
the share of the local workforce in skilled agricultural or extractive sector occupations.
Overall, our findings suggest that growth in commodities-for-manufactures trade spurred
by the rise of China has created winners as well as losers. Even though the increase in
export demand from China has mainly involved the relatively unglamorous agricultural
and extractive sectors, local labour markets specialised in these industries appear to have
flourished in the presence of this commodity export boom. Moreover, while areas spe-
cialised in manufacturing sectors do seem to have suffered from rising Chinese import
supply, our findings of slower growth of in-migration rates in more affected regions, along
with shifts in the structure of local employment towards nontraded industries, also provide
evidence of adjustment in response to competition from China.
Chapter 2 112
Appendix
2.A Additional Figures and Tables
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Figure 2.7: Distributions of import supply and export demand measures
NOTES: These graphs show the distributions of the import supply and export demand measures (ISm and XDm)
described in Section 2.2. The solid lines are kernel densities. Source: 2000 Brazilian Census, and CEPII BACI.
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Table 2.9: List of sectors and additional summary statistics
Import Export Import Supply Export Demand
Share Share from China to China
Mean IV Mean IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agriculture: rice - - - - - -
Agriculture: maize - .000 - - .000 -
Agriculture: other cereals .000 - .000 .000 - -
Agriculture: cotton .000 .005 .000 .000 .013 -
Agriculture: sugar cane - - - - - -
Agriculture: tobacco .000 .010 .000 .000 .022 .015
Agriculture: soya - .229 - - .555 .259
Agriculture: manioc - - - - - -
Agriculture: flowers and ornamentals .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -
Agriculture: citrus fruits - .000 - - .000 .000
Agriculture: coffee - .000 - - .000 .000
Agriculture: cocoa - - - - - -
Agriculture: grapes - - - - - -
Agriculture: bananas - - - - - -
Agriculture: other .007 .000 .006 .000 .000 .000
Agriculture: bovine animals - - - - - -
Agriculture: sheep - - - - - -
Agriculture: pigs - - - - - -
Agriculture: birds - - - - - -
Agriculture: beekeeping .000 .000 .000 - .000 .000
Agriculture: silk .000 - .000 - - -
Agriculture: other animals .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -
Forestry .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Fishing and aquaculture - .000 - - .000 .000
Mining: coal -.001 .000 -.002 -.018 .000 -
Mining: oil and gas - .137 - - .219 .015
Mining: radioactive metals - - - - - -
Mining: precious metals - - - - - -
Mining: other metals .000 .453 .000 -.001 .917 .649
Mining: nonmetals for construction .000 .001 .000 .000 .001 .002
Mining: precious stones .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .001
Mining: other nonmetals .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .001
Manuf: meat and fish .004 .008 .002 .000 .005 .001
Manuf: fruits and vegetables .002 .003 .002 .000 .003 .000
Manuf: oils and fats .000 .026 .000 .000 .045 .015
Manuf: dairy products .000 .000 .000 - .000 .000
Manuf: sugar .000 .018 .000 .000 .019 -
Manuf: coffee .000 .000 .000 - .000 .000
Manuf: other food .003 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000
Manuf: beverages .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Manuf: tobacco .000 - .000 .000 - -
Continued on next page.
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*List of sectors and additional summary statistics (continued)
Import Export Import Supply Export Demand
Share Share from China to China
Mean IV Mean IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Manuf: spinning and weaving .026 .000 .009 .000 .000 .000
Manuf: other textile products .029 .000 .014 .001 .000 .000
Manuf: apparel .025 .000 .008 .001 .000 .000
Manuf: leather processing .000 .011 .000 .000 .014 .000
Manuf: leather products .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Manuf: footwear .003 .000 .001 .001 .000 .000
Manuf: wood products .001 .001 .001 .000 .001 .002
Manuf: pulp and paper .003 .039 .003 .000 .041 .002
Manuf: paper products .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Manuf: printing and recording .003 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000
Manuf: coke .003 - .040 -.119 - -
Manuf: refined petroleum .002 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000
Manuf: nuclear fuel - - - - - -
Manuf: paints and varnishes .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Manuf: pharmaceuticals .018 .001 .004 .002 .000 .000
Manuf: cleaning and hygiene products .001 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000
Manuf: other chemicals .065 .008 .026 .014 .004 .003
Manuf: rubber products .014 .000 .004 .001 .000 .000
Manuf: plastic products .025 .000 .007 .001 .000 .000
Manuf: glass products .006 .000 .002 .001 .000 .000
Manuf: ceramic products .009 .000 .006 .000 .000 .000
Manuf: other nonmetallic mineral products .003 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000
Manuf: basic metals .064 .026 .027 .002 .013 .003
Manuf: metal products .029 .002 .007 .001 .000 .000
Manuf: machinery .133 .005 .038 .010 .002 .002
Manuf: domestic appliances .019 .000 .009 .001 .000 .000
Manuf: computing .073 .000 .033 .017 .000 .000
Manuf: electrical equipment .080 .001 .023 .005 .000 .000
Manuf: electronics .192 .001 .065 .024 .000 .001
Manuf: medical instruments .006 .000 .002 .000 .000 .000
Manuf: measuring instruments .008 .000 .004 .001 .000 .000
Manuf: optical equipment .061 .000 .030 .006 .000 .002
Manuf: watches and clocks .002 .000 .002 .000 .000 .000
Manuf: motor vehicles .009 .000 .002 .000 .000 .001
Manuf: motor vehicle bodies and parts .011 .002 .003 .000 .001 .001
Manuf: shipbuilding .018 - .016 .000 - -
Manuf: railway products .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -
Manuf: aircraft .000 .011 .000 - .012 .005
Manuf: other transport .009 .000 .007 .001 .000 -
Manuf: furniture .005 .000 .002 .000 .000 .000
Manuf: other .026 .001 .008 .001 .000 .000
NOTES: This table displays the share of each sector in the total growth of Brazil’s imports and exports to China
between 2000 and 2010 in columns (1) and (2), the means across microregions of the sector-microregion-level
variables used to calculate ISm and XDm in columns (3) and (5), and the means across microregions of the sector-
microregion-level variables used to calculate ivISm and ivXDm in columns (4) and (6). Source: 2000 and 2010
Brazilian Census, and CEPII BACI.
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Table 2.10: Results - formal private sector jobs
OLS IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Agricultural/Extractive Sectors
ISm .09 -.00 .06 -.01 .05
(.12) (.10) (.12) (.11) (.12)
XDm .17 .17 .17 .15 .17
(.12) (.13) (.11) (.12) (.11)
Panel B. Manufacturing Sectors
ISm -.27 -.28 -.16 .45 .53
(.55) (.57) (.62) (.65) (.73)
XDm -.00 -.06 -.06 -.10 -.11
(.08) (.08) (.09) (.08) (.10)
Panel C. Nontraded Sectors
ISm 1.04** 1.09** 1.26*** .75 1.00**
(.45) (.50) (.43) (.57) (.45)
XDm .20* .21 .21 .09 .11
(.12) (.13) (.13) (.16) (.14)
Region Fixed Effects X X
Lag Dep. Variable X X
1st Stage (KP F-stat.) 334.7 250.3 245.2 195.3
NOTES: This table displays estimated effects of Chinese import and export shocks on changes between 2000 and
2010 in the share of the workforce employed in formal private sector jobs, as captured by βI and βX from equation
(1). Panel A presents results for agricultural and extractive sectors, Panel B for manufacturing sectors, and Panel
C for nontraded sectors. Each column corresponds to a different regression with specification indicated. In the
columns marked with IV, we instrument imports from (exports to) China using a measure based on growth in
Chinese exports to (imports from) all countries, excluding Brazil, relative to a weighted cross-country average. The
unit of observation is a microregion (N=558). Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100, so that the
coefficients represent percentage point changes. All regressions include a constant and the following controls: 2000
workforce, 2000 share of workforce in agricultural sectors, 2000 share of workforce in extractive sectors, 2000 share of
workforce in manufacturing, 2000 share of workforce in nontraded sectors, 2000 share of workforce in informal jobs,
2000 share of workforce in rural areas, and a cubic polynomial of income per capita in 2000. Regressions in columns
(3) and (5) include region fixed effects, and in columns (4) and (5) include the lag of the dependent variable for
the period 1991-2000, instrumented with 1991 levels. All regressions are weighted by share of national workforce.
Standard errors are clustered by mesoregion, 138 clusters. Source: 1991, 2000 and 2010 Brazilian Census, and
CEPII BACI. *** p¡.01, ** p¡.05, * p¡.1.
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Table 2.11: Results - informal private sector jobs
OLS IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Agricultural/Extractive Sectors
ISm -.48** -.24 -.22 -.12 -.10
(.23) (.23) (.28) (.22) (.26)
XDm -.10 -.11 -.18 -.07 -.13
(.12) (.14) (.14) (.12) (.13)
Panel B. Manufacturing Sectors
ISm .07 -.01 .20 -.00 .21
(.12) (.10) (.13) (.11) (.14)
XDm -.06* -.06* -.04 -.06* -.04
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.03)
Panel C. Nontraded Sectors
ISm .14 .11 .08 .28 .27
(.35) (.38) (.47) (.36) (.46)
XDm -.09 -.04 .01 -.05 -.02
(.14) (.15) (.12) (.15) (.12)
Region Fixed Effects X X
Lag Dep. Variable X X
1st Stage (KP F-stat.) 334.7 250.3 245.2 195.3
NOTES: This table displays estimated effects of Chinese import and export shocks on changes between 2000 and
2010 in the share of the workforce employed in informal private sector jobs, as captured by βI and βX from equation
(1). Panel A presents results for agricultural and extractive sectors, Panel B for manufacturing sectors, and Panel
C for nontraded sectors. Each column corresponds to a different regression with specification indicated. In the
columns marked with IV, we instrument imports from (exports to) China using a measure based on growth in
Chinese exports to (imports from) all countries, excluding Brazil, relative to a weighted cross-country average. The
unit of observation is a microregion (N=558). Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100, so that the
coefficients represent percentage point changes. All regressions include a constant and the following controls: 2000
workforce, 2000 share of workforce in agricultural sectors, 2000 share of workforce in extractive sectors, 2000 share of
workforce in manufacturing, 2000 share of workforce in nontraded sectors, 2000 share of workforce in informal jobs,
2000 share of workforce in rural areas, and a cubic polynomial of income per capita in 2000. Regressions in columns
(3) and (5) include region fixed effects, and in columns (4) and (5) include the lag of the dependent variable for
the period 1991-2000, instrumented with 1991 levels. All regressions are weighted by share of national workforce.
Standard errors are clustered by mesoregion, 138 clusters. Source: 1991, 2000 and 2010 Brazilian Census, and
CEPII BACI. *** p¡.01, ** p¡.05, * p¡.1.
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Chapter 3
The UK Productivity and Jobs
Puzzle: Does the Answer lie in
Wage Flexibility?
3.1 Introduction
In the long-run productivity growth is the main determinant of material wellbeing. Con-
trary to popular belief there is a reasonably tight relationship between the growth of real
hourly compensation and the growth of GDP per hour over the last 40 years (see Pessoa
and Van Reenen, 2012). Figure 3.1 shows that the “decoupling” between average com-
pensation and productivity has been exaggerated, even though some “decoupling” has
been observed from the nineties.1 Given the importance of productivity, it is a serious
concern that labour productivity has fallen since the onset of the Great Recession in 2008.
GDP per worker was about 10% lower at the start of 2013 than it would have been had
productivity continued to grow on a trend of 1.5% per annum (1971-2007 average) after
2008Q2 (see Figure 3.2).
There are many possible culprits behind the fall in labour productivity. One popular
view that is not supported by many academics but has gained much credence among
policy-makers and commentators is “supply side pessimism” (e.g. Giles, 2013; King, 2013).
Under this view, the fall of productivity is structural, perhaps linked to the financial crisis
or to some kind of mismeasurement of “unsustainable” productivity in the decades leading
1 The confusion often arises because of a focus in the decoupling literature on the growth of median
wages (deflated by the CPI) rather than average compensation (deflated by the GDP deflator). Standard
theory points to a long-run relationship between productivity and average compensation with a common
deflator in the absence a growth in the profit share of GDP. For example, median wages can diverge from
average compensation due to a rise in wage inequality as has happened in the UK. Having said this, there
is also some fall in the share of labour compensation in GDP in the 2000s in the US. See Pessoa and Van
Reenen (2013) for more details.
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up to the crisis. The level of current output is close to potential output and attempts to
stimulate the economy with aggressive monetary or fiscal policy simply stokes up inflation.2
0.9
1.1
1.3
1.5
1.7
1.9
2.1
2.3
2.5
1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
In
d
e
x 
(1
9
7
2
 B
as
e
 Y
e
ar
)
Year
Labour Productivity: GDP per Hour (GDP Deflator)
ONS Employees Mean Annual Compensation (GDP Deflator)
Figure 3.1: Hourly Net Decoupling in the UK: growth in GDP per hour vs. Compensation
per hour 1972-2012 (1972=1).
Sources: Updated from Pessoa and Van Reenen (2013), using ONS, OECD and KLEMS data.
In this paper we emphasise one explanation that can potentially account for both
the twin puzzles of low productivity and of surprisingly low unemployment given poor
GDP growth. This explanation emphasises wage flexibility. Real wages are much more
responsive to negative output shocks in the last few years than they have been in previous
recessions (see Gregg et al., 2013). This is a secular change over time that is likely to
be due to weaker union power and welfare reforms that keep effective labour supply high
even when demand is low (e.g. Blundell et al., 2004; Van Reenen, 2004). This flexibility
meant that unlike earlier recessions, real wages fell significantly and employers faced lower
labour costs than in earlier downturns. As real wages fall there is likely to be downward
pressure on the capital-labour ratio (“capital shallowing”) as people are substituted for
structures and equipment. A second force increasing capital shallowing is the fact that this
2 By contrast Bagaria et al. (2012) argued that fiscal stimulus through higher public investment would
be welfare enhancing.
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recession stemmed from a global financial crisis that increased the effective cost of capital,
especially for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Banks have been reluctant to
lend as they repair their balance sheets.
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Figure 3.2: UK labour productivity: output per hour (2008 Q2 = 1).
Sources: ONS, July 2013.
Falling capital-labour ratios in response to changing factor prices, mean that labour
productivity will fall, but not necessarily Total Factor Productivity (TFP). Since it is
TFP that determines long-run economic growth, our view is that this more important
measure of productivity has been more resilient than usually thought. Although there are
many difficulties in accurately measuring the capital stock, especially in recent years, some
simple simulations show that most of the fall of labour productivity could be accounted for
by the fall in effective capital per worker. In these productivity decompositions (subject
to many caveats) TFP trends over the recession look much more like those in the 1970s
and 1980s and are not so surprising given the magnitude of the global shock.
We believe that it is important to consider the relevant counterfactual for the last five
years is not to simply extrapolate a pre-recession trend line as in Figure 2. First, given
that the output shock was huge, financially based and accompanied by severe austerity in
the UK and its main trading partner (the Eurozone), a better counterfactual is to look at
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previous recessions. Second, when considering the collateral damage to the economy we
should consider TFP which tries to remove the impact of changes in other inputs such as
capital and hours rather than GDP per worker. When these adjustments are done, the
current recessions looks more like previous deep post-war recessions than an event that
should cause a change in potential growth.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the basic facts, Section
3 sketches our main theory, Section 4 discusses other explanations of the productivity
mystery, Section 5 offers some preliminary quantitative estimates and Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Some Basic Facts
In an accounting sense the productivity puzzle is easily explained. GDP is still about 3%
below the level it stood at the start of the crisis in 2008 whereas employment levels have
recovered. Consequently, as a matter of arithmetic, GDP per worker fell. Figure 3.3 shows
the cumulative change of GDP since the start of the downturn (black line) compared to its
evolution in all other major recessions in the last century. The current recovery is worse
than all of them as by this point of the business cycle; GDP had made a stronger recovery
in the Great Depression between the wars.
 
Figure 3.3: The profile of recession and recovery.
Notes. Calculated from centred three-month moving averages of monthly GDP, the effect of the miners’ strike in
1921 is excluded from the 1920-1924 profile (the strike started on 31st March 1921and ended on 28th June 1921).
Sources: National Institute of Economic and Social Research estimates of monthly GDP, October 2013.
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Figure 3.4 produces the analogous figure for labour productivity for post-war reces-
sions. It is clear that productivity stalls or drops in all recessions. The fall was likely to
be larger in this recession because the magnitude of the 2008/09 shock was larger. Indeed,
two years after the start of the current recession, labour productivity was at a similar
level to the mid 1970s recession. What is more surprising is that over four years later
productivity has still not recovered and appears worse than all other post-war downturns.
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Figure 3.4: UK productivity levels, output per worker during UK recessions, seasonally
adjusted.
Sources: Patterson (2012).
The fall of GDP per hour looks worse than the fall of total GDP because the labour
market has recovered more quickly than the output market. The fall in GDP per worker
is worse than the fall in GDP per hour as there has been a move to more part-time work,
self-employment and zero hours contracts which has caused hours per worker to fall. This
is explored more deeply by Blundell et al. (2013) and Wadsworth (2013) and we will
examine the quantitative importance of hours in Section V. The key fact though is that
labour productivity has fallen on both a per worker and a per hour basis.
There are two pieces of evidence that suggest that the fall in productivity may be
temporary rather than permanent. Firstly, the UK is not unique in having a “productivity
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puzzle” as other European countries also experienced a fall in labour productivity (see
Figure 3.5). US productivity did do much better than in Europe, but again this is the
flipside of what happened in the jobs market. Although the magnitude of the initial GDP
shock was similar in the US and the European countries, American unemployment rose
much more severely (from 4.4% in late 2006 to 10% in late 2009) compared to the UK
and Germany. Part of the reason for the faster rise in US unemployment in than in the
UK may be because of lower US firing costs, the extensions of unemployment benefit and
deeper problems in the housing market.
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Figure 3.5: Output per hour (2008 Q1 = 100), seasonally adjusted.
Sources: Sources: Aghion et al. (2013). US output per hour covers only the business
sector.
A second cause for possible optimism is that the fall in UK productivity is surprising
in the light of recent economic history. As shown in Aghion et al. (2013), the UK reversed
a century of economic decline in the three decades after the end of the 1970s. Figure 3.6
shows that the advantage in per capita GDP enjoyed by the UK in 1870 over our American
and European counterparts had evaporated by 1979 with the US, France and Germany all
ahead of the UK. In the next three decades however, things changed. On the eve of the
crisis, the UK had again overtaken France and Germany and made inroads into the lead
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of the US.
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Figure 3.6: GDP per capita 1870–2007 (UK = 100).
Sources: Sources: Aghion et al. (2013) and Crafts (2012). Notes. In each year the base
is UK = 100 and each country’s GDP per capita is relative to this. So a value of US =
120, for example, implies the US has a 20% higher GDP per capita than the UK. GDP
per capita is expressed in 1990 International Geary–Khamis dollars.
Some of this was due to improvements in the labour market with employment rates
rising. But a good part was due to an improvement in productivity growth. Figure 3.7
shows that UK productivity growth outstripped the other countries after 1979 under both
Conservative and Labour governments. With the exception of the US this is true even
taking the Great Recession into account. Nor was this strong productivity growth simply
due to unsustainable booms in finance, oil, property or the government sector. Corry et al.
(2012) show that value added per hour growth in the market sector (dropping the public
and property sectors) was about 2.7% per annum 1979-2007 and only around a tenth of
this productivity growth was accounted for by the financial services sector.3
3 Oulton (2013) shows that given the way GDP is measured in the UK finance cannot have caused a
large bias in the measurement of GDP growth in the pre-crisis period. This is essentially because finance
is an intermediate input so is no counted in GDP which is value-added.
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Figure 3.7: Trends in real GDP per worker relative to 1997, from 1979 to 2012.
Sources: Sources: Analysis based on Conference Board data (extracted on 19 of February
2013). GDP is measured in US dollars, at constant prices and constant purchasing power
parity, with a Conference Board base year of 2011. ‘Adult’ refers to working age adults;
data obtained from US Bureau of Labor Force Statistics and includes the civilian popu-
lation aged over 16. Data for unified Germany from 1991. For each country the logged
series is set to 100 in 1997, so the level of the line in any year indicates the cumulative
growth rate (for example, a value of 110 in 2001 indicates that the series has grown by
exp(10/100) − 1 = 11% between 1997 and 2001). The steeper the slope of the line, the
faster growth has been over that period.
Aghion et al. (2013) argue that these productivity improvements can be linked to pol-
icy reforms such as enhanced product market competition (e.g. privatisation and tougher
anti-trust policies), labour market flexibility (due to weakening union power and wel-
fare reforms) and the growth of independent institutions such as utility regulators, the
Monetary Policy Committee and the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
(NICE). If these improvements to UK economic capacity were real, it seems unlikely that
they would quickly disappear.
Having said this, it is of course possible that a large part of the productivity loss is
permanent and/or that the UK is on a much lower trend growth path for the foreseeable
future even though this would be a break with historical experience. To explore this we
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turn to a simple model and empirical evidence in the next two sections.
3.3 Theory
3.3.1 Flexibility of the Labour Market
Consider a representative firm facing competitive market conditions with a constant re-
turns production function of the form:
Q = ALαK1−α, (3.1)
where Q is output, L is labour, K is capital and A is TFP. From the first order
conditions, labour productivity is related to the real product wage, i.e. nominal wages
(W) deflated by the output price deflator (P)
Q
L
=
1
α
W
P
. (3.2)
Real Wage, W/P
Jobs, N
Lab Supply
L*L’
Unemployment
Lab Demand
0
Recession
shock
MRP=W/P
Figure 3.8: Negative output shock and rigid wages – labour productivity stable (“Normal
time”). MRP = marginal revenue product of labour. Fixed real wages.
Sources: Sources: Aghion et al. (2013). US output per hour covers only the business
sector.
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This gives us a conventional downward sloping labour demand curve as illustrated
in Figure 3.8. For simplicity we consider an inelastic supply curve which generates an
equilibrium wage with full employment L = L* where L* is the labour force.
Now consider a recession which is a negative output shock (Q to Q’ ) shifting the labour
demand curve to the left. In a “normal” recession real wages are downwardly rigid, hence
employment will fall and unemployment will emerge (L*- L’ ). Notice that equation 3.2
still holds as even though output and employment are lower their ratio remains the same
(Q’/L’ ). Because real wages are unchanged labour productivity is also unchanged.
The polar opposite case of a classical labour market where real wages are completely
flexible in Figure 3.9. In this case real wages fall to ensure full employment, but now
labour productivity has fallen Q′/L = 1/α(W/P )′ < Q/L. The greater flexibility of real
wages has protected jobs, but measured productivity is lower.
Real Wage, W/P
Jobs, N
Lab Supply
Lab Demand
L*0
MRP=W/P
MRP’=(W/P)’
Recession
shock
Figure 3.9: Negative output shock and flexible wages – labour productivity fall. Flexible
real wages.
Sources: Sources: Aghion et al. (2013). US output per hour covers only the business
sector.
One way the adjustment takes place is through changes in the capital-labour ra-
tio. Combining the first order conditions for labour and capital we obtain K/L =
[(1 − α)/α](W/R) where R is the cost of capital. Assuming that the cost of capital is
unchanged, the fall in W means an offsetting fall in K. This fall in the capital-labour ratio
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will depress labour productivity, the output to labour ratio.
Another way to see this is to re-write the production function in logarithmic changes
and solve for TFP growth:
∆lnA = ∆ln(Q/L)− (1− α)∆ln(K/L). (3.3)
TFP growth is the difference between labour productivity growth and the change in
the (weighted) capital-labour ratio. A pure demand shock causes a fall in ∆ln(Q/L) and
∆ln(K/L) but leaves TFP unchanged.
This is obviously an extreme model as real wages are not really fully flexible and will
not fall by as much as suggested in Figure 3.9. Nevertheless, if the most recent recession
is closer to Figure 3.9 and previous recessions were closer to Figure 3.8, then this may
explain why employment has fallen by less in this recession than in previous recessions,
but labour productivity has fallen by more.
The qualitative evidence gives some support for this simple model. In the four years
after 2008Q2 real product wages fell by 4% (and CPI deflated wages by 8%). This is
unprecedented for a post-war recession and is likely linked to policy reforms that have
weakened unions, lowered the replacement rate and kept up work search pressure on
benefit claimants (those claiming Job Seekers Allowance, but also Incapacity and Lone
Parent Benefits). The sensitivity of wages to negative shocks has increased over time:
Gregg et al. (2013) show that the “wage curve” (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994) has
become more elastic, i.e. an increase in unemployment has a more depressing effect on
real wages today than in the 1980s or 1990s.
3.3.2 Other Causes of a Fall in the Effective Capital to Labour Ratio
In addition to falls in real wages, other factors may have depressed the capital-labour ratio.
Even though this may be a temporary effect, according to Bank of England (2012) the
cost of capital for large firms has risen by about a quarter from 8% in the pre-crisis period
to 10% in 2012 (see Figure 3.10). The increase in the cost of capital for SMEs is even
higher (e.g. Armstrong et al., 2013). Despite a fall in the Bank of England’s base rate
banks have been re-building their balance sheets and are so very reluctant to lend. Various
government credit easing schemes such as Project Merlin, the National Loan Guarantee
Scheme and Funding for Lending do not seem to have made a significant impact.
Investment has been held back by low demand expectations and a higher cost of capital.
But a third factor is that uncertainty has also risen. This always tends to increase in
recessions (see Bloom et al., 2013) but the increase in uncertainty in this recession may
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Figure 3.10: Increasing cost of capital for large firms.
Sources: Bank of England (2012): Consensus Economics, Thomson Reuters Datastream
and Bank of England calculations. Ratio of earnings before interest and depreciation to
enterprise value calculated for all UK listed companies, as defined by Datastream code
TOTMKUK; enterprise value sums the market values of firms’ equities and outstanding
debt. The overall measure is calculated by adding an estimate of expected long-run growth
of earnings.
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have been particularly severe due to the size of the demand shock. Although fiscal policy
was aggressive in the first year of the recession, in subsequent years policy-makers have
struggled to find a consistent way to tackle the problem of low growth and high deficit.
In 2010 the new government accelerated an already tough austerity programme inherited
from the previous Labour administration, and has had to constantly revise its estimates of
growth downwards and budget deficits upwards. The crisis in the Eurozone has a strong
effect on the UK as almost half of all exports go there. The chaos over the fiscal cliff, debt
ceiling and sequester in the US has also added to policy uncertainty. Since uncertainty
can be an important barrier to investment (Bloom et al., 2007; Bloom, 2009), this policy
risk may further reduce investment.4
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Figure 3.11: The collapse of real investment, 2008Q2-2013Q1 (2008 Q2=100). Investment
defined as gross fixed capital formation, in constant prices, seasonally adjusted.
Sources: ONS data, July 2013.
Together these factors may explain the collapse of investment in the UK as shown in
Figure 3.11. The UK has had a problem of low investment for many decades (Aghion
et al., 2013) and this has taken a severe turn for the worse since 2008. In Section V we
4 Of course, uncertainty will also reduce hiring, but since labour has lower adjustment costs than capital
the impact is likely to be less severe.
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show how this helps resolve much of the productivity puzzle as it leads to a fall in capital
intensity and therefore output.
3.4 Other Explanations of the Productivity Slowdown
3.4.1 Mismeasurement
One mundane explanation for the puzzle is simply mismeasurement. The denominator of
labour productivity is simply employment or hours and measurement error is not a major
concern (although there could be some contribution coming from the increasing number
of self-employed and those on zero-hours contracts). A more serious concern is that GDP
may be understated. The GDP number is subject to very large revisions, but Grice (2012)
shows that the magnitude of these revisions is not usually large enough to explain away
the puzzle and future revisions may lower the GDP number rather than raise them.5
3.4.2 Under-utilisation of Resources
As Wadsworth (2013) points out, the UK population has risen by about a million since
2008, so the absolute number of jobs is a poor measure of labour market tightness. As
expected - there has been a significant rise in unemployment and fall in the employment
rate (employees as a proportion of working age population) during the recession. So there
is clear under-utilisation of human resources. Labour productivity measures account for
this, however, as only employed or hours are in the denominator. It may well be, however,
that people are not being used to their full potential when in work. This is usually
described as “labour hoarding” whereby firms will not reduce employment by as much as
expected as they hope that demand will pick up later and do not want to pay the cost of
re-hiring the laid off workers (e.g. if they have firm-specific human capital). This is the
usual explanation of why productivity is pro-cyclical.
The labour hoarding story has become less plausible as time goes by. This is because
employment rates have been rising for the last two years and it is hard to square this with
labour hoarding. There is some evidence that the increase in employment has been in
some low productivity sectors, however, so the hoarding may still be happening in some
firms and sectors where demand remains depressed but employers are reluctant to shed as
many workers even though output has fallen (e.g. Martin and Rowthorn, 2012).
5 Still the disruption of the ONS move to Newport and severe nature of the recession leaves room for
concern. For example, if service exports were severely understated this would help resolve both the puzzle
of both why productivity and exports are so surprisingly low despite a large sterling depreciation.
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3.4.3 Zombies: Misallocation of Capital
Representative firm models are a poor reflection of economic reality as firms differ con-
siderably in their productivity, efficiency and management quality (Bloom et al., 2013).
Modern theories of heterogeneous firms emphasise that much of aggregate productivity
growth is caused by the reallocation of capital from less productive to more productive
firms. A given aggregate quantity of capital may be allocated in different ways across firms
of heterogeneous efficiency. Allocating too much capital to inefficient firms for example
will diminish aggregate productivity. This has been shown to be of first order importance
when considering aggregate productivity differences across countries (e.g. Bartelsman et
al., 2013; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Bloom et al., 2013). Some have argued that this
could account for the fall in UK productivity (Bank of England, 2012). Another way of
saying this is that the effective amount of aggregate capital has fallen due to increased
misallocation.
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Figure 3.12: Company liquidations from 1984 to 2012.
Sources: Bureau van Dijk, The Insolvency Service and Bank calculations. The number of
companies that reported negative pre-tax profits in each year as a percentage of the total
number of private non-financial companies in the Bureau van Dijk data set that report
data on pre-tax profits.
Companies in the mining and quarrying, electricity and gas supply, and water supply
sectors and extra-territorial organisations are excluded from the calculations.
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There is some suggestive evidence of these capital misallocation forces having got worse
in the recession. First, the rate of bankruptcies and liquidations appears to be particularly
low given the macro-economic climate (See Figure 3.12). Second, the cross sectional
variance of employment, output and prices has increased across sectors (see Figure 3.13).
Finally, Field and Franklin (2013) point to the increased variance of productivity across
establishments even within sectors.
Why should misallocation have become worse? First, Bloom et al. (2013) argue
that increased uncertainty is pervasive in all recessions and that this is responsible for a
substantial fraction of aggregate productivity falls. As noted above, uncertainty may be
particularly severe in the current recession.
A second set of reasons focuses more directly on the dysfunctionality of the financial
system – after all, a massive banking crisis was the catalyst for the 2008/9 Great Re-
cession. The major issue here is of bank “forbearance”, i.e. that banks are reluctant to
call in underperforming loans to firms and projects that can no longer make their inter-
est payments. Hence low productivity projects and firms that in “normal times” should
have exited the economy do not, and their persistence pulls down aggregate productivity.
Why should banks behave in such a manner? It may be rational to allow debt restruc-
turing/forgiveness if lenders believe that projects are ultimately viable and demand will
recover (analogous to labour hoarding). However, lenders may be sure that a project will
not be viable and still not call in their loans if they are reluctant to admit the true state of
the under-performing loans on their balance sheet as this may force them into bankruptcy
or regulatory intervention. This seems to have been a pervasive feature of Japan following
the bust of the asset bubble in the 1980s (e.g. Cabellero et al., 2008). A second reason for
forbearance may be political pressure, especially when many banks are fully or partially
owned by the public sector (e.g. RBS) as politicians are reluctant to push SMEs into
bankruptcy and be seen to be making workers redundant.
These under-performing companies are often pejoratively called “zombies”. If output
could be swiftly reallocated from low productivity zombies to other projects this would
tend to raise productivity. However, if some of the value of the assets were lost this is a
cost to be born in mind. For example, there may be firm-specific capital that is lost or
workers may spend considerable time in non-employment before they are reallocated to
more productive firms. Since these problems may be particularly severe in deep recessions,
it is not obvious that faster closing down of the zombies is welfare enhancing. Although
it is often assumed in Austrian economics that recessions are the best time for cleansing
the economy of low productivity firms, the evidence on this is unclear. For example, in a
financially driven recession many productive firms may also be closed down during a sharp
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downturn if they are credit constrained (e.g. smaller actual and potential innovators as in
Garicano and Steinwender, 2013).
 
Figure 3.13: Misallocation across sectors.
Sources: Bank of England (2012), ONS and Bank of England calculations.
The direct micro-evidence on zombies is rather mixed. In the early part of the recession
in 2008-2009 it seemed as if most of the fall in productivity was confined to small firms who
may be most susceptible to forbearance. However, after 2009 it appears that productivity
also fell in larger firms. Furthermore, decompositions of the aggregate fall in labour
productivity suggest it is a within establishment rather than a between establishment
phenomenon (Bank of England, 2013). However, the fall in labour productivity in these
surviving firms is all accounted for by falls in real wages and investment (Crawford et al.,
2013)
Since the forbearance story is mainly on the exit/entry dimension, this suggests that
the problem is with ongoing plants rather than zombies. Consequently, the role of zombies
seems less important than changes in factor prices.
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3.4.4 Intangible Capital
Our focus so far has been on tangible capital, but an influential line of research suggests
that intangible capital such as scientific know-how, business practices, advertising, etc.
may be as important as more conventional equipment and structures. Goodridge et al.
(2013) allow for intangible capital in analysing UK productivity growth through 2010 and
argue that about a third of the productivity slowdown could be due to mismeasurement
of intangible capital. The essential problem is that output growth is mismeasured when
intangible capital is ignored. Intangible investment should be part of GDP but is instead
treated only as an intermediate input and therefore not included in GDP (which is a
value added based measure net of intermediate inputs). During times when intangible
investment is growing fast (as in the late 1990s and early 2000s) GDP growth and therefore
productivity is over-estimated. During periods when intangible investment is growing more
slowly (as today) GDP and productivity growth is under-estimated.
3.4.5 Labour Quality
Another explanation of the fall in labour productivity is that the quality of the workforce
could have deteriorated: for example, older workers may be delaying retirement because of
the fall in house prices. In fact, labour quality tends to rise during recessions as unskilled
and less experienced workers are more likely to be unemployed. The current recession
is similar in this regard. But the relevant counterfactual is what happened in previous
recessions. It does not appear that there is much of a difference in the increase in labour
quality in this recession compared to previous recessions, however (Blundell et al., 2013).
This may seem surprising given the more flexible labour market, but it appears that the
main reason for the fall in aggregate real wages is that incumbent workers are accepting
more nominal wage freezes which are eroding aggregate real wages.
3.5 Putting it All Together
Table 3.1 gives some examples of some growth accounting estimates over the recession
where we are just using 3.3 to decompose the growth of GDP per worker: ∆ln(Q/L) =
∆lnA+(1−α)∆ln(K/L). These are very crude, back of the envelope estimates in order to
examine whether the labour market flexibility story might matter in a quantitative sense.
We focus on the period from the start of the Great Recession in 2008Q2 (just before
Lehman’s collapse) to the latest data at the time of writing (2013Q1). Over this period
whole economy real GDP fell by 3.1% (column (1)), employment rose by 0.8% and so
labour productivity (GDP per worker) fell by 3.9% (column (2)). This is the productivity
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puzzle we are trying to explain.
Table 3.1: Example of Aggregate Productivity Growth Accounting Exercise
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Change in Change in Change in Contribution % Labour
GDP labour effective of capital to productivity
productivity capital-labour change in labour change accounted for
(GDP per ratio productivity by capital-labour
worker) changes
1. Baseline -3.1 -3.9 -9.1 -3.1 79%
(2008Q2-2013Q1)
2. Use changes in factor -3.1 -3.9 -6.1 -2.1 52%
prices (2008Q2-2013Q1)
3. Baseline -3.8 -4.0 -7.1 -2.4 59%
(2008Q2-2012Q2)
4. Lower depreciation -3.1 -3.9 -6.8 -2.3 59%
rate (2008Q2-2013Q1)
Notes: Assumes labour costs are two-thirds of value added & Constant Returns to Scale ; Capital stock estimated
from ONS 2009 whole economy net capital stock updated with real investment series as ONS has not published
capital stock estimates since 2010 (depreciation=2.2% per quarter except in row 4 where it is 2.06%).
Unfortunately, estimating the change in the capital stock is extremely hard as the ONS
have suspended the series and have not produced a measure of the UK capital stock since
2009 (ONS, 2010). Presumably concerns over data quality were particularly fierce during
the severe downturn. Aggregate capital stocks are very hard to measure even in the best
circumstances so the calculations in Table 3.1 should be regarded as very rough exercises
to give the reader an idea of the magnitudes of capital shallowing that would be needed
to account for the productivity fall.
A series for the volume of real investment is produced by ONS so we update the net
capital stock in 2008 with this quarterly investment series using the perpetual inventory
method.6 Our baseline estimates suggest that capital per worker has declined by just over
9% (column (4)). Assuming that GDP is split two-thirds to labour costs and one third
to capital costs implies that capital shallowing has made a contribution of -3.1 percentage
points to declining labour productivity (column (4)). Hence, changes in capital can account
for almost four fifths of the decline in labour productivity. This is obviously a much
smaller proportion of the gap between current labour productivity and what it might have
been “but for” the recession (recall Figure 2), but we have argued that this is a poor
counterfactual. A more plausible counterfactual would be the productivity experience of
previous severe recessions.
To examine this we use the estimates of Table 3.1 row 1 to produce a crude TFP index
for the whole economy for the current recession and compare this to the 1970s and 1980s
6 To be precise we use the whole economy current net capital stock for 2008 as the initial value of the
capital stock in 2008Q2 (CIXM from ONS, 2010). We then uprate this using the PIM with the first value
of seasonally adjusted gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) from 2008Q3 onwards. The constant price
investment series is rebased to be in 2008Q3 prices (instead of 2010) using the current and constant values
of GFCF (series NPQT and NPQS). We use a quarterly depreciation rate of 2.2%, slightly higher than
normal to reflect capital scrapping in the baseline results, but check the sensitivity of this assumption to
alternative depreciation rates.
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recessions in Figure 3.14.7 This figure shows that in TFP terms the current recession is
not so unusual compared to severe recessions in the past. In 2010 the TFP performance
was actually better than the previous recessions, but it then stalled so by the end of 2012 it
was worse than the 1980s recession (but still better than the 1970s). Given that the GDP
fall was worse than in both these recessions, there is much less of a mystery to be explained
in TFP terms. The fall of measured TFP in recessions is likely to be a more standard
combination of labour hoarding and misallocation – there is no compelling evidence of
a permanent structural change in underlying potential output growth according to these
estimates.
time
 TFP_current  TFP_70s
 TFP_80s
1 2 3 4 5 6
92
94
96
98
100 1980s
Current
1970s
Figure 3.14: Change of TFP in recessions over time.
Notes: 1970s and 1980s derived from EU KLEMS data by Goodridge et al. (2013) . 1970s
recession is 1973-1978.
1980s recession is 1979-1984; Current is 2007-2012. 2000s authors’ estimates.
Our estimates of the fall in the aggregate capital stock are larger than others have used
on shorter runs of data (e.g. ONS, 2013; Goodridge et al., 2013) so we performed some
checks on the plausibility of the estimates. The model presented earlier implies that the
evolution of relative factor uses could be described as ∆ln(K/L) = ∆ln(W/R). The real
product wage fell by 4.1% in the four years after 2008Q2 and the Bank of England (2012)
7 It is crude because inter alia we are not making adjustments for heterogeneous types of capital or
labour services. For a much more sophisticated analysis over a shorter period of the recession see Goodridge
et al. (2013).
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suggests an increase in the cost of capital of 2%. This implies a fall in the capital-labour
ratio of 6.1% and therefore 52% the fall in row 2 of Table 3.1. So this is smaller than our
baseline, but still more than half of the fall.
There is an arbitrariness in using 2013Q1 as the end date and this will shift of course as
more data becomes available. We checked that too much hinges on this by re-estimating
over different sample periods. Row three looks at a four year window from 2008Q2 to
2012Q2 and shows that 59% of the fall is accounted for. In the final row we use a lower
depreciation rate of capital (equal to 8% annual following Oulton, 2013) and find a similar
result to the previous row. We also considered using an adjustment for hours.8 Although
hours per worker fell at the start of the recession, by the start of 2013 hours had recovered
so this adjustments makes no discernible difference.
Taking Table 3.1 as a whole capital shallowing caused by changes in factor prices seems
to account for over half of the fall in labour productivity in the period since the start of
the Great Recession.
As noted at the start of this sub-section, considerable uncertainty surrounds these
estimates due to the difficulty of measuring the capital stock. Oulton (2013), for example,
finds no fall in the capital stock from 2007Q4. The reasons for the differences include
(i) he looks at the market sector where inputs and outputs are better measured than
our focus on the whole economy9; (ii) he uses a lower depreciation rate (we have used a
higher depreciation rate to reflect greater capital scrapping and lower capital quality due to
forbearance and weaker entry) and (iii) he calculates the initial capital stock in a different
way. This may be a more reasonable approach and as time goes on we will hopefully get
improved capital stock measures which should help sort out whether declining effective
capital is as important as we think it is.
3.6 Conclusion
We have argued that the twin puzzles of the fall in labour productivity (GDP per worker)
and the good performance of the labour market may both have their source in greater
wage flexibility compared to earlier recessions (probably because of labour market policy
reforms over the last 30 years). The big difference of this recession is (i) its severity and
(ii) that real wages have fallen dramatically. The fall in the price of labour coupled with
the rise in the cost of capital is likely to cause a fall in the capital to labour ratio which
means that labour productivity falls substantially even though TFP has barely fallen at
8 In other words we look at including a correction for the change in average hours worked (∆ln(H/L)):
∆ln(Q/L) = ∆lnA+ (1− α)∆ln(K/L) + α∆ln(H/L)
9 The market economy drops the public sector and property. Dwellings are a problematic category for
productivity analysis.
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all. The fall in TFP is similar to other (less severe) post-war recessions from which the
economy eventually recovered. The fall in measured TFP in recessions is likely to be due
to factors such as under-utilisation of factors and uncertainty-driven misallocation. These
are real costs but rather are more a feature of a typical cyclical downturn rather than
permanent, structural changes.
This analysis suggests that UK economy was not fundamentally the victim of a large
supply side shock, but rather a very severe demand side shock (exacerbated by the ongoing
problems of the financial system). We should not be complacent – the longer the recession
goes on, the greater risks of structural damage through hysteresis effects (e.g. DeLong and
Summers, 2012). However, these demand problems are amenable to conventional solutions
of fiscal and monetary stimulus as they imply a substantial output gap. In other words,
the argument of supply side pessimists that such stimulus programmes would simply lead
to higher inflation do not, in our view, appear to be strongly supported by the data.
The message of this paper is not that structural policies are unnecessary. For example,
strategies to improve the functioning of credit markets are vital. Long-run policies to
improve investment in human capital, infrastructure and innovation are also extremely
important for long-run economic health as argued by Aghion et al. (2013).
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Chapter 4
Decoupling of Wage Growth and
Productivity Growth? Myth and
Reality
4.1 Introduction
It is widely believed that in the US wage growth has fallen massively behind productivity
growth. Recently, it has also been suggested that the UK is starting to follow the same
path. Analysts point to the much faster growth of GDP per hour than median wages. The
purpose of this paper is to look at the decoupling between wages and productivity in the
UK and compare this with other countries, in particular the US. We do this by defining
what is meant by decoupling and then examining trends in these variables between 1972
and 2010.
We distinguish between “net decoupling” – the difference in growth of GDP per hour
deflated by the GDP deflator and average compensation deflated by the same index -
and “gross decoupling” – the difference in growth of GDP per hour deflated by the GDP
deflator and median wages deflated by a measure of consumer price inflation (CPI-U-RS
in the US and RPI in the UK). Basic economics would predict that real compensation
growth deflated by the producer price (the labour costs that employers face) should follow
real labour productivity growth (value added per hour), so net decoupling should only
occur if labour’s share falls as a proportion of gross GDP, something that rarely happens
over sustained periods. So net decoupling would be a real surprise.
We show that over the past 40 years that there is almost no net decoupling, although
there is evidence of substantial gross decoupling in the US and, to a lesser extent, the
UK. This difference can be accounted for essentially by three factors (i) compensation
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inequality (which means the average compensation is growing faster than the median
one), (ii) “benefits” - the wedge between compensation (which includes employer-provided
benefits like pensions and health insurance) and wages which do not and (iii) differences in
the GDP deflator and the CPI-U-RS/RPI deflator (i.e. producer wages and consumption
wages). These three factors explain basically ALL of the gross decoupling leaving only a
small amount of “net decoupling”. The first two factors are important in both countries,
whereas the difference in price deflators is only important in the US.
This is illustrated in the Figure 4.1 for the UK. Looking at the 1972-2010 period
as a whole productivity grew almost 42.5% faster than median wage – this is “gross
decoupling”. But there was almost zero net decoupling (the blue bar at -0.8%). The
diagonally hatched bar and the dotted bar are inequality (a 16.6% contribution) and
“benefits” (a 16% contribution) which explain just about all the divergence between gross
and net decoupling. Benefits are the difference between compensation (which includes
health and pension benefits) and wages which do not.
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Figure 4.1: Decoupling Decomposition in the UK, 1972-2010
We also look at the share of labour in national income as a cross check. These trends
are consistent with our analysis. Labour’s share has fallen only slightly as a share of GDP
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in the US and UK. Interestingly, there is more of a fall in this “functional” share of income
in Continental EU nations and Japan, so there might be evidence of capitalists doing a
lot better than workers in these nations whereas the latter group have done a lot better
in the US and UK.
Although we focus at the macro level we also analyse trends in productivity and
wages at the industry level. Again, we find no evidence of net decoupling here except
(paradoxically) in the “non-market” sectors of real estate, health, education and public
administration. We suspect this is because of poor measurement of value added in these
sectors. In other sectors (“the market economy) compensation growth has tended, if
anything, to outstrip productivity growth.
In terms of policy, there has been a lack of clarity over what specifically is meant
by decoupling. Our results suggest that net decoupling is essentially a myth and cannot
be used to justify redressing the overall balance between wages and profits. Inequality
within the group of employees however, is a major issue and the existing literature has
been correct to focus on the causes of this and what could be done to improve matters.
Improvements in the quantity and quality of skills and education for people in the bottom
half of the distribution are the most important.
In terms of research questions, we need to understand a lot better why there is diver-
gence between the wage series and compensation series. In the US this is driven by the
rapid inflation in healthcare insurance costs, something that healthcare reform is seeking
to tackle. This is not the case in the UK where pension costs seem to be more of the dom-
inant force. Of course, the underlying reasons for the growth of wage inequality, especially
the recent polarisation of the labour market remain very important research topics.
The structure of this report is as follows. Section 4.2 examines the theory of decoupling,
section 4.3 looks at decoupling in the UK and section 4.4 looks at decoupling in the US.
In section 4.5 we turn to examine labour’s share of GDP across many countries so we can
see the UK and US in comparison with other OECD nations. Finally we return to the
UK to look at industry-level trends in wages and productivity in Section 4.6. Sections 4.7
and 4.8 draws some conclusions for policy and for future research.
4.2 Decoupling Theory
Decoupling has had no precise definition, but loosely it refers to the difference between
wages and productivity, or rather the idea that wage growth is substantially lagging behind
productivity growth. Appendix 4.A shows what we would expect from some basic economic
relationships.
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We define the notion of Net Decoupling (ND) as the difference between the growth
of GDP per hour (labour productivity) deflated by the GDP deflator and average com-
pensation deflated by the same index. We would normally expect labour productivity
and compensation to grow at the same rate in long-run. Appendix 4.A gives a model
which shows the conditions under which we would expect this to happen. In particular, if
the production function parameters and preferences are stable across time then we would
expect a 10% growth in GDP per hour to lead to a 10% growth in real compensation.
Of course, net decoupling could certainly occur for a number of reasons. For example:
• In the short run there could be shocks that disturb the long-run equilibrium.
• Technological changes that are biased against labour as a whole.
• An increase in the profit mark-up (for example if product market competition weak-
ens).
• A fall in the bargaining power of workers compared to firms1.
• Changes in effective labour supply – for example the growth of globalisation, immi-
gration, female participation.
It is worth noting that examining the net decoupling relationship is robust (in principle)
to changes in the composition of the workforce. If the quality of the workforce increases
because workers gain more human capital, this will increase their productivity and their
wages by an equal amount, according to the marginal revenue productivity condition.
Similarly, if there is an influx of low skilled immigrants then average productivity and
wages will fall together.
By contrast, Gross Decoupling (GD) is the measure more frequently looked at in
policy circles. It is not so easy to relate this to basic theory, but a common definition would
be to use the same measure of productivity as net decoupling but instead of average real
compensation use median wage deflated by a consumer price deflator such as the CPI.
Thus, the difference in gross vs. net decoupling can be defined as:
GD −ND = Inequality +Wage wedge+ Price wedge.
The first term (“inequality”) is the difference between the average compensation and
the median one, the second term (“wage wedge”) is the difference between compensation
1 This will only happen in some models. In basic models of bargaining over wages, a fall in worker
power implies a lower nominal wage at a firm, but no change in the wage bill share of value added, because
employers increase employment to exactly offset the wage bill (i.e. move up the labour demand curve. Even
in efficient bargaining models the aggregate share of labor may not change - see Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2003); Layard and Nickell (1998).
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and wages and the third term (“price wedge”) is the difference between the GDP deflator
and the consumer price index. These can all change even if gross decoupling stays the
same.
Gross decoupling is an important economic indicator since it measures how the pro-
ductivity growth is accruing to the middle worker in the economy and it considers wages
(not compensation), a variable that is more tightly related to workers’ static material
wellbeing. Moreover, the changes in the true cost of living faced by individuals seem to
be better represented by the consumer price index than by the GDP deflator, increasing
the importance of this measure.
Economists would tend to be more surprised by systematic net decoupling, though.
For one thing, net decoupling would imply that the share of labour in GDP should be
falling, and the stability of labour’s share is generally taken (rightly or wrongly) as one
of the stylised facts of the US and UK economies. We will examine the trends in labour’s
share in this report explicitly and show that the results are consistent with what we find
when looking at the productivity and compensation trends. In fact, the labour share of
GDP for the UK and US look relatively stable, whereas the share has declined significantly
in Japan and many Continental Europe and countries.
4.3 Macro Analysis of Decoupling in the UK
4.3.1 Data Sources
We use several sources of data to compute hourly compensation and productivity (see
Data Appendix for more details). We measure labour productivity by examining GDP
per hour based on national accounts from the ONS. The information on total number
of hours worked in the economy is provided by the OECD. Hours is obviously a more
appropriate measure of labour input than total workers because of part-time working.
But may be subject to greater measurement error so in subsection 4.3.5 below we also
consider GDP per worker and annual compensation.
The basic measure of wage (w) is the basic payments, allowances, tips, and bonuses
that workers receive pre-tax. This is recorded from representative samples of households
in the General Household Survey (GHS) and the Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS is
a quarterly sample of 60,000 households living at private addresses2 and is the main source
of UK micro-data on the labour market. It has been running since 1976 but comprehensive
wage information was only asked in 1992 and subsequent quarters. The GHS has been
2 From 1992 onwards, all the UK is included, but before this year only Great Britain was included in
the database.
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running since 1972, and although the sample size has varied a lot between years it is much
smaller than the LFS. In order to get the longest time series we splice the series together
using the GHS prior to 1992 and the LFS after 1992.
We also cross checked the wage results with the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings
(ASHE) - formerly known as the New Earnings Survey (NES) – which is an administrative
dataset covering 1% of the working population. Employers are asked to provide detailed
information on the hours and earnings of their employees to ASHE (note that it does not
include self-employed workers).
A wider measure to appropriately look at decoupling is workers compensation (c). This
includes non-pay benefits that are received by the worker such as pension contributions,
employer’s payroll tax (NI), health benefits, etc. Obviously these are costs to the employer
and benefits to the employee, but they will not be captured by the standard surveys.
The advantage of compensation is that it is a theoretically more appropriate measure
to examine decoupling. The disadvantage is that there is no dataset that can track the
inequality of compensation over time in the UK (in the US this is possible – see Pierce,
2001). By contrast, with the more narrow measure of wages from LFS we can examine
how wages have changed at different points of the distribution. In particular, we can look
at how median wages have done compared to the mean. As inequality rises, the mean
worker will be increasingly richer than the median worker.
The widest measure of employers’ costs is labour costs. This is the same as compen-
sation but also adds on other labour-related costs that may not be regarded as direct
benefits to the worker such as payroll taxes and training costs. Trends in this look rather
similar to compensation, so we will focus on compensation and use labour costs only as
a cross check in Section 4.5. Our approach follows the majority of the literature – see
Krueger (1999) or Gollin (2002) for example.
Without further assumptions, it is not possible to compute the self-employed wage
and compensation directly from the ONS national accounts data. A common practice
is to assume that employees and self-employed earn the same on average. Although we
explicitly assume this in Section 4.5, in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 this assumption would not
change the analysis since we consider only growth rates in them. Note that computing
wage and compensation per hour using data from the ONS also requires information on the
total number of hours worked by all employees (excluding self-employed) in the economy,
which is provided by the EU KLEMS.
Labour productivity is computed as:
Labour Productivity = volume measure of output / measure of labour input
The OECD uses gross domestic product (GDP) or gross value added (GVA) as a
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volume measure of output. The UN System of Accounts (SNA) defines GDP (measured
at market prices) as the sum of the GVA estimates, plus taxes on products (for example,
value added tax, alcohol duty), less subsidies on products. It is important to point out
that GVA and GDP are highly correlated over time within a country, as reported by the
OECD. More specifically, from 1972 to 2010, the correlation between the two measures
is 0.99 in the UK. Although we use GVA as our measure of output in Sections 4.6 (and
in Appendix 4.E) due to restrictions in the KLEMS database, we will focus on the more
standard GDP measure.
4.3.2 Trends in Compensation and Wages
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Figure 4.2: Real Mean Weekly Earnings in UK
Sources: ONS, GHS/LFS Survey, ASHE. “Workers” includes both Employees and Self-Employed.
Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 plot the growth over time for compensation and some wage
series mentioned above (all series consider the mean and are deflated by the GDP deflator).
The legend in the graph describes the source, the definition of the series, and the deflator
to convert the series to real terms. If the name of the series is related to “workers”, then
it includes both employees and self-employed. By contrast “employees” excludes the self-
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employed. The structure of most of the figures in this paper is that we normalize the level
of the series to be 1 in the base year (usually 1972) so the number on the vertical axis can
be read as a growth rate. For example, the fact that the ONS wage series (red squares)
reached 1.7 in 2010 indicates that real hourly compensation was 70% higher in 2010 than
in 1972. An arithmetic growth rate of 1.84% per annum (70/(2010-1972)).
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2.0
2.1
2.2
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
In
d
e
x 
(1
9
7
2
 B
as
e
 Y
e
ar
)
Year
ONS Employees Mean Hourly Wage (GDP Deflator)
LFS Employees Mean Hourly Earnings (GDP Deflator)
ASHE Employees Mean Hourly Earnings (GDP Deflator)
LFS Workers Mean Hourly Earnings (GDP Deflator)
ONS Employees Mean Hourly Compensation (GDP Deflator)
Figure 4.3: Real Mean Hourly Earnings in the UK/GB
Sources: ONS, GHS/LFS Survey, ASHE. “Workers” includes both Employees and Self-Employed.
Figure 4.2 shows that employees’ real weekly earnings from ASHE and LFS follow each
other quite closely and indeed are identical in growth rates over the 1972-2010 period as a
whole. The LFS workers’ wage has grown more slowly than the employees’ earnings series
because it includes the self-employed and measured earnings of the self-employed appears
to have grown more slowly since 1993. We should be cautious about this as self-employed
earnings are hard to define as some of the compensation may be taken directly in the form
of dividends, profits or in other ways3. Wages computed by the ONS seem to be growing
much less than the other series, but this is due to the fact that ONS wages are in annual
terms, while other series are weekly. The growth of part-time and temporary work will be
3 Note also that workers’ earnings growth after 1993 is based on the GHS survey (and not only on the
LFS survey as the in the employees series), which becomes noisy after 2005. This is another reason why
the workers series should be interpreted carefully.
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reflected in annual earnings more than it is in weekly earnings.
Figure 4.3 considers the same five series but now in terms of hourly earnings4. Note
first that, as in the weekly case, including self-employed earnings drops the growth rate
of wages. The self-employed are facing slower earning growth than other groups and the
difference is greater in hourly terms than in weekly ones (although the caveats about
data must still be taken into account, especially over hours now). Second, in this figure
the ONS wage presents a similar growth when compared to the LFS series as we are
measuring things on a common basis. Third, ASHE seems to have faster growth in hourly
wages than the other series, but this may be due to needing to make more imputations
regarding hours. In what follows we will focus on the ONS and LFS series.
Note that in both figures the ONS compensation is growing faster than the ONS wage.
Moreover, it is growing faster than all wage series in Figure 4.3 (except for the ASHE
measure with its approximation). Note that the difference in growth starts to increase
in the beginning of the last decade, increasing ever since. Obviously, some components
included only in the compensation measure are growing much faster than wages. More on
the reasons behind this growth difference in Subsection 4.3.5 below.
4.3.3 Labour Productivity Trends
Figure 4.4 shows GDP (and GVA) per hour and per worker using the GDP deflator. GDP
per hour has more than doubled between 1972 and 2010 (a factor of 2.14) whereas GVA per
hour has about doubled. Note that this is faster than the growth of wages discussed above
which is the first sign of decoupling. The per worker equivalents of these productivity
measures have grown more slowly which reflects the increase in part-time work (fewer
hours per worker).
Note that either in annual or hourly terms, computing labour productivity using the
GVA instead of the GDP decreases the labour productivity growth in the period as a
whole by approximately 8%. Hence, since we consider GDP per Hour in our analysis,
keep in mind that the decoupling would be smaller (or inexistent) if we considered GVA
per hour instead. We show in Appendix 4.C results using gross value added which show
even less decoupling on this measure – thus using GDP is actually more “conservative”
and gives decoupling a better chance of working, as will become clear.
4 Although the ASHE hourly earnings are available only from 1982, we included it here considering
that before this period its growth was the average between the LFS and the ONS wage growth.
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Figure 4.4: Labour Productivity in the UK
Sources: ONS, OECD.
4.3.4 Decoupling between Hourly Productivity and Compensation in
the UK?
No Net Decoupling in the UK
We start our analysis considering hourly measures since they are more robust to some
kinds of shifts in the labour market composition. Figure 4.5 describes the basic story
behind the decoupling in the UK. Looking at the 1972-2010 period as whole both labour
productivity and hourly compensation have doubled, so there is not much sign of net
decoupling. Having said this, there are periods when the two series diverge. During the
recession periods of the late 1970s and early 1990s wage growth outstripped productivity
growth which is consistent with the idea of some labour hoarding – firms holding on to
workers even when their productivity is low because demand is low (inverse decoupling if
you will). There is even some sign of this in the current recession where wage falls have
been outstripped by productivity falls5. By contrast, during boom periods, especially the
long upswing from 1994-2007 productivity growth was faster than compensation growth
leading to some decoupling.
5 It is worth mentioning that the 2008 crisis brought a lot of noise to the data and this data may be
revised at some point by the ONS.
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Figure 4.5: Hourly Net Decoupling in the UK
Sources: ONS, OECD.
Explaining Gross and Net Decoupling
Given the absence of net decoupling one might legitimately ask “why so much debate
around decoupling in the UK”? The reason is that some policy analysts have been focused
on other important measures of median wages, in particular what we call gross decoupling.
Rather than look at the real hourly average compensation series, the focus has been more
on the median hourly wage series. We plot the productivity and compensation curves
again in Figure 4.6, but now we add to them some alternative wage and compensation
measures6.
Looking at the median LFS worker wage (including self-employed and deflated by the
Retail Price Index -RPI). This has only increased by a factor of 1.71 over our sample period,
compared to a factor of 2.14 for productivity and compensation. So there is something
like a 43% difference between productivity and median wage growth on this measure of
gross decoupling which disappears when we consider net decoupling. Figure 4.6 shows us
why this is the case. Looking at the curve for LFS median compensation we can see that
the line is more than one third way between the mean compensation/productivity by the
6 Our LFS compensation measure is calculated assuming that the growth in benefits is proportional to
the one observed in the ONS series, i.e., we multiply the LFS earnings series by a factor equals to the ratio
of ONS compensation to ONS wages. This approach is similar to the one used in Mishel and Gee (2012).
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end of the period. This implies about one third of the gap is due to inequality. The other
half is essentially due to the faster growth of compensation than wages.
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Figure 4.6: Hourly Decoupling in the UK
Sources: GHS/LFS Survey, OECD, HM Treasury, and ONS. “Workers” includes both Employees and Self-Employed.
This divergence between wages and compensation is surprising – it is showing us that
the employer provided benefits such as pensions have been growing much faster than wages
(the difference between the ONS average wage measure and LFS average wage measure
is trivial). Even though the compensation growth level is greater than the wages one
throughout the period, we can observe that the difference increases significantly in the
2000s. What would be behind this?
The ONS description of the national accounts system clearly shows us which are the
components responsible for the fast growth of compensation compared to wages. The
non-wage compensation is decomposed in Table 4.1 from 1999 to 2007. The accounts
that are included in compensation (but not in wages) are employers’ contributions to
national insurance schemes and employers’ contributions to pension schemes (funded and
unfunded). The first component grew 67% (from £31bn to £52.3bn) in nominal terms
between 1999 and 2007. The second grew considerably more: 98% (from £ 32.9 to £ 65.3
billions) in nominal terms in this same period (from which the relevant part corresponds
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to growth in funded pension schemes).
In the meantime, wages and salaries grew at a modest rate of 47% (not shown in
the Table). Hence, contributions to pension schemes are the major component behind
this disparity. This fact might reflect the various legal acts that affected pension schemes
during the 1990s7.
Table 4.1: Non-Wage Compensation Decomposition (millions of GB Pounds)
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
National Insurance 31,286 34,028 35,706 35,735 39,890 43,586 46,741 49,552 52,300
Contributions
Notionally Funded 2,115 2,369 2,754 3,045 5,177 5,616 6,028 6,472 7,003
Pension Schemes
Funded 19,128 20,891 21,836 26,025 32,054 38,473 42,963 47,527 45,995
Pension Schemes
Imputed Social 11,670 12,536 12,920 13,977 11,692 11,031 11,931 11,739 12,328
Contributions*
Sources: ONS - United Kingdom National Accounts: The Blue Book 2008 edition.
*This last account includes employers’ imputed contributions to unfunded government pension schemes.
In the Appendix 4.C we show the decoupling in terms of GVA per hour (and not GDP).
Even the net decoupling observed from 1993 almost disappears when we consider the GVA
as our measure of output, showing an even closer correlation between compensation and
productivity growth.
Figure 4.7 decomposes the difference between gross and net decoupling more formally.
It compares the contribution of each of the components listed to the final difference be-
tween labour productivity (measured as GDP per hour) deflated by the GDP deflator and
the LFS median hourly earnings (including self-employment) deflated by the RPI. The
numbers behind each element are in Appendix 4.D, Table 4.3.
Looking at the entire four decades of data, we see that gross decoupling reaches a
maximum in 2010 of 42.5%. Yet, as we noted net decoupling is zero (actually it is slightly
negative). As noted above, the two largest components of this are inequality (the bar)
which accounts for 16.6 percentage points and non-wage benefits (the horizontal lines,
the difference between compensation and wages) which accounts for 16 percentage points.
So between them, inequality and benefits account for 32.5% of the 42.5 percentage points
gross decoupling. Other components that make some minor contribution are the difference
between the GDP deflator and the RPI (3.1%) arising from the faster growth of the RPI
than the GDP deflator and the gap between employees and self-employed earnings in the
UK (5.5%). Next, the ONS wage series growth was slightly faster than the LFS wage series
7 The Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999, the Pensions Act 1995 and the Pension Schemes Act
1993.
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(2 percentage points). Nevertheless, these last three components are minor – inequality
and benefits are basically the story taking the last 4 decades together.
Figure 4.7 also performs the same decomposition for other years. As Figure 4.6 showed,
there is some net decoupling in some periods, especially in the Labour years of 1997-2010,
although it is still very small compared to the headline gross decoupling figures. Net
decoupling takes its maximum value in 2007. In this year gross decoupling was 40.6% and
net decoupling was 8.1%. Inequality contributed 14.4% and benefits 11.8% so they were
still both more important.
Looking over the sample period, as noted above there are times when compensation
has outstripped productivity growth. From 1990 inequality started to make an important
contribution to gross decoupling and “benefits” became much more important from the
mid-nineties, although they have always made a contribution throughout the last 40 years.
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Figure 4.7: Decoupling Decomposition in the UK
Sources: GHS/LFS Survey, OECD, HM Treasury, and ONS.
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4.3.5 Weekly and Annual Measures of productivity and wages
Figure 4.8 summarizes the decoupling analysis in the UK in terms of compensation and
labour productivity per worker, and weekly earnings. As a measure of labour productivity
we use GDP divided by the total number of employed individuals (including self-employed).
Once more, the analysis here is robust to the hypothesis that employees and self-employed
earn on average the same amount. Focusing on the net decoupling, i.e., the difference
between labour compensation and labour productivity, Figure 4.8 is a lot like Figure 4.6,
with the excepetion that LFS figures seem a bit overstaded when compared to the ONS
ones.
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Figure 4.8: Weekly/Annual Decoupling in the UK
Sources: GHS/LFS, OECD, HM Treasury and ONS. “Workers” includes both Employees and Self-Employed.
4.3.6 Summary on UK Decoupling
The data tell a pretty straightforward story. Over the 1972 to 2010 period compensation
and productivity grew as the same rate – a factor of 2.14 compared to 1972. There was
no net decoupling as economists would generally think of it. Although the series diverge
over some periods, the consistency is striking, no matter how these are measured (in hours
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compared to weeks; in value added or GDP).
On the other hand a large wedge did open up between the growth of median wages and
productivity (gross decoupling). The main reason for this is (i) the growth of inequality
which causes the mean compensation to grow faster than the median and (ii) the faster
growth of compensation (which includes non-pay benefits like pensions and healthcare)
compared to wages. The first reason is expected given the extensive empirical literature
about the subject, the second is more surprising. Van Reenen (2011) shows how the
inequality is evolving in the UK. Inequality is rising since the early eighties, but the
“lower tail” inequality (comparing the 50th percentile gains with the 10th percentile ones)
stabilised in the 2000s while the upper tail inequality (comparing the 90th percentile gains
with the 50th percentile ones) continued to grow during this period. These facts support
the findings of this section, showing that the mean-median inequality has risen since the
eighties with significant increases both in the nineties and in the last decade.
4.4 Macro Analysis of Decoupling in the US
4.4.1 Data Sources in the US
As in the UK case, we use more than one data source to compute workers’ wages and
compensation. The first database is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) who
has information on wages and compensation in order to compute the National Income and
Products Account (NIPA) tables. This is the equivalent of our ONS measures.
The second database is the Current Population Survey (CPS) March supplement,
which is the US equivalent of the LFS survey. It is a survey conducted by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the Census Bureau of about 50,000 households per annum
representing the civilian non-institutional population. It includes individuals of 16 years
and older. Even though the earning computed in this survey does not include some
types of compensation included in the NIPA tables, it permits us to analyse self-employed
earnings and the median earnings of workers and employees. We also collected information
on employment and hours worked from the BLS and the OECD.
As with the UK we obtain measures of labour productivity from the NIPA and OECD
and focus on GDP (although we also compare with GVA).
4.4.2 Trends in Compensation and Wages in the US
Figure 4.9 plots the growth over time for some annual wage and compensation series and
Figure 4.10 does the same for their hourly equivalents. Only the “CPS Workers” series
include self-employment. We can observe that the NIPA annual wages are growing slower
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than the CPS annual employees earnings. In hourly terms, however, the two wage series
seem to track each other fairly well.
In contrast with the UK, the self-employed earnings appear to be growing faster than
employees in both in hourly and annual terms. We also observe a lot of noise in the
CPS hourly earnings series that includes the self-employed. Note that, as in the UK,
compensation is growing faster than the wage series in general.
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Figure 4.9: Real Mean Annual Earnings in the US
Sources: BEA, OECD and CPS Survey. “Workers” includes both Employees and Self-Employed.
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Figure 4.10: Real Mean Hourly Earnings in the US
Sources: BEA, OECD and CPS Survey. “Workers” includes both Employees and Self-Employed.
4.4.3 Labour Productivity Trends in the US
Figure 4.11 plots out productivity measured in per hour terms and per worker terms. As
with the UK the hourly-based measure has grown faster than the per worker measure,
which again reflects falls in average hours worked (although this is less marked in the US
than in the UK). GDP per hour has risen by a factor of 1.84 since 1972, less than the
UK’s productivity growth. This reflects some catch-up growth of the UK with the US
(although UK productivity levels remain well below those of the US even by the end of
the sample).
We can see in Figure 4.11 that GDP per Hour and GVA per hour have a similar
growth, apart from some minor divergence that starts in the late eighties and ends in the
late nineties. As in the UK case, the correlation between GVA and GDP is extremely high
(approximately 0.99)
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Figure 4.11: Labour Productivity in the US
Sources: BEA and OECD.
4.4.4 Decoupling between Hourly Productivity and Compensation in
the US
The measures we use are analogous to the ones used in the previous section. In Figure 4.12
labour productivity is measured as GDP per hour and we use hourly compensation. Both
are deflated by the GDP deflator. There is some evidence of net decoupling throughout
the period especially during cyclical upswings (as in the UK). Unlike the UK, however, the
faster growth of productivity during the 2000s has not been fully reversed by the Great
Recession.
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Figure 4.12: Hourly Net Decoupling in the US
Sources: BEA and OECD.
In Figure 4.13 we add five other wage series: NIPA mean wages, CPS mean employees’
wages (deflated both by the GDP deflator and by the CPI-U-RS), CPS median wages
(deflated by the CPI-U-RS) and CPS median workers’ wages (deflated by the CPI-U-RS).
It is clear that gross decoupling is much more dramatic in the US than in the UK. The
gap between productivity and median wages is about 63% compared to only 42% in the
UK over the 1972-2010 period as a whole8.
8 Similar to the UK analysis, our CPS compensation measure is constructed assuming that the growth
in benefits is proportional to the one observed in the NIPA series, i.e., we multiply the CPS earnings by a
factor equals to the ratio of NIPA compensation to NIPA wages. This approach is similar to the one used
in Mishel and Gee (2012).
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Figure 4.13: Hourly Decoupling in the US
Sources: BEA, OECD, CPS Survey and BLS. “Workers” includes both Employees and Self-Employed.
Looking at the cumulative change as indicated by where the lines finish, it is clear
that the net decoupling in Figure 4.13 is pretty small compared to the overall change:
only 13.3 percentage points relative to the 63% change. Just as with the UK, “benefits”
(the difference between compensation and wages) and “inequality” (the difference between
mean and median wages) are large components of the difference. Unlike the UK, however,
the difference between the CPI-U-RS and GDP deflator also accounts for a substantial
chunk of the difference.
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Figure 4.14 decomposes the decoupling. It compares the contribution of each of the
components listed to the difference between the labour productivity measure and CPS
workers’ median hourly earnings (deflated by the CPI-U-RS). Looking at 2010, the second
largest component of gross decoupling is the divergence between the two measures of
inflation (13.7%). Since this is puzzling and different from the UK we will discuss this
explicitly in the next subsection. The first and the third components are inequality and
benefits accounting for 20.5% and 12.7%, respectively. This is similar to the UK. The
benefit which matters most in the US is health insurance which is generally provided by
the employer. There has been substantial cost inflation for health insurance which is a
major part of why compensation has risen faster than wages. Net decoupling is more
important in the US than in the UK as already mentioned. There is a larger discrepancy
between NIPA wages and CPS wages than their equivalents in the UK, contributing to
4.6%. Finally, unlike the UK, the self-employed have had faster income growth which
reduces the decoupling.
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Figure 4.14: Decoupling Decomposition in the US
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4.4.5 Deflator Discrepancies
In our main analysis in this section we consider the CPI for all urban consumers – research
series (or CPI-U-RS). We prefer to use the CPI-U-RS because it incorporates most of the
improvements made to the CPI over the last 33 years, i.e., the CPI-U-RS is measured
consistently over the entire period while the CPI is not (the CPI historical series would
not be adjusted for modifications made from today onwards, for example). Unfortunately,
the CPI-U-RS is available only from 1977. So, in our main analysis we actually considered
a composition of the CPI and the CPI-URS: we used the former series for the period
1972-1976 and the latter for the post 1976 years.
We also take into account different price deflators in our US analysis as it appears
that, in contrast with the UK, different price deflators play an important role here. There
are two alternatives to the CPI-U-RS - the non-consistent CPI for all urban consumers
(or CPI) series and the Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) deflator series.
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Figure 4.15: GDP Deflator, PCE Deflator and CPI over Time in the US
Sources: BEA and BLS.
In Appendix 4.E we show that using the non-consistent CPI and considering the 1977-
2010 period, the gross decoupling is 14 percentage points higher when compared to the
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one obtained using the CPI-U-RS. In other words gross decoupling after 1977 was 57.2%
using the CPI whereas it was only 43.2% using the CPI-U-RS. The difference is simply
because the CPI-U-RS has not risen as fast as the CPI and is therefore closer to the
GDP deflator (net decoupling was equal to 9.8% and is unchanged of course as this is
in terms of the GDP deflator). In terms of a decomposition analogous to the one seen
in Figure 4.14, looking at the 1977-2010 period the breakdown of gross decoupling using
the CPI was 9.8% due to inequality, 27.5% due to difference in deflators, 7.3% due to the
difference in mean compensation vs. mean wages, 3.7% due to the NIPA-CPS divergence
and self-employment contributed with -1%
We also show in Appendix 4.E that gross decoupling falls when we consider the PCE
deflator during the 1977-2010 period (37.8%). In terms of gross decoupling decomposition,
now only 6.5% of the gross decoupling is explained by differences in deflators. The part
explained by inequality is 11.5% and the other components do not change relative to the
values obtained using the CPI described in the previous paragraph.
It is not completely clear which deflator is best to use. Because we want to look over
as long a period in the US as possible to compare with the UK (where we can do this for
all years after 1972) we have used a mixed CPI/CPI-U-RS index in the main part of this
section, since for the period after 1977 the CPI-U-RS does include many improvements
relative to the CPI.
Explaining the differences between deflators
As we mentioned previously, the CPI and the CPI-U-RS differ because the latter series
is measured consistently over time, incorporating modifications made to the CPI since the
late seventies. An example of a methodological difference between the two series is the
treatment given to homeowner cost. In 1983 the homeownership component of the CPI
was changed from the cost of purchase of a home to a “rental equivalence” approach. The
CPI-U-RS incorporates this modification for the pre 1983 years, while the CPI does not.
Several modifications like this9 since 1978 led to significant divergence between the two
series, with the CPI rising faster than the CPI-U-RS.
The difference between the CPI and the GDP deflator is more complex. Figure 4.15
below plots the GDP deflator, Personal Consumption Expenditure10 (PCE) deflator and
the Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers (CPI). We can observe that the CPI
increases steeply after the late seventies, diverging significantly from the two other series
9 For a complete list of the improvements to the CPI between 1978 and 1998 see Stewart and Reed
(1999).
10 Personal consumption expenditures (PCE) measures the goods and services purchased by households
and by non-profit institutions serving households who are resident in the United States. The implicit PCE
deflator is calculated in a similar way to the implicit GDP deflator.
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after this same period. This faster growth of the CPI compared to the GDP deflator is
also common to other countries – see Figure 4.36 in Appendix 4.E.
There are several papers that try to explain the differences between the three deflators
seen below11. Here we summarise the possible channels of divergence and indicate which
of them might be responsible for such a gap. To understand the difference between the
CPI and the GDP deflator we decompose our analysis in two steps. First we explain
potential differences between the GDP deflator and the PCE deflator, and then mention
the reasons behind the PCE deflator and the CPI differences.
Consumer expenditure and GDP are obviously not exactly equal, but they are similar,
with the former accounting for two thirds of the latter. The PCE and the GDP differ
because of the composition of the aggregate purchases by consumers relative to the com-
position of the total GDP. An important source of potential differences between the two
measures is that the PCE includes imported goods, while the GDP deflator includes only
domestic production. Apparently, the greater weight given to energy in the PCE associ-
ated with increased costs of this product since the mid-seventies, account for a significant
part of the divergence between the two deflators.
The difference between the CPI and the PCE deflator comes from four main potential
sources12. First, they have different formulae. The CPI is based on a modified Laspeyres
formula, while the PCE is based on a Fisher-Ideal formula (which is a geometric average
of the Laspeyres and Paasche price relatives). The major practical difference between the
two formulas is the substitution among items as the relative price of those items change.
Consumers tend to substitute away from products that are increasing in prices, and the
Fisher price index better reflects this type of changes.
A second source of divergence is the relative weights assigned to comparable items
in the two indexes. The weights are different because they are not based on the same
data source. For example, Bosworth (2010) points out that the CPI final weight on
housing is considerably higher than that of the PCE deflator. Additionally, he highlights
that different weights to housing and energy, whose prices have risen faster than average,
account for a significant part of the divergence observed in the last decade.
Third, there are differences in the scope of the two measures. A significant example
regards medical care. The CPI includes only medical expenses actually paid by individuals.
On the other hand, the PCE includes medical expenses paid by third parties (public and
private insurers) on behalf of individuals.
A final potential source of divergence regards different methodologies for computing
11 See Triplett (1981); Fixler and Jaditz (2002); McCully et al. (2007); Bosworth (2010).
12 There are other sources not mentioned here – for example, seasonal adjustment.
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price changes, especially for owner-occupied housing. Triplett (1981) finds that different
approaches for estimating owners’ equivalent rent accounts for approximately 65% of the
cumulative difference between the CPI and the PCE deflator from 1972 until 1980 (the
weighting effect is also responsible for a significant 30% chunk).
In sum, the many potential sources of divergence (formula, weight, scope and price
changes) between the CPI and the PCE deflator makes it difficult to elect a main respon-
sible for the pattern observed in Figure 4.15. Fixler and Jaditz (2002) reach a similar
conclusion in a more detailed analysis considering a five year period in the mid-nineties
(1992-97). They attribute most part of the difference between the PCE deflator and the
CPI to formula and price change effects, but highlight that “. . . there is no “smoking
gun” that accounts for the entire discrepancy between the two indexes.”
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Figure 4.16: GDP Deflator and RPI over Time in the UK
Sources: ONS and HM Treasury.
UK Deflators
For the sake of comparison we also put in the UK numbers since 1955. There is no CPI
equivalent inflation measure available in the UK before 1988, but we show in Appendix
4.E that the CPI grew at slower rate compared to the above two deflators in the period
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available for analysis. Hence, we plot the Retail Price Index (RPI) against the GDP
deflator. Figure 4.16 shows that the two inflation measures are not exactly equal, but the
divergence between them is trivial.
4.4.6 Annual Measures of Productivity and Wages in the US
In contrast to the UK case, with the US data it is possible to compute all measures in
annual (or per worker) terms so we present these in Figure 4.17. Labour productivity
is measured as GDP per worker. The decoupling characteristics are relatively similar to
the ones presented earlier, but we can observe that the CPS measures are growing faster
relatively to the NIPA ones.
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Figure 4.17: Annual Decoupling in the US
Sources: BEA, OECD, CPS Survey and BLS. “Workers” includes both Employees and Self-Employed.
4.4.7 Summary on US Decoupling
The policy debate on decoupling started in the US. However, like the UK the headline
numbers that focus on gross decoupling: the difference between median workers’ wages
deflated by the CPI and productivity deflated by the GDP deflator. This gross decou-
Chapter 4 166
pling appears to be 1.5 times the size of that in the UK (approximately 63% vs. 42%).
However, only about 13% is due to net decoupling: the difference between compensation
and labour productivity using common deflators. Much of gross decoupling in the US is
driven by increases in inequality and the growing wedge between compensation (which
includes employer provided health and pension benefits) and wages (which do not). These
account for approximately 33% of the gross decoupling. Unlike the UK, however, the
wedge between the CPI-U-RS and GDP price deflator accounts for a great part of gross
decoupling, approximately 12.7%, a phenomenon that requires deeper investigation. Part
of this seems to be due to discrepancies in the measures of consumer price inflation used.
If we use the PCE deflator then the contribution of deflator differences falls from 12.7% to
5.7%. On the other hand, If we use the non-consistent version of the CPI the contribution
of deflator differences rises to 26.8%.So differences in deflators can account for between
5.7% to 26.8% of the difference between net and gross decoupling in the US – quite a large
range13. Given the problems of comparability of the CPI over time we would tend to guess
that the deflator difference is more towards the bottom of this range and therefore the US
looks more like the UK.
4.5 Trends in the Labour Share of Income: Evidence from
the UK, US and other OECD Countries
Theory predicts that labour productivity should follow average wages (or average compen-
sation) in a given economy. If this is not happening, i.e., if labour productivity is actually
decoupling from average compensation, than we should observe a fall in labour income
share over time. In this section we investigate if there is any indication of decoupling in
some of the major economies of the world by analysing labour income shares.
The OECD computes the labour income share as total labour costs divided by the
GVA of the economy, where labour costs include wages, allowances, bonuses, payments in
kind, benefits paid by the employer, costs associated with training of the workers, taxes
regarded as labour costs, and other labour associated costs. So unlike compensation,
payroll taxes (like employer NI in the UK) and training costs are also factored in.
Here we assume that employees and self-employed earn the same on average (in hourly
terms). Hence, before computing the labour share we multiply compensation by a factor
equals to the total hours worked in the economy divided by hours worked only by employees
13Baker (2007) also finds that inequality and inflation are important in explaining differences between
wage growth and productivity growth. He claims that the slow growth in productivity after 1973 (when
compared to the post war period growth) is one of the main causes behind the slow wage growth, i.e., he is
implicitly assuming that net decoupling should be always zero (that compensation growth should always
reflect productivity growth).
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(excluding self-employed)14. The OECD measure considers a similar approximation.
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Figure 4.18: Labour Income Share in the UK
Sources: ONS, OECD, and KLEMS. All Measures Adjusted for Self-Employment.
We begin by using compensation. Figure 4.18 plots the UK share of compensation
in GDP and Figure 4.19 does the same for the US. Unsurprisingly (since there is an
identity between them) these figures show the same information as the compensation and
productivity trends. The labour share in the UK in 2010 is essentially identical to that
in 1972 at just under two thirds of GDP, although it did fall during the long-boom after
1993. The US share is also around 65% of GDP, although as noted above, the fall in the
labour share in the 2000s was not reversed in the Great Recession.
14 In Appendix 4.F we plot the labour shares for the UK and for the US dropping the self-employed (i.e.
assuming they have a wage of zero). This is obviously the wrong thing to do because it is assuming that
the self-employed have a zero wage and all their return should be counted as capital (since large numbers
of the measured self-employed work as builder on construction sites this is obviously misleading). Since
the proportion of self-employed is increasing, this artificially makes it appear as if labour’s share is falling.
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Figure 4.19: Labour Income Share in the US
Sources: BEA and OECD. All Measures Adjusted for Self-Employment.
Figure 4.20 and Figure 4.21 show again the compensation share compared with the
wider concept of the labour share in the UK and US. Obviously, since the labour cost
share includes more items than compensation (like payroll taxes and training costs) it
takes up a larger share of GVA (which is also smaller than the GDP), the difference is
not great (e.g. about 70% of GDP rather than 65% for the UK) and the trends are near
identical.
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Figure 4.20: Labour Income Share over Time in the UK
Sources: OECD, ONS, and KLEMS. All Measures Adjusted for Self-Employment.
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Figure 4.21: Labour Income Share over Time in the US
Sources: OECD and BEA. All Measures Adjusted for Self-Employment.
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Figure 4.22 and Figure 4.23 show the labour share for a number of other OECD
countries. What is striking is that many of these countries have seen substantial falls in
labour’s share of income, so therefore substantial net decoupling. The German share fell
from about 75% in 1975 to 65% in 2006, Japan from 73% in 1975 to 57% in 2006 and
France from 80% in 1975 to 67% by the end of the period. Italy saw a fall in labour’s
share from 80% in 1970 to 67% by 2006. This net decoupling is vastly greater than the
changes that have been seen in the US and UK and suggests workers have fared badly in
the Continental EU countries and Japan which are usually regarded as being much more
worker-friendly. This is not news, of course. The decline of the labour share especially
in the Continental EU countries is the source of a considerable (and unsettled) literature
(e.g., Azmat et al., 2011; Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003). Globalisation, decline of worker
bargaining power and privatisation have all been seen as possible (multiple) culprits. What
is less widely realised is that the UK and US have been relatively immune to these negative
trends against the labouring classes as a whole.
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Figure 4.22: Labour Income Share over Time in Australia, France and Italy
Source: OECD. All Measures Adjusted for Self-Employment.
Chapter 4 172
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
La
b
o
u
r 
In
co
m
e
 S
h
ar
e
Year
Canada Germany Japan
Figure 4.23: Labour Income Share over Time in Canada, Germany and Japan
Source: OECD. All Measures Adjusted for Self-Employment.
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4.6 Industry- Level Analysis of Decoupling in the UK
We examined some disaggregation of the trends by industry. Of course, there is no reason
to expect that compensation growth should match productivity growth at the industry
(or firm) level. In the standard economic model workers’ wages will depend on aggregate
demand and supply, not the productivity of a specific firm or sector. Of course, when
there is imperfect competition a positive shock to an industry’s (or firm’s) productivity
might increase wages. But one might expect this to be only a short-run effect.
4.6.1 Data
For the “micro” analysis we use the EU KLEMS database. This is the best available
internationally comparable database on productivity measures at the industry level. In
the UK, the data is available from 1970 to 2007, but we start our analysis from 1972 in
order to keep some consistency with the analysis made previously.
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Figure 4.24: Hourly Net Decoupling in the UK considering GVA
Source: KLEMS.
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4.6.2 Overall Trends
We begin by taking another look at net decoupling using only KLEMS data in Figure 4.24.
There is even less net decoupling here than in the ONS data with compensation growth
slightly ahead of productivity growth through much of the period and almost exactly equal
in 2007. The reason (as noted above) is that KLEMs used gross value added which has
grown slightly more slowly than GDP.
4.6.3 Changes in the Shares of Sectors
The KLEMS data permits us to separate the economy into two different levels of disaggre-
gation. In a first level, we separate the economy into a Market and a Non-Market Services
sectors. The latter includes public services like administration, education, health, and de-
fence; it also includes private education, health and social work, and real estate activities.
These are sectors where value added is hard to measure and dominated by public sector
services.
The Market sector comprises the rest of the private economy. We separate the Market
sector into the following industries:
1. Electrical Machinery, Post and Communication Services – This classification includes
electrical and optical equipment, and post and telecommunication services.
2. Goods Producing (excluding electrical machinery) – Includes manufacturing, agri-
culture, mining, construction, and supply of electricity, gas, and water.
3. Distribution Services - This is associated to retail and wholesale trade, transport,
and storage.
4. Financial and Business Services (except real estate) – comprises financial interme-
diation, renting of mergers and acquisitions, and other business activities.
5. Personal Services – Composed by services like hotels and restaurants, private house-
holds with employed persons, and other community, social, and personal services.
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Figure 4.25 splits GVA into market and non-market and shows that the non-market
sector has increased from 18.3, to 26.4%, much of this is driven by increases in health and
real estate.
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Figure 4.25: GVA Decomposition between Market and Non-Market Economies in the UK
Source: KLEMS.
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Looking within the market economy in Figure 4.26, we see that the Financial and
Business Services grew considerably along time, going from approximately 11% of the
Market economy GVA, to 31% in 2007. In contrast, the Goods Producing sector fell from
55% to 31% during the same period. The Personal Services also increased significantly,
changing from 6% to 11% with stability in the other two sectors.
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Source: KLEMS.
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4.6.4 Changes within Sectors
Figure 4.27 shows that compensation grew more slowly than productivity in the non-
Market services whereas the reverse was true in the market economy. We may doubt
the accuracy of value added measures in the non-market sector, but what is remarkable is
that in the better-measured market economy there is no sign of decoupling at all – workers
compensation appears to outstrip productivity growth
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Figure 4.27: Hourly Net Decoupling in the UK considering GVA for Market and Non-
Market Economies
Source: KLEMS. All Measures Adjusted for Self-Employment.
Disaggregating the Market economy, Figure 4.28 below shows that labour productivity
tracks labour compensation reasonably well in the Goods Producing and in the Electrical
Machinery sectors. The same is true for Distribution. In Finance, however, there is some
“negative decoupling” in the sense that compensation appears to grow faster than produc-
tivity. Personal services (Figure 4.30) are the most extreme example where compensation
appears to have grown much faster than productivity. Again, this may be due to mea-
surement issues, although it is worth remembering that this is an important component
of total GVA by the end of the sample.
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Source: KLEMS.
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Figure 4.30: Hourly Net Decoupling per Sector in the UK considering the GVA; Personal
Services
Source: KLEMS.
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4.6.5 Summary on industry-specific analysis
Using industry data to obtain a more disaggregated view of decoupling does not give a
very clear picture. Overall, using value added per hour as our productivity measure there
is no aggregate net decoupling in the UK over the 1972-2007 period, so in one sense there
is not much “to explain” when we disaggregate by sector. The only major decoupling
we find is in the non-market economy which is dominated by the public sector. In the
market economy, compensation appears to have generally growth faster than productivity,
especially in personal services and (to a lesser extent) in finance.
It is perhaps unsurprising that there should be less of a clear picture at the industry
level than at the national level as noted in the introduction to this section. There is
certainly no sign of net decoupling.
4.7 Research and Policy Implications
4.7.1 Research Implications
The decoupling literature has been more popular in policy circles than in academic re-
search. Perhaps this is because some economists are blinkered and find it hard to un-
derstand how net decoupling could be a long-term phenomenon when labour’s share of
GDP has not changed so much (at least in the US and UK). In fact, we have found that
there is not much evidence for net decoupling in the UK or US, so an investigation of the
functional distribution of income is unlikely to excite much analysis.
There have been some interesting new puzzles thrown up by our analysis:
1. Why has compensation grown so much faster than wages in the UK and the US?
2. Why in the US have the CPI and GDP deflators diverged so much, whereas they
(RPI and CPI) have not in the UK?
3. Why has there been net decoupling in Continental European countries and Japan
(but not the UK and US)?
4. ....And the same old question of what has caused the massive increase in inequality
between workers?
4.7.2 Policy Implications
If (net) decoupling were a major fact in the UK (or US) it would lead to a concern that the
shares of economic growth are not going to workers. This may not matter if shares were
evenly distributed, but that is not the case. Assets are distributed even more unequally
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than wages. However, we have seen that there is not much, if any, net decoupling in the
UK.
The fact that we see gross decoupling raises some issues, but of a different sort:
1. The fact that compensation has followed productivity growth over the long run high-
lights the importance of a growth policy to boost productivity. Reforms supporting
productivity will lead to higher compensation which is good for workers (Corry et al.,
2011).
2. What can be done about the increase in inequality between workers as indicated by
the growing divergence between the mean and the median wage? This is the classic
policy issue that has been discussed by economists for the last three decades when
the rise in wage inequality first started to be properly documented, showing that
inequality is rising since the eighties in the UK with significant increases along the
past two decades (although the “lower tail” inequality seems to have stabilised in
the 2000s – see Van Reenen, 2011). Dealing with wage (or compensation) inequality
is fundamentally about dealing with inequality in the acquisition of human capi-
tal. There is a major need in the US and UK to improve education and skills for
those in the lower half of the distribution and in the long-term this has to be done
through public school (and early years) reform and the school to work transition
(e.g. apprenticeships).
3. Is the increasing divergence between wages and compensation a problem? Since this
is driven by pensions in the UK, this is an issue of whether the wedge is sufficiently
large (See the Turner Report). There is evidence that people are not saving enough
for retirement and that the current pension regime is unsustainable without signif-
icant changes to the generosity of pensions (such as the raising of the retirement
age).
4. In the US, a major issue is the cost of healthcare which is outstripping wage inflation
by a considerable degree. The issue here is whether the new healthcare act will be
sufficient to tackle this problem. At the moment, the Act does not look like it has
sufficient cost control elements in it even though it extends entitlements.
4.8 Conclusion
This paper seeks to shed some light on a confused debate around decoupling. We have
focused on the following question: has the growth of workers’ compensation and wages
fallen behind the growth of labour productivity in the UK? We start with the growth
Chapter 4 183
of GDP per hour (deflated by the GDP deflator) and compare this to (i) the growth of
median wages per hour deflated by the CPI (net decoupling) and (ii) the growth of mean
compensation per hour (deflated by the GDP deflator).
We find no evidence of net decoupling in the UK over the 1972-2010 period as a whole.
There is some evidence of net decoupling in the US of the order of 13% (i.e. productivity
grew by 13% more than compensation since 1972), but it is small compared to gross
decoupling (about 63%) . This means that workers’ compensation and productivity growth
have tracked each other fairly well since the seventies in both countries. This is consistent
with generally used, simple economic models.
The reason for the confusion in some policy circles is that there certainly has been
some “gross decoupling”, i.e. median workers’ wages (deflated by consumer prices) have
been growing more slowly that GDP per hour (deflated by the GDP deflator). In the UK
this gross decoupling is 42% and in the US this was 63% (although this falls or rises if
different consumer deflators are used such as the PCE deflator or the non-consistent CPI).
In the UK the difference between gross and net decoupling is because of increased inequal-
ity (mean wages have grown much faster than median wage) and because compensation
(which includes non-wage benefits like employer pension contribution) has grown faster
than wages. In the US these two factors are also important (health premiums are another
big driver of the wedge between wages and compensation) but so is a third: an increased
divergence between the consumer and producer price index (this deflator difference can
account for between 6 and 27 percentage points of gross decoupling). We introduce a
decomposition method to clarify where these differences between gross and net decoupling
comes from.
Our conclusion is that the debate around net decoupling in the UK and US is rather a
distraction (it is actually more important in Continental Europe and Japan). Obtaining
faster productivity growth is a highly desirable policy goal in the current climate of near
recession as it will ultimately lead to faster wage growth and consumption. On the other
hand, the clear presence of gross decoupling shows that the real issues are inequality within
the class of workers, not between workers and firm profits and the challenge of health and
retirement benefits.
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Appendix
4.A Decoupling Theory
Consider a firm who maximises profits
Π = PQ− cL− rK.
Where P is producer prices, Q is output, c is worker compensation (wages plus employer
costs), L is labour, r is the cost of capital and K is capital. Assume also that the firm
faces a Cobb-Douglas production function (this can be relaxed).
Q = ALαK1−α.
Where A is an efficiency parameter. We can allow for imperfect competition in the
product market so the firm can have market power by letting the demand curve facing
the firm be downward sloping with elasticity η. This implies that the firm will potentially
enjoy a mark-up, µ, which will be falling in the elasticity of demand (perfect competition
is when the demand elasticity facing the firm is infinite).
The firm will choose a level of employment by maximising profits given the techno-
logical constrains and factor prices it faces. This leads to a first order condition for the
demand for labour that can be written as:
c
P
=
αµQ
L
.
Or in logarithmic differences (i.e. a growth rate approximation):
∆ln(c/P ) = ∆ln(Q/L) + ∆ln(α) + ∆ln(µ).
This equation shows the basic forces at work. If the factor bias of technology and
consumer preferences does not change (i.e. ∆ln(α) = ∆ln(µ) = 0 ), then the growth
of compensation deflated by product prices (∆ln(c/P )) should equal the growth of real
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productivity (∆ln(Q/L)).
We define Net Decoupling as:
ND ≡ ∆ln(Q/L)−∆ln(c/P ).
Of course, technology and preferences may change in a way that is unfavourable to
workers. For example, if firm mark-ups increase because (for example) consumers become
less sensitive to price increases then ∆ln(µ) > 0 and there will be some net decoupling.
Behind much of the analysis is the view that firms are enjoying more market power and
this is allowing them to gain “excess profits”.
Gross decoupling is what is usually analysed in the policy literature. It can be
defined as
GD ≡ ∆ln(Q/L)−∆ln(Medw/CPI).
Where Medw is the MEDIAN wage rather than the AVERAGE compensation. CPI
is the consumer (rather than producer) price index. There is no theoretical reason to
expect the two measures to be the same. In particular there is no reason why we would
think GD should be constant over time. A simple way to see the difference is to write:
GD−ND = (∆ln(c)−∆ln(Medc))+(∆ln(Medc)−∆ln(Medw))+(∆ln(CPI)−∆ln(P ))
or
GD −ND = Inequality +Wage wedge+ Price wedge.
The first term (inequality) is the difference between the average compensation and the
median one, the second term (“wage wedge”) is the difference between compensation and
wages and the third term is the difference between the consumer price index and the GDP
deflator.
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4.B Data Sources
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4.C Net Decoupling in Terms of Gross Value Added (GVA)
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Figure 4.31: Labour Productivity and Labour Compensation per Hour Growth over Time
in the UK
Sources: ONS and OECD and KLEMS.
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Figure 4.32: Labour Productivity and Labour Compensation per Hour Growth over Time
in the US
Sources: BEA and OECD.
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4.D Decoupling Decomposition Tables
Table 4.3: Decoupling Decomposition in the UK
Year Net ONS - Inequality Benefits Deflators Self- Gross
Decoupling LFS Divergence Employment Decoupling
1975 -9.85% -0.30% -2.76% 2.88% 0.17% 0.76% -9.10%
1980 -2.09% -5.08% -2.97% 4.99% -2.68% 1.52% -6.31%
1985 2.98% -11.83% 1.49% 5.59% -0.75% 3.21% 0.69%
1990 -3.84% -10.39% 4.82% 4.25% -1.36% 2.04% -4.49%
1995 3.44% -3.45% 11.11% 4.94% -1.73% 3.67% 17.98%
2000 4.70% 3.07% 11.65% 5.74% 0.51% 3.03% 28.71%
2005 6.96% -4.73% 12.16% 12.38% -0.57% 2.85% 29.04%
2007 8.10% -1.75% 14.37% 11.79% 1.94% 6.19% 40.64%
2010 -0.81% 2.20% 16.57% 15.95% 3.12% 5.47% 42.51%
Table 4.4: Decoupling Decomposition in the US
Year Net ONS - Inequality Benefits Deflators Self- Gross
Decoupling LFS Divergence Employment Decoupling
1975 -9.85% -0.30% -2.76% 2.88% 0.17% 0.76% -9.10%
1980 -2.09% -5.08% -2.97% 4.99% -2.68% 1.52% -6.31%
1985 2.98% -11.83% 1.49% 5.59% -0.75% 3.21% 0.69%
1990 -3.84% -10.39% 4.82% 4.25% -1.36% 2.04% -4.49%
1995 3.44% -3.45% 11.11% 4.94% -1.73% 3.67% 17.98%
2000 4.70% 3.07% 11.65% 5.74% 0.51% 3.03% 28.71%
2005 6.96% -4.73% 12.16% 12.38% -0.57% 2.85% 29.04%
2007 8.10% -1.75% 14.37% 11.79% 1.94% 6.19% 40.64%
2010 -0.81% 2.20% 16.57% 15.95% 3.12% 5.47% 42.51%
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4.E Inflation
 
Figure 4.33: Hourly Decoupling in the US after 1977 considering the PCE Deflator
Sources: BEA, OECD, CPS Survey and BLS. “Workers” includes both Employees and Self-Employed.
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Figure 4.34: Hourly Decoupling in the US after 1977 considering the CPI-U-RS
Sources: BEA, OECD, CPS Survey and BLS. “Workers” includes both Employees and Self-Employed.
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Figure 4.35: Hourly Decoupling in the US after 1977 considering the CPI
Sources: BEA, OECD, CPS Survey and BLS. “Workers” includes both Employees and Self-Employed.
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Figure 4.36: Difference between the CPI growth and the GDP Deflator growth for some
OECD countries
Source: OECD.
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Figure 4.37: CPI, GDP Deflator and RPI over Time in the UK
Sources: ONS and HM Treasury.
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4.F Labour Income Shares
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Figure 4.38: Labour Income Share in the UK
ONS, OECD, and KLEMS. No adjustment for Self-Employment.
Chapter 4 197
0.5
0.52
0.54
0.56
0.58
0.6
0.62
0.64
1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
La
b
o
u
r 
In
co
m
e
 S
h
ar
e
Year
Labour Compensation/GDP 1972 Labour Share
Figure 4.39: Labour Income Share in the US
Sources: BEA and OECD. No adjustment for Self-Employment.
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